University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2012

Information Sharing Using a State Fusion Center: A Case Study of
the New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center
Carla Lewandowski
University of Pennsylvania, carlai@sas.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons

Recommended Citation
Lewandowski, Carla, "Information Sharing Using a State Fusion Center: A Case Study of the New Jersey
Regional Operations Intelligence Center" (2012). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 537.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/537

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/537
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Information Sharing Using a State Fusion Center: A Case Study of the New Jersey
Regional Operations Intelligence Center
Abstract
The aftereffects from September 11, 2001, demonstrated how much the United States lacked sufficiently
coordinated efforts for addressing--and even potentially preventing--this monumental tragedy. The 9/11
Commission reported that a failure of information-sharing among law-enforcement agencies was one of
the many reasons for the terrorist attack. Although goodwill existed between many of the agencies, they
were unable to completely assess the risk to the U.S. because information was not being shared. Fusion
centers were the answer; and 72 fusion centers exist today. These centers are a collaboration between
federal, state, local, and tribal authorities to improve information-gathering among public-safety entities,
so that analysis can be conducted and local law-enforcement agencies can act on the resulting
intelligence. Thus, the centers help local agencies become better-equipped to target crime by giving the
latter the necessary tools to adopt the new intelligence-led policing (ILP) model.
Although much of the fusion center and policing literature focuses on information-sharing as a tool for
intelligence-led policing, I hypothesize that focused intelligence will help promote the fusion center's goal
of information-sharing and persuade law enforcement to "buy in" to its benefits and ILP. This is necessary
for fusion centers to continue to operate because they need more information from the people who
interact with the public daily. However, the long history of secrecy that pervades the law enforcement
community is not easy to overcome.
This dissertation offers a case study of one fusion center, the New Jersey Regional Operations
Intelligence Center (ROIC), and its customers, the New Jersey municipal law enforcement community.
Ethnographic methods such as participant observation, surveys, and interviews were used to discover
how intelligence is disseminated and then shared within the state of New Jersey.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
Criminology

First Advisor
Melissa Wilde

Keywords
Dissemination, Fusion Center, Information-sharing, Intelligence, Intelligence-led policing, Policing

Subject Categories
Criminology | Criminology and Criminal Justice | Sociology

This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/537

INFORMATION SHARING USING A STATE FUSION CENTER:
A CASE STUDY OF THE NEW JERSEY
REGIONAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Carla Lewandowski
A DISSERTATION
in
Criminology
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2012
Supervisor of Dissertation
___________________________
Melissa Wilde, Associate Professor of Sociology

Graduate Group Chairperson
___________________________
Adrian Raine, Graduate Richard Perry University Professor, Departments of
Criminology, Psychiatry, and Psychology
Dissertation Committee:
William Laufer, Julian Aresty Professor; Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics,
Sociology, and Criminology
Larry M. Starr, Executive Director, Center for Organizational Dynamics; Director,
Organizational Dynamics Graduate Programs
!
!

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are many people to thank for helping me get to this point and I will try to
make sure that I get everyone in here. Earning my Ph.D. was quite a difficult task, but
many people around me pushed me to succeed and I know that my support network
earned some of this credit.
First, I would like to thank my family. My mother and father worked very hard to
give me the education they believed I needed to flourish. Both from Mexico, they truly
believed that education was the method by which people could earn a successful living.
Because of them, my three sisters and I are productive members of society who embody
hard work and resist old stereotypes of women.
Along with my parents, my sisters have played a very important role in my
development as a scholar. Though we sometimes fight as siblings do, I know that they
will always be by side defending or supporting me. Cristina, Clarisa and Claudia, thank
you for showing me what true friendship means.
This study would never have been possible without the support and acceptance of
the ROIC personnel. To Dan and Ray: I have no doubt that you guys had so much to do
with me having access to the ROIC. Thank you so much for believing in me and my
project. I think law enforcement would benefit so much from having more men like you
two.
Tom Nestel. There are no words to say how thankful I am to you. I don’t think I
will ever realize just how much you have helped me. I am only finally realizing it now.
These past 6 years would have been unbearable without you. You kept me smiling and
became one of my best friends. I continue to learn so much from you and truly believe
that you are one of the most amazing people in this world. If you can teach me how to
manage the 1 million things you do, I would be forever indebted to you, too!
I am also very thankful for the funding and support I have received from the
Critical Writing Department at Penn. The fellowship offered me a chance to continue my
work at Penn and I have no doubt that it helped me improve my writing as well. Thank
you Val, Patrick and Susanna for always helping me by offering me so many
opportunities to teach.
Of course, my dissertation would not be the academic work it is without the help
of my committee. I knew before I asked Melissa to be on my committee that she was
going to be tough. I was not disappointed and I am so happy that she was. Not only did I
get great feedback on my drafts, but I also gained a role model. Her ability to balance her
personal and professional lives was amazing to me and I hope to one day be able to do
the same. Thank you Larry for always responding to me and offering me thoughtful
feedback. I always enjoyed coming to you with my drafts because you always showed so
much excitement in my work! It was so refreshing. Finally, thank you Bill for pointing
me in the direction of the fusion center. I had no idea what it was and without your
helpful guidance, I would not have learned about this amazing collaboration.
Eleanor, though you came in late to the process, I also want to thank you. Your
helpful feedback and guidance were a godsend at this time of my life. I think I would
have probably passed out from stress if it had not been for you. Thank you for keeping
me calm in the last few weeks and being so attentive and detail-oriented.
!

""!

Finally, and most importantly, thank you to my partner in life, Brad. You make
me so happy every day. Unfortunately, you had to see me under incredible amounts of
pressure and you took it like a champ. I am going to take some of the credit for you
learning how to cook so well since I was unable to help around the house while I was
writing! I will forever be indebted to you for all of your support and I can’t wait to see
what the future holds for us.
!

!

"""!

ABSTRACT
INFORMATION SHARING USING A STATE FUSION CENTER:
A CASE STUDY OF THE NEW JERSEY
REGIONAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Carla Lewandowski

Melissa Wilde

The aftereffects from September 11, 2001, demonstrated how much the United
States lacked sufficiently coordinated efforts for addressing—and even potentially
preventing—this monumental tragedy. The 9/11 Commission reported that a failure of
information-sharing among law-enforcement agencies was one of the many reasons for
the terrorist attack. Although goodwill existed between many of the agencies, they were
unable to completely assess the risk to the U.S. because information was not being
shared. Fusion centers were the answer; and 72 fusion centers exist today. These centers
are a collaboration between federal, state, local, and tribal authorities to improve
information-gathering among public-safety entities, so that analysis can be conducted and
local law-enforcement agencies can act on the resulting intelligence. Thus, the centers
help local agencies become better-equipped to target crime by giving the latter the
necessary tools to adopt the new intelligence-led policing (ILP) model.
Although much of the fusion center and policing literature focuses on
information-sharing as a tool for intelligence-led policing, I hypothesize that focused
intelligence will help promote the fusion center’s goal of information-sharing and
!

"#!

persuade law enforcement to “buy in” to its benefits and ILP. This is necessary for fusion
centers to continue to operate because they need more information from the people who
interact with the public daily. However, the long history of secrecy that pervades the law
enforcement community is not easy to overcome.
This dissertation offers a case study of one fusion center, the New Jersey Regional
Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC), and its customers, the New Jersey municipal law
enforcement community. Ethnographic methods such as participant observation, surveys,
and interviews were used to discover how intelligence is disseminated and then shared
within the state of New Jersey.
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Introduction
Policing across all levels of government has changed dramatically since the attack
of September 11, 2001 (Carter & Carter, 2009b; Cooney, Rojek, & Kaminski, 2011). One
significant addition to law enforcement in the United States has been the creation of
fusion centers. These centers bring together federal, state, local, and tribal agencies in a
physical space where information can be shared and analyzed and where contextualized
information, now called intelligence, is disseminated to local law enforcement. While the
terms “information” and “intelligence” are often used interchangeably, this does not
apply within law enforcement. Information is raw data.1 Action is rarely taken based
simply on information. In contrast, under law-enforcement protocols, intelligence is
increasingly relied upon and expected to direct and lead operations. Intelligence is
created when context is provided. As Palmieri (2005) has noted, “corroboration must be
supplied; value must be added to this raw information. The major component of the
process that turns raw information into something useful is analysis; the product is
intelligence.”
Despite the existence of a fusion center in every state, due to security limitations,
very little research has been conducted on these centers, how they operate, or how
information is shared between members of different agencies. Fortunately, I was able to
gain access and observe the actions of the analysts and employees of the New Jersey
Regional Operations Intelligence Center (hereafter the ROIC), using participant
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Information “includes any data about people, organizations, events, incidents, or objects, regardless of the
medium in which it exists. Information received by law enforcement agencies can be categorized into four
general areas: general data, including investigative information; tips and leads data; suspicious activity
reports; and criminal intelligence information” (NJ ROIC, n.d., pp. 29-30).
!
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observation, surveys, and interviews to examine this center and the local lawenforcement agencies it serves.
First, I observed the ROIC employees to determine how information is shared at
the most general level and to understand how the information and intelligence are
disseminated. To study intelligence dissemination, I studied the Common Operating
Picture (COP). The daily COP is a bulletin which describes the threat environment for the
state of New Jersey. It is a descriptive bulletin sent out every 24 hours which contains
“little or no predictive or judgmental analysis” (Mackay & Ratcliffe, 2004, p. 148). I
then interviewed police officers across the state of New Jersey to determine the amount
of and degree to which and how much information local agencies share with each other
and with the fusion center.
I conclude that fusion centers work, but only to a certain point. Many local law
enforcement agencies are not sharing information with the ROIC. Whether they see merit
in the ROICs’ products is determined by the amount of contact law enforcement had with
the center on a day-to-day basis.
Fusion centers serve not only to disseminate intelligence, but also to help police
agencies across the country implement a model within their organizations called
intelligence-led policing (ILP) (GIWG, 2003). While this term has varied definitions,
Carter and Carter (2009b) define it as “the collection and analysis of information related
to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence
product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or
strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats” (p. 317). Information-sharing
is an important component of ILP and predicting future crimes. To implement this model,
2

the intelligence must be used to direct the actions of public safety personnel (Peterson,
2005, p. vii). !
It is vital that organizations share information. As Baker & Thomas (2010) point
out with respect to information that is unknown, “what one cannot observe and receive
feedback from acts as the principal deterrent to effective leadership and decision-making.
Enhanced communication allows leaders to observe by achieving a proper feedback loop
that includes police leaders, analysts, officers, and other customers” (p. 22). A robust
feedback loop is required to receive and analyze the most accurate information in order to
create an actionable intelligence product. A resulting product is intelligence that can be
acted upon by decision makers.
Current popular models of policing, on the other hand, include not only ILP, but
also problem-solving policing and community-oriented policing. While ILP is not a
complete paradigm shift from these models, which are used by the majority of police
agencies,2 it is essential in the modern era of policing to deal with the multijurisdictional
problems, such as information-sharing, that many police agencies face today. Fusion
centers help combat the problem of failed information-sharing and make ILP more
accessible at local levels of public safety.
A fusion center is defined as a “collaborative effort of two or more agencies that
provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing
their ability to detect, prevent, investigate and respond to criminal and terrorist activity”
(GIWG, 2005, p. 2). The essence of fusion “is the integration and analysis of existing
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2

While many police agencies are reactive, responding to 911 calls, some authors see many similarities
between ILP and Community and Problem-Oriented Policing (COP) (Carter & Carter, 2009b, McGarrell,
Freilich & Chermak, 2007).

3

streams of information and intelligence for actionable public policy ends—be they
counterterrorism, broader counter-crime issues, or natural disaster response” (Rollins,
2008, pp. 10-11). In principle, if the information is analyzed more purposefully, the
resulting end product will be a more targeted collection of new intelligence that could
potentially thwart the plans of sophisticated criminal groups.
Moreover, while fusion centers were created in response to the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, their scope has now expanded. Many centers are now “all-crimes” or “all
hazards” (Masse, O’Neil, & Rollins, 2007, p. 21), which means they seek information to
create intelligence on any and all crimes and dangers that presently or will have the
potential to affect public safety. Cooney et al. (2011) point to three different reasons for
this change. First, the fusion centers were created to prevent the types of communication
breaks that occurred on 9/11, when normal officer behavior could have produced
information that would have uncovered links to terrorism. Second, state and local law
enforcement agencies face additional threats to public safety. These agencies recognize
the need for intelligence-led policing in these areas as well. Finally, “adopting an ‘all
crimes’ approach was an important mechanism for gaining the support from fusion center
stakeholders” (Cooney et al., p. 5).3
Despite changing the focus to include “all crimes,” the decentralized lawenforcement model, of which the fusion center is a part, still makes serving the lawenforcement community very difficult. A fusion center does not answer to police
agencies; nor do the agencies answer to the center. Rather, a fusion center is an optional
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

This was also noted in Joyal’s (2010) recent qualitative study of four fusion centers. Interviews with
center participants revealed the need for “services and products that address their user’s needs and concerns
in a timely manner” (Joyal, p. 74). Joyal’s study will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3.
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resource for many local law-enforcement agencies. The center does, however, obtain
most of its funding from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As an entity of
the DHS, it is an organization (a subsystem) within the larger (containing) system of law
enforcement.
Therefore, when examining a fusion center as a complex organization, one must
first formulate an analysis of the current configuration, sometimes referred to as the
"mess" in organizational dynamics (Ackoff, 1981). This involves identifying the parts
(the different agencies and/or people represented at the fusion center) and examining how
they function on their own and in interaction with each other.
Understanding the workings of the fusion center may not reveal a solution to a
complex organizational system problem. Implementation of a satisfactory adjustment
commonly requires changes in the containing system of law enforcement within which
the center is only one subsystem. Nevertheless, an extensive descriptive analysis of the
center and its relationship with local police agencies is essential for beginning the process.
Question and Hypothesis
What follows is a portrait of one of the 72 fusion centers in the U.S., the most
tangible catalyst of ILP developed after 9/11. This study is unique because, until now,
researchers have never been permitted to spend much time observing fusion-center
personnel to see what really occurs. Rather, studies have described the fusion center
model and examined its general utility based on interviews or surveys (Ratcliffe &
Walden, 2010; Joyal, 2010; Cooney et al., 2011). Beginning with a micro-level analysis
of the ROIC and the flow of information and intelligence in New Jersey facilitates an
5

understanding of the elements that improve this process. Certainly, one forward-looking
result is the potential to classify the elements of good information-sharing for future
large-scale studies.
This dissertation seeks to add to the ILP literature by asking how this model can
inspire and elicit information-sharing. While collaboration or information-sharing is seen
as necessary for ILP, the literature does not elaborate on how, in fact, it can actively
encourage information-sharing. By examining the flow of intelligence within and
between the fusion center and local police agencies, this study will examine how fusion
centers convey the necessary information and intelligence to public-safety planners
(GIWG, 2003, p. v) and thus motivate police officers to share information with the fusion
center.
For ILP to be effective, information—and, when possible, intelligence—must be
collected from every possible source and not only be sent from the fusion center down to
the local levels but also be sent back to the center so the analysis may be more robust.
Therefore, if the ROIC is disseminating targeted intelligence that helps apprehend
criminals and solve crimes, agencies will be more motivated to share information with
the center and, by extension, with other police agencies. In turn, the center will be able to
share information of value to other agencies across the state. If, however, the ROIC is
disseminating information or intelligence that does not add value to daily police work,
then agencies will not see the importance of sending information to the center for the
purpose of sharing. Information–sharing, therefore, must first occur at the ROIC.
The first chapter explores the daily activities, people, and relationships at the New
Jersey ROIC through participant observation to determine whether information-sharing is
6

occurring and how it has been institutionalized, both formally and informally at the
fusion center. After nine months of observation, I found that the ROIC had created an
open and friendly environment that was conducive to dialogue among all of its
employees, which could help to institutionalize valuable information-sharing. This is an
important first step before examining the flow of intelligence, because the fusion center
personnel need to work well together to manage the information collected there for
analysis and dissemination.
The second chapter analyzes one of the ROIC’s most prominent intelligence
products—the Common Operating Picture (COP) bulletin—to determine whether the
intelligence sent out daily has value for local law enforcement. I sought to determine
what proportion of ROIC information consumers—the New Jersey law enforcement
community—actually read the bulletin and, of that group, what proportion believe the
intelligence is useful. This is important to ILP because police officers need to be aware of,
read, and use the products that the ROIC disseminates to guide police action.
Using survey data and interviews with municipal police, I determined that the
COP is a useful tool but in need of improvement. I found that between 25% and 60% of
the recipients currently read the COP. One of their criticisms was that the ROIC analysts
need to link significant national and international events to what is occurring in New
Jersey. Police departments want to know how large-scale occurrences can affect them,
what new forms of crime they may encounter, and finally, how to keep their officers safe.
Most importantly, the COP could be more effective if it were sent to a thorough and
completely up-to-date list of law-enforcement bureaus and agencies via at least one
designated representative for each.
7

The third and final chapter tests the hypothesis by evaluating the current
information-sharing environment among local police agencies in New Jersey and the
ROIC’s macro-level overseer role in facilitating communication and aiding these
agencies. In addition to their role as analysts, fusion centers collect information from the
local agencies to discern and discover connections and patterns that emerge across county
lines that individual agencies may not be able identify on their own. I therefore,
investigated how municipal agencies share information with one another and with the
ROIC. My analysis revealed that this center needs to focus on encouraging informationsharing among municipal agencies and with the center.
At present, police from smaller police departments in southern New Jersey are
unaware of the ROIC’s capabilities. Therefore, as hypothesized, they are less likely to
share information with the center. Furthermore, police from agencies that have benefited
from a previous relationship with the ROIC, view the center as having value and are more
likely to share information.
Finally, I will summarize my findings and make recommendations for the ROIC
based on these results. I will also discuss how these findings may be applied more
generally, as all fusion centers have the same mission. No study is without its limitations,
which I will discuss before suggesting some possible areas for future research.
A Case Study of the New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC)
The New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC, pronounced
“rock”) is the fusion center for the entire state. Located in Ewing, outside of Trenton, it is
managed by the New Jersey State Police. Opened in January 2007, it is the state’s
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intelligence hub. It also serves as the “home for the New Jersey Office of Emergency
Management and the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC)” and as the “command
center for all state-led emergency response operations, such as natural disasters, chemical
or nuclear emergencies, or terror alerts” (New Jersey State League of Municipalities,
n.d.). Key public-safety officials gathered at the EOC during Hurricane Irene on August
27, 2011, to avoid the lack of preparation and mismanagement that occurred during
2005’s Hurricane Katrina, one of the deadliest hurricanes in U.S. history.
The stated mission of the ROIC is:
to interface with the New Jersey law enforcement community, and other law enforcement and
homeland security agencies, by being a primary point of contact for collection, evaluation,
analysis, and dissemination of intelligence data and criminal background information in a timely
and effective manner in order to detect and/or prevent criminal or terrorist activity, and to solve
crimes. (NJ ROIC, n.d., p. 1)

The privacy policy, which discloses how the ROIC gathers and uses information,
enumerates several goals that include actively participating in the Information-Sharing
Environment (ISE), increasing public safety and mitigating threats, protecting privacy
rights, fostering relationships to “promote cooperation between law enforcement and the
community which it serves,” and making “the most effective use of public safety
resources” (NJ ROIC, p. 1). The ROIC has no plans to develop new databases; it utilizes
current databases in the law-enforcement arena such as the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) 2000, the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS), and the Motor
Vehicle Commission’s Driver’s Registry.
The ROIC prepares intelligence reports for the New Jersey law-enforcement
community by gathering information from its many partners co-located at the center,
including federal partnerships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), state partnerships with the New
Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (NJ OHSP), and the New Jersey
State Department of Corrections, as well as regional partners that include the New York
City Police Department (see Table 1.1). In addition, the ROIC receives information from
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) that are called into the center by concerned citizens
and police officers. SARs are “official documentation of observed behavior reasonably
indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity” (NJ
ROIC, n.d., p. 38). Once the information is verified from all sources, the center uses this
information as a resource in order to analyze and disseminate accurate and timely
intelligence to local police agencies across the state.
Table 1.1
Partnerships at the ROIC
Federal
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Department of Homeland
Security
Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement/Homeland
Security Investigations
National Crime
Information Center
Customs and Border Patrol
Secret Service
Diplomatic Security
Service

State
New Jersey State Police
New Jersey Office of
Homeland Security and
Preparedness
New Jersey Department of
Corrections
New Jersey Probation and
Parole
New Jersey Fire Service
New Jersey Treasury
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Local
Essex County Prosecutor's
Office
Newark Police Department
Jersey City Police
Department
Paterson Police
Department
Camden Police
Department
Ocean County
Prosecutor’s Office

The Analysis Element is the ROIC division that creates and distributes targeted
intelligence data and where all observations within the center were conducted for this
study. There are three programs within the Analysis Element: the Threat Analysis
Program, the Crime Analysis North Program, and the Crime Analysis South Program.
The Threat Analysis Program is further subdivided into desks, including the Threat
Watch Desk, the Warning Desk, the Critical Infrastructure Desk, and the Safe Passage
Desk. The Crime Analysis North and South Programs each have a Geo-Spatial Mapping
Desk, a Threat/Warning Desk, and a Production Desk (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1
Structure of the ROIC4

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

Source: Provided by Dan Engelhardt, Analysis Element, Assistant Unit Head of the NJ ROIC, August 17,
2010
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The main goal of the Threat Analysis Program is to identify viable threats and
apprise the New Jersey law enforcement community. The Threat Watch Desk, within the
Threat Analysis Program, has the most contact with the public and is where most of the
collaborative efforts of the different agencies occur. This desk, which serves New Jersey
law enforcement in general, is tasked with disseminating the daily COP bulletins and
occasionally completes threat, incident, or event assessments. These assessments are
produced only when a significant incidents occur or are being planned which involve a
potential nexus to homeland security and/or terrorism, potential deployment of law
enforcement resources and high visibility. For example, the recent attempted bombing in
Portland, Oregon (Denson, 2010), generated an incident assessment. In the assessment in
which the ROIC informed the community of the incident and its history and whether it
had any ties to New Jersey. In addition, the center recommends courses of action that are
intended to help prevent such incidents from occurring.
The main task of the Crime Analysis North and South Programs is to analyze and
map crimes throughout northern and southern New Jersey. Analysts primarily gather
information on gun seizures shooting hit incidents in an effort to identify “problem
people” and “problem places”, i.e. hot spots of criminal activity. This analyzed
information, or criminal intelligence is then used to develop the New Jersey Pins on
Paper (POP) reports. In these reports, local police can then see exactly where much of the
crime is occurring, who is committing these crimes, and if there are any crossjurisdictional issues and apply resources and target operations accordingly. The POP
reports play a key role for local police departments that may not have in-house analysts.
At present, the reports are sent to a specific law enforcement listserv. Optimally, they
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should be sent to the more comprehensive distribution list that is being suggested for the
COP. Finally, they are also uploaded to the NCIC and a message is posted on the ROIC’s
intranet indicating their availability for download.
The Crime Analysis North and South Programs are also tasked with providing
analyses of specific events or people. The Person of Strategic Interest (PSI) Package, a
customer-specific creation, is an in-depth analysis of an individual designated as a person
of strategic interest. The package outlines the person’s associates, vehicles, addresses,
etc., to give law enforcement a visual and tangible aid in criminal investigations. Other ad
hoc requests include background checks, indice checks, Be On the Look Out for
(BOLOs) bulletins, Officer Safety alerts, current intelligence products, and briefings.
The Production Desk is another arm of both Crime Analysis Programs. Its
contribution to the ROIC’s mission takes the form of a Weekly Shooting Environment
Comparative Statistics Report, which covers information from several cities in New
Jersey. The target audience for this information includes allied partners in these cities,
particularly state and local police. This report summarizes shooting incidents that
occurred over the previous week and compares them both geospatially and statistically to
the previous year’s numbers for the same week. Other statistics are available through
similar reports that cover 28 days and the year to date.
Before analyzing information-sharing in New Jersey, it is important to understand
the state’s historical and geographic background. This will help to explain the disparate
needs of the many police departments and the difficulty of producing an intelligence
product that meets the needs of all of them.
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New Jersey presents a unique case study. With a population of 8,791,894 in 2010,
it is the most densely populated state in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011).
Despite this density, according to the 2006 Census Estimate, New Jersey currently has
only 5 cities with populations greater than 100,000, only 2 of which are greater than
200,000 (U.S. Census Bureau). This is due in part to the fact that all 7,354 square miles
of land comprise 566 municipalities (U.S. Census Bureau). This means that some
municipalities are as small as a neighborhood. For example, while Long Beach Island is
18 miles in length and less than a mile wide, it contains 6 different municipalities, each
with its own police department (Long Beach Island Summers, 2009).
To help understand the population spread across the state, three maps of New
Jersey with city populations are included in Appendix A. They show that most of the
cities with a population greater than 6,000 are clustered around either New York City in
the north or Philadelphia in the south. Northern New Jersey has more urban/suburban
cities. In fact, the six cities in New Jersey with the greatest population are all in the
northern part. Smaller cities, towns, and villages with 1,000-6,000 residents are only
slightly more evenly spread throughout the state, but are still clustered along the eastern
shoreline and around Philadelphia. The 27 “very small towns” with less than 1,000
residents are spread evenly throughout the state. This is notable because crime trends may
differ in different parts of the state. Rural communities may not have the same crime
fears as a larger city outside Philadelphia or New York City, and these differences may
affect the type of information the respective police departments find useful.
How the importance of crimes is ranked by various New Jersey cities thus varies
greatly. A car theft may receive much attention in one city but far less in a larger city that
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has a high homicide rate. These differences have grown even more pronounced since the
downturn in the economy, as police agencies across New Jersey have been affected by
budget cuts. Many cities have been forced to make personnel cuts in order to close budget
gaps. CNN reported that Camden was forced to lay off nearly half of its police force
(CNN Wire Staff, 2011). Paterson, the third largest city, laid off a quarter of its force
(Putney, 2011). Other cities—including Trenton, Newark, and West Orange—with
significant populations have also had to lay off police officers (CBS New York, 2011;
Reed, 2011; Zdan, 2011). Smaller police agencies have avoided lay-offs by cutting
budgets in areas other than personnel—for example, by not replacing out-dated
equipment
Anecdotally, the population spread is not the only difference between northern
and southern New Jersey. Residents in the north seem to align themselves with New
York City, while those in the south identify themselves as living in suburbs of
Philadelphia. Central New Jersey tends to be grouped together with northern New Jersey.
As will be seen later, I categorized the interviews into two groups according to
northern/central New Jersey and southern New Jersey, not only because of the population
spread, but also because many of the police officers believe their crime problems are a
product of spill-over from either New York City or Philadelphia.
Despite the relatively small size of New Jersey, according to data from the FBI,
three cities are ranked in the top 26 most dangerous cities in the United States: Camden in
southern New Jersey, Trenton in Central New Jersey, and Newark in northern New
Jersey (CQ Press, 2010).
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Methodology
With limited research on fusion centers, a case study is helpful to “reveal patterns
and designs that pervade the larger picture” (Davidman, 1991, p. 27). While the ROIC is
only 1 of 72 fusion centers across the country, it must be seen as part of a general pattern
of how law enforcement has attempted to increase communication across its different
levels because it has been recognized by the DHS as one of the most exemplary fusion
centers. Ethnography, the principal methodology I employed, in the form of participant
observation, guided my actions and observations over an eighteen- month period. On
average, I visited the ROIC twice a week to observe and understand how the employees
worked together and shared information.
Participant observation can be defined as “that method in which the observer
participates in the daily life of the people under study, either openly in the role of
researcher or covertly in some disguised role, observing things that happen, listening to
what is said, and questioning people, over some length of time” (Becker & Geer, 1957, p.
28). Becker and Geer called this “the most complete form of the sociological datum”
because of the method by which the participant observer gathers information: “An
observation of some social event, the events which precede and follow it, and
explanations of its meaning by participants and spectators, before, during, and after its
occurrence” (p. 28).
For this research, I observed employees’ interactions at the ROIC and attempted
to understand the subtleties and consequences of the daily routine. I also asked the
employees how they thought information-sharing occurred at the center. The final
product is an ethnography detailing a day at the ROIC.
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During my data-collection phase, I observed and recorded significant interactions
among employees, where I believed information-sharing would be occurring. I also
attended some of the daily meetings and provided periodic updates about my research. In
addition, I was permitted to speak with other employees about their work. After I was
first introduced to the group, it was very easy to talk to people, as my cubicle was in front
of the long hallway that ran the length of the office. Many of the employees were eager to
speak with me. As time passed and my interactions became friendlier, I sometimes found
it difficult to maintain a purely sociological perspective. Schwartz and Schwartz (1955)
believed that participant observation data can be distorted as a result of bias or because of
affective participation in which the observers “inevitably become involved in and with
the observed’s emotional life” (p. 350). However, the increasing level of trust I
experienced from the ROIC employees provided valuable information about the various
interactions at the center.
I gained access to the ROIC through personal contacts and proposed my project to
the center’s leadership. After I received their approval but before I was able to begin my
study, however, the leadership changed, and I had to re-initiate the process. Two of the
more senior employees, who firmly believed my project could benefit the center,
advocated for me, and I was again given access once the ROIC leadership and I signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This document formally and legally assured the
center that I would not publish any private information that could harm the ROIC, its
employees, or its customers or otherwise negatively affect its mission. It also
acknowledged my understanding of my ethical responsibilities as a researcher and
doctoral candidate at the University of Pennsylvania.
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I was given a card that allowed me to enter the facilities at my convenience and
was assigned a cubicle with a desk where I could do my work. I was invited to many of
the meetings and was privy to much of the information that many of the ROIC employees
saw. I was excluded from the meetings that required a higher clearance level, but these
were few and far between.
The second strategy I used was a written survey with open-ended and multiplechoice questions (see Appendix B) that I sent to the 2,500 people on the COP listserv to
determine law enforcement’s opinions of the COP. This effort yielded a response rate of
12.5%. The results can be interpreted, therefore, as representing those who read the COP
and are most invested in the bulletin.
Finally, I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews in 2 stages with 21 lawenforcement agents—selected at random from the COP listserv—who were located
throughout New Jersey. The questions that helped guide the interviews appear in
Appendix C. Stratification was abstracted from the initial listserv because the e-mail
addresses did not establish the location of each officer. I had hoped to conduct random
interviews with 12 people from southern New Jersey and 12 people from central and
northern New Jersey. I also sought to include at least one person from one of the 10
largest cities in the state or a high-crime city. I sent initial e-mails to 19 people. I then
made follow-up phone calls to those had not responded within one week. I scheduled 13
interviews at the respondents’ places of employment. The other six people I tried to
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contact did not return phone calls or e-mails.5 The initial 13 interviews comprised more
southern New Jersey police officers than northern/central New Jersey officers.
Therefore, in stage 2 I scheduled interviews with police officers in cities that are
considered to be northern or central New Jersey, high-crime cities, or larger population
city. To schedule these interviews, I asked my contacts at the ROIC to help me, as coldcalling or e-mailing police officers from the COP listserv was not garnering enough
responses.6 I was thus able to interview two people from two of New Jersey’s 10 most
populous cities, which are also two of the 10 most crime-ridden cities in the state. I
scheduled six additional interviews, resulting in a total of 11 interviews in southern New
Jersey counties and 10 interviews with police officers from central and northern New
Jersey.7 Table 1.2 shows the characteristics of the interviewees based on the locations of
their departments (northern/central or southern), the types of cities (urban, suburban, or
rural), and the interviewees’ positions in their respective police forces (upper-level
management, middle-level management, or first-line supervisor and patrol).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!Lack of response was more likely due to their schedules than their discretion in sharing negative thoughts
about the ROIC with the researcher. The center has no authority over the local police agencies. In fact, I
found that many police officers were very comfortable telling me how little they knew about or used the
ROIC.
#
!Asking the ROIC for specific names of people to contact enhanced this the study because I was able to
interview people who had a broader variety of experiences with the center. Many of the police contacts I
made through ROIC employees knew more about the center and its capabilities and, therefore, enabled me
to understand more about who uses the ROIC. I do not believe their responses were biased, since all were
informed that the final product would be anonymous.!
7
Twenty-four cases were originally thought to be sufficient in order to have at least twelve cases in each of
the two cells: northern/central New Jersey and southern New Jersey. The interviewees were categorized
according to their location in the state because of the concentration of more urban cities in the northern half
of the state and the need to understand communication across all the cities in New Jersey, urban to
suburban, rural to urban, etc. It was also important to interview as many police officers from different
counties as possible because the quality of communication seemed to depend on the county. Twenty-one
cases were found to be sufficient, however, because I had confirmatory evidence from more than two cases
for the main topics of the study and no new findings had been uncovered in the last five interviews.
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Table 1.2
Descriptive statistics of interviewees

!
<!
>!
?!
@!
"!
#!
A!
B!
C!
<D!
<<!
<>!
<?!
<@!
<"!
<#!
<A!
<B!
<C!
>D!
><!

$%&'()!
*+,'&-.!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

/%0'(!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!

1&2-,!
=!
=!
!
=!
=!
=!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
=!
!
!
!

/020&2-,!
!
!
=!
!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!
=!

30&-.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
=!
!
=!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

144+&!
=!
=!
=!
!
!
!
!
!
=!
=!
!
!
!
!
!
!
=!
!
!
!
!

5677.+!
!
!
!
!
=!
!
=!
=!
!
=!
=!
=!
!
!
!
=!
!
!
!
=!
=!

86&9'.6,+!
/04+&:69%&)!
;-'&%.!
!
!
!
=!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
=!
=!
=!
!
!
=!
=!
!
!

The first question posed in the first chapter was: Do people who represent
different public safety departments share information with one another? The answer to
this question has far-reaching consequences. The lack of communication among lawenforcement agencies was blamed for 9/11 and set in motion the creation of the fusion
centers. To be effective and successful—i.e., to send out targeted intelligence—
information-sharing must start from within the ROIC itself. If the center has not created
an environment to institutionalize information-sharing among its partners within its
physical space, then the products it disseminates will not be as well-informed as they
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could be. As noted earlier, what is not known, perhaps from a lack of sharing, can be
detrimental to decision-making. The following is an ethnographic study of the Analysis
Element. The central question of the chapter is: Has information-sharing been
institutionalized within the ROIC?
First, I will present my data in the form of an ethnographic view of a typical day
at the ROIC. This will include an examination of the physical space, the people who
work there, and their thoughts about information-sharing. I will then discuss the formal
structure of the programs within the ROIC. Next, I will present the theoretical literature
regarding the importance of collaboration, the history of secrecy within law enforcement,
and how to institutionalize a policy of information-sharing. Finally, I will discuss how I
concluded that information-sharing has, indeed, been institutionalized at the ROIC.!
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Chapter 1
A Day in the Life of the ROIC: Institutionalizing Information-sharing
The Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) is situated in the rear of the
New Jersey State Police (NJSP) Headquarters campus property. The entrance to the
building is guarded by NJSP security. Once in the building, the Analysis Element where
the employees work and meet is located behind a card-accessed door at the back of the
building. Before reaching the Analysis Element office, the Emergency Operations Center
(EOC) can be seen. This is the area of the ROIC where representatives from all agencies
would convene if a natural, chemical or terrorist emergency were to occur. Each
representative has access to their own computer terminal and a telephone. All of the
desks face the front of the room where there is a stage and a large screen projecting
updates.
When I walked into the Analysis Element for the official start of my participant
observation, I first noticed that it was now located in a different room than the one I had
observed on the first occasion that I had seen the Analysis Element. During my talk with
the past director of the ROIC only months earlier, I was given a tour of the ROIC and
was able to speak to some of the employees. The room that originally housed the
Analysis Element of the ROIC had cubicles with high walls that were at least 6 feet tall
and signs that came down from the ceiling which directed one to the agency he/she
wished to contact. At that time, the only place that seemed to be available for
conversation with employees was a small table located in the middle of the room. It
would have been difficult for sustained conversation because people frequently passed in
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and out of the space. The only other spaces for meetings were large conference rooms
outside the office.
The room that I observed during my second and consequent visits had a far more
open feeling. Figure 1.2 is a pictorial representation of the Analysis Element of the ROIC.
Card-access opened a door that led into a long hallway. Cubicles, with walls that were
roughly 3.5 feet high, populated the large open space with the exception of four offices in
the middle of the room which housed some of the more senior employees at the ROIC.
Televisions broadcasting local and national news were spaced around the large room. A
large space with a long rectangular table was positioned between the offices and was used
primarily for meetings. The cubicles formed a U-shape around the 4 offices and meeting
space which also served as a lunch spot and a place for the employees to get their coffee
in the morning.
Figure 1.2
Pictorial representation of Analysis Element of the ROIC
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Compartmentalized Information Facility (SCIF). A SCIF is an area of a building used to
process Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (SCI) level classified information, a
higher level of classified information that some employees at the ROIC do not have. It
was my experience that the FBI and DHS used the room more frequently than other
partners. The SCIF is a separate room past the cubicles. The door is closed when
meetings are in progress or when analysts are using the facility to access SCI.
The offices in the middle of the room that house the more senior employees were
always open; I rarely passed the offices when the doors were closed. In fact, some of the
employees walked in and out of the offices in order to use the computers in those offices
because of some of the programs on the computers. Very late in my observation period,
one of the FBI agents moved into the office. One of the NJSP supervisors informed me
that it was the ROIC’s way of recognizing the FBI’s significant involvement in the fusion
center endeavor.
The openness of the room makes it possible for everyone to see one other and to
easily carry on conversations. This seems to foster a comfortable atmosphere among the
many employees as evidenced by the environment where off-the-cuff banter is frequent. I
often observed some of the employees gathering around one person’s desk to engage in
non-work-related conversation. More evidence of the comfortable atmosphere could be
seen in the amount of extracurricular paraphernalia hanging on cubicle walls. For
instance, one state police trooper was known to be an avid hunter and sports fan in his
free time. The trooper was thus showed pictures of himself in camouflage or hung
memorabilia from his favorite sports team.
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Conversations at the ROIC are rarely private; often, others join a conversation by
turning their chair or peaking over the cubicle so that they can participate, too. I
experienced how public and open conversations could be when I spoke with one of the
employees. Our initial conversation was about my dissertation, but our conversation then
turned to what I wanted to do after receiving my Ph.D. As I discussed my goals, I
mentioned that my husband worked for the government. A nearby employee asked if my
husband knew a particular person and the conversation expanded to include this
employee as well.
Daily Routine of the ROIC
!

The workday does not begin at the same time for all of the employees but most
arrive at the ROIC by 8:00 A.M. Employees cull through e-mails, internet and print news,
and databases to find out what crimes have occurred in the past 24 or 72 hours on
Mondays. This is the time when the Analysis Element is the quietest. I often walked in
before the 9:30 meetings and was very surprised by the calmness of the morning. People
worked very diligently to gather information from the night or weekend before in order to
present it at meetings. No one was distracted by the televisions around them nor were
they engaged in conversation.
At their desks, the partners looked through their work databases and identified
information streams to see if anything has occurred that could have a connection to or
impact on New Jersey. While each agency has its own mission and concerns, the
representatives who work at the fusion center contribute to the precision and wide-angle
perspective that the ROIC attempts to create. For example, I interviewed one of the two
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Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) representatives at the ROIC who come in
once a week. It is the job of the ICE representative to cross reference all of the names of
the people who have been involved in shootings in New Jersey with those in their
database to see if the same person appears in their system. She obtains the names from
one of the analysts at the ROIC after the daily meeting. If any of the names are in her
database, she informs an analyst or supervisor of what kind of visa they are on, when they
came to the country and any other important information that she finds. The
representative is not able to give this information if it is an active, open case for ICE, but
she can still put the ROIC in contact with the case agent for an active case.
There are three FBI employees employed at the ROIC from the Newark and
Philadelphia offices, all of whom I interviewed and/or observed regularly. They include
two agents and an intelligence analyst; all three FBI employees have access to top-secret
databases to which many employees at the ROIC do not have access. I interviewed the
FBI analyst and asked how she decides what information to report on in the daily huddle.
She stated that she tries to report on anything that could impact law enforcement and
private sector security operations and planning in New Jersey. Furthermore, she noted it
was not often the case that she felt that she had information that could prove important
but could not share it with her colleagues because she had a higher level of clearance. On
the rare occasion when this did occur, she shared what information she could with others
at the ROIC and shared other parts of it with the employees who did have the necessary
clearance.
After reading through reports on events and databases, the Threat Analysis
program and the Crime Analysis North and South meet separately at 9:30 A.M. to review
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the events of the past 24-72 hours.8 Just before the meeting, employees from the Crime
Analysis North and South programs meet in the Analysis Element’s meeting space in the
office while those employees in the Threat Program walk down the hall to a separate
location in another conference room. This arrangement has actually worked to the
advantage of the Threat Program as it has encouraged camaraderie among members of
the group because the long hallway allows the employees to converse socially on their
way to the meeting. I often heard employees talking about what they did over the past
weekend; sometimes it involved physical activities like running. Friendly banter about
the football teams was a very popular topic after a Sunday football game in the fall. The
walk back to the office involved more business-related remarks about something that was
just presented on the 9:30 meeting.
The 9:30 meetings are convened around a large, circular table and begin with a
roll call. One of the more senior employees calls out the name of the agency for which
there is a partner present. Partners in the Threat Analysis Program, the FBI, DHS, Federal
Air Marshal Service (FAMS), crime-mapping agents, New Jersey Office of Homeland
Security and Preparedness (OHSP) take turns to report on significant events. If there are
any classified documents for which a special clearance is necessary, the agent who has
the information will give a brief description of the information and inform the other
personnel that he will share what he can with them if they think the information would be
valuable to them.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As mentioned in the introduction, the Threat Program, Crime Analysis North and Crime Analysis South
programs are all programs in the Analysis Element. Figure 1.1 is a diagram of the different programs and
desks in the Analysis Element.
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This is also the time when people are able to ask questions to learn what other
personnel may have heard. For example, on one occasion an employee of the ROIC said
that fake calls to restaurants from the sanitation department had been reported. He asked
some of the people in the partner agencies if they had ever heard of this practice and to
see if a pattern was emerging. In other cases, I observed one of the employees asking the
FBI or DHS representatives who have a higher clearance and access to more databases to
complete a search on a particular topic. I never saw anyone deny this request. Instead, I
heard many of the partner agencies offer their services even before they were asked to do
so.
Towards the end of my observation, I noticed a new effort to extend the reach and
impact of information that was shared. During the 9:30 meeting, one of the senior
managers started taking notes. Although management had always taken notes, this time,
after everyone had contributed to the meeting, the manager gave out tasks to the ROIC
analysts who were in charge of particular areas of the state. The manager made
connections between what had just been said and possible future targets or sources of
information. He then asked the analysts to either investigate a particular incident or to get
in touch with one of their contacts at the local police departments to see if they could find
more information regarding the person or incident.
One of the most interesting partnerships evident at the Threat Program meeting
includes the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services (NJ DHSS). Though
this may not seem immediately relevant to the ROIC’s responsibilities, it is an important
link since the NJ DHSS is able to pass information about drugs or illnesses that may
affect the criminal world. For example, the NJ DHSS representative once learned of a
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contaminated supply of a specific illegal drug. He made sure to find out how to notify
police and health officials as the contaminated supply could be brought to New Jersey
and would most likely make drug-users ill. Another area in the criminal arena that the
health liaison plugs into is the sharing of information regarding the cost to medical
facilities for shooting victims at New Jersey hospitals and trauma centers. In this way, the
fusion center is able to provide specific information to law enforcement and state
government decision-makers on the bottom line cost of shooting incidents to New Jersey
taxpayers, thereby raising the profile of the problem in this era of fiscal challenges.
In addition to the people at the ROIC, the Threat Analysis Program also connects
with the National Operations Center (NOC) via teleconference. The NOC can be
described as a national fusion center where agencies from all over the country, including
large metropolitan cities, have representatives. The ROIC has a representative there who
is able to share information he has gathered from the other 35 federal, state, territorial,
tribal, local and private sector agencies present at the NOC. By having a representative at
there, the ROIC ensures that they are receiving the most up-to-date information from
across the U.S. They are also able to utilize the personal relationships that their
representative has developed through the NOC in order to contact other agencies that are
not represented at the ROIC.
Finally, the ROIC also has a number of guests who are temporarily assigned there.
A number of factors determine who will come for a temporary duty; these factors include
funding availability, need of both the ROIC and the partner agency for the relationship,
and current crime distribution. The Essex County Prosecutor’s Office sent 2 employees to
share their information and bring back information from across the state that could be
29

useful in finding out why “carjackings had recently soared.” The majority of the
carjackings took place in Essex County in northern New Jersey, an area which includes
Newark, the largest city in the state. Unfortunately, due to limited resources, after just
three weeks, one of the employees had to return to the prosecutor’s office. Partnerships
like this allow the fusion center to target a particular crime trend that they see occurring.
It is a beneficial relationship for both agencies as the center receives up-to-date
information from the representative, while the guest and his supervisors are assured that
additional resources are being directed to them. In fact, the ROIC has found their
partnership with Essex County Prosecutor’s Office to be so helpful that they have now
started considering partnerships with the employees from the other 20 counties in New
Jersey.
At 10:00 A.M. the whole Analysis Element gathers in the conference area for the
daily huddle. The huddle includes everyone without exception. The secretary of the
Analysis Element quietly takes roll. It appears that everyone attends not only to give their
input but also to listen to what occurs as I never witnessed acts of incivility while any of
the employees were speaking with the exception of a few people who texted or e-mailed
from phones. For the most part, those who attended the meetings appeared to be attentive
and respectful of colleagues and the information shared.
Most days the huddle is characterized by the same roll call style of informationsharing as that of the program meetings. It is the only time during the day when
representatives of all programs are mandated to meet and share information. In addition
to the partners in the Threat Analysis Program already mentioned, the huddle also
includes a representative from the New Jersey Fire Service, ICE/HSI, New Jersey
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Probation and Parole Department, New Jersey Corrections, New Jersey Treasury, and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). At the end of the daily
huddle, analysts compare the total number of shooting victims to the number at the same
time the previous year. Though this is not used as a benchmark, it does provide some
context for the number of shooting hits. A representative from the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) also gives the number of gun recoveries for the week.
Sometimes the meeting took on a somewhat jovial feeling. During one particular
meeting, a picture of one of the state police agents from a recent mud race was shown
with a comparison to Sasquatch. Though this type of humor was rare, the meeting was
still a place where the employees felt comfortable enough to make jokes. In a pressured
environment such as this, humor is a good way to release the tension that inevitably
comes from hearing about shooting victims and carjackings every day. It was not
uncommon to hear someone joke about something that had been said during the huddle if
it was appropriate. The supervisor who often led the meetings also made it a point to
announce significant events in the lives of the employees that included birthdays,
retirements, deaths in the family, weddings and births. Additionally, new employees or
guests were always introduced at the first huddle they attended.
As this is the only time that all representatives are together, this was often
the only time that I would also see the director of the ROIC. Thomas Souchek, a Major in
the New Jersey State Police,9 had an office outside of the Analysis Element area but
occasionally came to the huddle. Despite Major Souchek’s usually serious demeanor, he
was extremely approachable and always said hello to employees by name. He typically
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9

Major Thomas Souchek has since left the ROIC to pursue another position elsewhere.
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walked into the office a minute or two after the meeting began so as not to interrupt the
meeting. The person leading the huddle usually noticed his presence and asked him if he
would like to add anything. Sometimes he would let those in the huddle know that a tour
was going to come through the Analysis Element or he commended the Analysis Element
on their work thus far.
After the huddle, people disperse and go back to their desks to continue
work. Some people remain to talk to others in the group about something they just heard
in the huddle or to ask for more information regarding a particular case or tactic,
technique or practice. For example, if the ICE agent did not record all of the names that
one of the analysts had stated during the meeting, she asked the analyst to repeat the
names to her. The thirty minutes following the huddle are usually the liveliest at the
ROIC. Employees converse with one another not only about business-related matters but
also about recreational and personal matters. Although there are no other formal times for
the Analysis Element to meet, interaction among the analysts and employees continues
throughout the day.
The environment at the ROIC
!

Although males make up a larger percentage of the NJSP employees at the ROIC,
females are well-represented among the analysts and partner agencies. The law
enforcement community at the ROIC is extremely professional and I never felt or
observed that there was a “good ol’ boy” network. Just as in any other workplace or
community, cliques formed among some of the males who also spent time together
outside of the office.
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Though very professional, the work environment at the ROIC is also casual. The
dress code is business casual but this varies from agency to agency. For example, state
police agents are required to dress in uniform on particular days while most federal
employees dressed in suits.
The casual dress code and openness of the office does not deter from the
professional environment. I often heard employees talking to each other about different
cases or shootings or new techniques bomb-builders are using. For example, I asked an
employee some questions early in the study about how the counties were divided for each
analyst. As the employee began explaining to me how northern New Jersey and southern
New Jersey were divided, a nearby employee added to the answer by telling me a bit
more about the cities in each territory. By having low walls and a very open office,
everyone is able to hear what is being said around them and can contribute to
conversations they hear if they choose.
Another benefit of the openness of the office is the potential to build relationships
among the different agencies. In the world of crime and crime prevention, time is always
of the essence. The relationships among the different partners also allow the analysts to
get past the bureaucratic walls that some may encounter. Rather than call the FBI for
information on a particular case, a ROIC analyst can approach the FBI representative
who can either look up the information himself or can contact a person within the agency
who has the information. The person within the agency is less likely to be ignored than
the outsider and effort is not wasted seeking information. By having all of the
information and the data available immediately, analysts can do other, more important
tasks. They no longer have to make phone calls and wait to find the right person. This
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gives the law enforcement on the ground the information quickly so that they may be able
to apprehend a suspect.
The need to keep open relationships among all of the employees for informationsharing cannot be overstated. The ROIC, like any other organization, is also affected by
politics and friction between agencies. For example, the New Jersey State Police and the
New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (NJ OHSP) are partners in
the fusion center. The NJ OHSP provides analysts and is an integral member of the ROIC
as it responsible for information on counterterrorism and preparedness efforts in New
Jersey. Because this mission overlaps with some of the existing responsibilities of New
Jersey State Police at the ROIC, there can be some conflict between the two agencies
with regards to authority. I never witnessed the conflict firsthand and only heard about it
in private conversations. It seems to be something that originated in the higher echelons
of both organizations. However, employees of both entities who are working at the ROIC
do not let it affect their relationship with each other. As one ROIC employee explained,
he stays amicable with the analyst from the OHSP because he likes her as a person and
tries not to let the politics of what is occurring outside their office affect his working
relationships.
In addition to politics, privacy protection is another concern that must be factored
into the work of the ROIC. This area is the principal concern of the privacy officer, one
of the managers inside the Analysis Element. According to the ROIC Privacy Policy, he
“liases with community privacy advocacy groups to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties are protected within the provisions of the policy” (NJ ROIC, n.d., p.4). For
instance, the written privacy policy of the ROIC, which states the goals of the fusion
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center, is reviewed with the most junior member of the ROIC when they first come to
work there. Additionally, the first sentence of the mission statement is written in a framed
picture in the huddle room so that everyone sees it daily.
When asked how he tries to ensure that information-sharing is occurring within
these restrictions, one of the senior New Jersey State Police employees explained some of
his techniques. He, along with the managers at the ROIC, believes it is their duty to foster
relationships by keeping the atmosphere friendly. The employee stated that he tries to do
this by sharing the good news of employees with the group. In addition, the employee
with whom I spoke stated that he attempts to present himself as an approachable person
and, to this end, keeps his office door open to all of the employees.
These efforts to foster openness and maintain high morale, in spite of many
restrictions and regulations, are the goals of all senior management. A supervisor may
show the employees how their work is being used at the local level in order to convey the
importance of their work to them. This can be significantly motivating since a
contribution cannot always be seen when the focus seems to be at the state or federal
level. For instance, the ROIC works closely with major cities in the state which
historically have with high crime rates. I observed a presentation during the huddle in
which the ROIC completed an analysis of where crime was most focused, or the “hot
spots” of the city. These crime maps, developed by the ROIC geo-spatial mapping
component, were shown to all ROIC employees. The supervisors then showed the effect
of targeting crime based on the analysis in the number of arrests and consequent crime
decline despite the city’s declining budget. When these statistics and other information
are gathered, it is not always known whether they will be helpful in preventing a
35

terroristic attack or stopping a local criminal, or preventing some kind of coordination or
cooperation between the two.
I interviewed another supervisor to find out more about how they are trying to
increase information-sharing among the ROIC and its partners. He was eager for me to
interview the customers, or the New Jersey public safety officers whose duty it is to know
the threat environment in order to keep citizens safe, as he wanted to do more to involve
local public safety community. He stated to me his desire to have a representative at the
county level who would help filter information from the local police to the ROIC about
violent crimes occurring at the local level. He noted that there needed to be a feedback
loop from the local police in order to help better analyze crime. To begin this process of
building relationships between the local police and the ROIC, the employee added the
contact information of representatives from all the local police agencies to the COP
distribution list, as he believed that sharing information with the local police agencies
was the first step to receiving information from the local police agencies as well.
Finally, one of the ways in which partners at all levels make information-sharing
better is by actively seeking additional partners who are willing to collaborate in this
environment. When asked about people in the office who are unwilling to share, two
employees recalled an FBI partner who was assigned to the ROIC who was not
particularly good at information-sharing. Both employees remembered that the agent had
not wanted to be assigned to the ROIC and therefore did not perceive that he had a vested
interest in sharing information. He had a “bad attitude” that was detrimental to the
mission of information-sharing as he represented more than just himself; he represented a
federal agency to which the ROIC needed access. Eventually, the agent was assigned to a
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role outside the ROIC and was replaced with another agent who has since built a sense of
camaraderie with the other employees at the ROIC.
Theoretical Literature
One way of viewing the interorganizational relationships which exist in the fusion
center is through the notion of a consortium. A consortium is an alliance between entities
that have similar needs. The members of the consortium come together to create a greater
entity which satisfies the needs of all its members (Kehler, 2004). Fusion centers
represent the culmination of collaborative efforts on the part of state, local, tribal and
federal agencies. The various agencies share resources in order to garner a clearer picture
of the threats facing the United States. Each agency, including law enforcement, public
safety and the private sector, may contribute data for the good of the collective. Once
information has been shared, the expectation is that analysts are able to synthesize the
information which will:
allow local and state entities to better forecast and identify emerging crime and public health
trends; support multidisciplinary, proactive, risk-based, and community-focused problem solving;
provide a continuous flow of intelligence to officials to assist in developing a depiction of
evolving threats; improve the delivery of emergency and nonemergency services (GIWG, 2005,
p.11).

The goal of fusion centers is to disseminate an ever-expanding yet focused body
of targeted intelligence which can be acted upon in order to prevent crime. Informationsharing and collaboration of many agencies across different levels of government and
jurisdictions make information analysis possible. Collaboration, defined as “a process of
joint decision-making among key stakeholders of a problem domain about the future of
that domain,” is necessary in order to deliver the most accurate and precise representation
of crime in a particular area (Gray, 1989, p.227). Education psychologist C.R. Pete
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Petersen (2003) sees collaboration as an essential process that can be seen throughout
history. He explains that “progress, and even survival, have at times depended on
collaboration” (Petersen). Communities which collaborate “encourage greatness by
uniting, and encouraging the discovery, building, enhancing and expanding of existing
strengths, assets, and resources” (Petersen). When faced with adversity and a decreasing
amount of resources, collaboration is important.
Although collaboration may be a means and the motivation for fusion, it is the
theory of emergence that describes what occurs when organizations share information
and thus collaborate. Drawing from systems theory,
Emergence is the overall system behavior that comes out of the interaction of many participants. It
is behavior that cannot be predicted or even envisioned from a knowledge of what each
component of a system does in isolation (Casti, 1997, p. 82).

Emergence, put simply, derives from the premise that the whole is greater than
the sum of its parts (von Bertalanffy, 1968). Emergent phenomena, though the result of
underlying processes, are autonomous from the processes which have led to this creation
because they “exert an irreducible form of downward causal influence” (Bedau, 1997, p.
377). In other words, the final product cannot be reduced to the individual components
which have made it up. Furthermore, the emergent phenomena, the behaviors, and
outcomes are a product of the whole and could not have been produced from any of the
parts alone.
Collaboration of the partners leads to information-sharing so that emergence can
occur. Information-sharing can occur whenever a partner at the ROIC sees a link between
something he has found and something that he believes might be he might pertinent to
another partner’s jurisdiction. Additionally, when he believes information-sharing can
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help bring meaning to his own information, he must feel comfortable enough to
communicate this to the appropriate partner. Therefore, information-sharing must become
institutionalized. To understand this better, the theory of new institutionalism in
organizational analysis can be applied. Theories on organizational fields and
isomorphism will be explored in order to understand how the organizations within the
fusion center work together and bring about an institutional change.
Studies have posited that police culture emphasizes secrecy and self-protection
(Wesley, 1970; Christensen & Crank, 2001). The 9/11 Commission Report provides
further evidence of a culture of secrecy when it reported that information-sharing was not
taking place among law enforcement agencies. It stated that the FBI was unable to
develop an effective counterterrorism strategy because of “a limited capacity to share
information both internally and externally” and “perceived legal barriers to sharing
information” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004b,
p.18). The 9/11 Commission proposed a strategy to combat terrorism which included
protecting against and preparing for future terrorist attacks by “unifying the many
participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based
information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries”
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004b, p.21). The
Commission wanted information-sharing to become an institution in law enforcement.
How does one institutionalize a strategy of sharing in a culture with such a deep history
of secrecy?
In order to understand how any organization could overcome this barrier and
successfully institutionalize information-sharing, the ROIC must be examined from an
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organizational perspective. Information-sharing is thus the practice that needs to be
institutionalized. Two organizational structures may be identified. One is the larger
system: the organization of law enforcement. The ROIC is one of the organizations
within law enforcement. For purposes of this study, while it is understood that law
enforcement in general needs to institutionalize information-sharing, we will focus on the
ROIC as a case study. By looking at the fusion center as a formal organizational structure,
we can gauge how successful law enforcement will be in institutionalizing informationsharing as many states across the U.S. implement or seek to improve fusion centers. It is
best to first understand the terms of the theory of new institutionalism. New
institutionalism proposes:
that formal organizational structure(s) reflected not only technical demands and resource
dependencies, but was also shaped by institutional forces, including rational myths, knowledge
legitimated through the educational system and by the professions, public opinion, and the law.
The core idea that organizations are deeply embedded in social and political environments
suggested that organizational practices and structures are often either reflections of or responses to
rules, beliefs, and conventions built into the wider environment (Powell, 2007, p. 975).

Within law enforcement, as pointed out earlier, information was kept from others
in order to protect one’s case, whether it was from fear that another agent would take
credit for solving the case or to protect people involved in the case. These fears, or
rational myths, led to the institutionalization of secrecy within law enforcement within
the agencies and among them as well. Ronald Jepperson (1991) defines institution as
representing “a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property” and
institutionalization as the process of making this routine for the established system (p.
145).
Fligstein (1991) suggests that change among members in an organization can only
occur once individuals perceive a need and a source for that change. He continues: “the
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state or the organizational field will create shocks that reflect either a reconstitution of the
rules or models of new organizational strategies that undermine the rule” (Fligstein, p.
315).
Institutional change within an organization is not easily achieved and may even be
thwarted by myths held by those outside and by members of the organization itself.
Meyer and Rowan (1991) posit that the “formal structures of many organizations in postindustrial society dramatically reflect the myths of their institutional environments
instead of the demands of their work activities” (p.41). Myths regarding how an
organization should proceed pervade modern society and organizations. These myths,
Meyer and Rowan argue, are rationalized and impersonal instructions which characterize
social goals that an organization should have and the way in which they should be
obtained. Furthermore, these myths are so ingrained in our society and thinking that they
are never questioned but rather are taken at face value as legitimate. For example, Meyer
and Rowan point out that as people become specialized in research and development,
organizations are under increasing pressure to create research and development (R&D)
units. No thought is put forward regarding how essential these departments are because
companies think they are necessary in order to seem more legitimate.
Myths are not the only possible impediments that organizations including the
ROIC face in their efforts to institutionalize information-sharing. Havelock (1971)
identifies several factors which would influence the dissemination of new information
within an organization. He suggests that a division of labor, a system made up of other
subsystems of individuals with a common background, may “encourage the formation of
idiosyncratic information coding schemes, stimulate inter-unit competition and encourage
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the formation of separate and incompatible group norms” (Havelock, p. 6-21). Each
subgroup at the ROIC, i.e. the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland
Security, and the New Jersey State Police as well as local agencies and departments, has
its own language and set of terms that it uses that could hinder the flow of information to
and from other subgroups. A division of labor could also create competition among the
subgroups because of the limited resources available to all of the agencies within the
organization. Finally, Havelock believes that each subgroup may not only develop its
own vocabulary but that it can develop its own norms which may contrast with the norms
of the organization. Each individual may therefore be too concerned with upholding the
norms of the subgroup of which he is a member to identify with the organization, the
ROIC.
The structure of the organization can also impede the flow of information among
agencies. Havelock (1971) identifies several studies which show that the greater the
degree of hierarchy in an organization, the less the possibility of knowledge flow.
Literature on the topic of hierarchy gives several reasons for this: “Members are very
hesitant to transmit knowledge upward through a hierarchy unless it is 1.) firmly
substantiated by hard data which in the case of most innovation is hard to come by; 2)
reflective of only a positive evaluation of themselves; and 3) directly relevant to the
receiver” (Havelock, p. 6-23).
Centralization can also affect the movement of new information within the
organization in two ways: “it increases the effectiveness of downward communication
but at the same time reduces the possibility of intra-organizational variation” (Havelock,
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1971, p.6-24). Centralization, therefore, helps efficiency in the organization but hinders
the generation of new ideas.
The members of the organization must be physically close to each other in order
for information to flow freely among the different groups. Havelock (1971) points to
several studies that show that “distance was the most important factor in determining
interaction between employees in an office” (p. 6-26).
Finally, leadership behavior is an important factor in the information flow within
an organization. The behavior of the leader “serves as a stimulus and as a model for much
behavior in the organization” (Havelock, 1971, p. 6-26). Leadership is no longer looked
upon as the entity which gives orders and ensures that they are followed. Leaders must
“integrate the objectives of the organization with the personal needs and goals of its
members” (Havelock, p. 6-27). Good leadership leads to a constant flow of information
by understanding the dynamics of the group and helping the group to contribute to task
performance.
Discussion-How the ROIC has attempted to institutionalize information-sharing
Building the physical structure and placing everyone together does not guarantee
that information-sharing will take hold in a fusion center. How successful has the ROIC
been in creating an environment that will lead to the institutionalization of informationsharing in law enforcement? I argue that the ROIC has been effective in establishing a
new culture and environment to encourage the free exchange of information so that
collaboration can take place and emergence can occur.
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According to Fligstein (1991) the state creates shocks that allow the individuals
involved to see that the rules have been undermined or need to be reconstituted. However,
a shock by the state was not necessary for the law enforcement community to see the
need for information-sharing. The shock was provided in the 9/11 tragedy. The old rules
regarding secrecy were undermined because the non-exchange of information hurt the
whole country. The 9/11 Commission responded to this shock by providing a new
organizational strategy when it suggested increasing information-sharing. This call for a
new organizational strategy was answered by many policy makers and the International
Association of the Chiefs of Police (IACP) when the idea for the fusion center was
born.10 9/11 helped many individuals within law enforcement see that the good of the
whole was threatened when the top priority was trying to protect oneself at the expense of
a broader concern.
The 9/11 Commission also provided law enforcement, and more specifically the
fusion centers, with the pressure needed to institutionalize information-sharing. The
centers were developed so that information-sharing could be facilitated across agencies.
This pressure is what Dimaggio and Powell (1991) refer to as coercive processes. The
state pressured law enforcement within fusion centers to work together and share
information to prevent future large-scale terrorist attacks.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The concept of organization-information collaboration, the primary inspiration for fusion centers, was
actually developed long before 2001. Starting in the 1990s, the increasing interest in the Intelligence-Led
Policing Model (ILP), the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) success, support of key
homeland security entities and agreement among governors that each state should have its own fusion
center led to the creation of many fusion centers after 9/11 (Rollins, 2008). However, 9/11 was the impetus
for the quick growth in number of fusion centers.
!
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Moreover, the ROIC has fostered an environment where information-sharing can
occur in its physical space and daily routine. As identified by Havelock (1971), several
factors including physical proximity, centralization, hierarchy, division of labor and
leadership behavior, can all influence the dissemination of new information within an
organization. The employees must feel there is an open exchange of information within
the office among everyone for them to collaborate. A shorter physical distance between
the organization members helps to facilitate this exchange of information. This physical
proximity to agents in other departments engenders friendships which break down the
walls of secrecy among agencies. The ROIC makes it physically and emotionally easier
for a particular agency to ask for information that is necessary during analysis. Without
tall cubicle walls or separate agency rooms, each person experiences the same physical
office space and thus the environment reduces the notion of a pecking order and in that
way encourages information-sharing that includes other office mates. Havelock points
out that physical separation is often a function of status discrepancy. The lack of physical
separation among the individuals of the ROIC keeps everyone on an equal power status,
regardless of the agency they represent.
By allowing all of the members of the ROIC to experience their workspace as one
of seemingly equal status for all, the flow of information becomes primarily horizontal,
rather than vertical. Indeed, a stringent hierarchy reduces the flow of information. At the
ROIC, the degree of hierarchy is fairly limited. This can be seen not only in the physical
space where the vast majority of the cubicles are the same size, but also in the daily
meetings where everyone is encouraged to contribute information. All of the individuals
are treated as information managers, even those who have higher security clearances than
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the majority of the employees. Federal employees work side-by-side with state
employees. By bringing together many different agencies and eliminating the hierarchy
among the agencies, the ROIC has centralized law enforcement information which
ideally increases the effectiveness of distribution of communication to the local police
agencies.
The hierarchy of people and agencies has now shifted to a hierarchy of
information. The intelligence that results from the sharing of information has become
more important than protecting the interests of the people with the information, which is
a critical paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962).
Additionally, the centralization and lack of a hierarchical structure at the ROIC is
made clear and reinforced in the daily meetings. The 10:00 huddle is mandatory for all
individuals in the office. Each person is called on with the request to share any
information garnered over the last 24-72 hours. The desk manager does not skip anyone,
even if it is known from the 9:30 meeting that the individual may have nothing to offer.
By performing this daily ritual, the desk manager reinforces participation of each agency
and individual in information-sharing every day.
It is this type of leadership that has also helped make information-sharing at the
ROIC successful. The director and the managers of each program need to be firmly
invested in the mission of information-sharing. This was evident to employees by the
decision to allow other researchers and me open access to the ROIC and its employees.
The ROIC leadership made it clear to employees that innovation in information-sharing
was a goal and the present study contributed to the mission by seeking feedback on how
they disseminate information. The management at the ROIC provides an example of
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beliefs and conventions that they want to see reflected in the organizational practices and
structures which provided an example to the members of the ROIC on how to contribute
to task performance.
Using Havelock’s (1971) criteria to identify the factors which influence the
dissemination of new information within an organization, I came to recognize that the
ROIC has created an environment where employees feel comfortable sharing information.
Not only do employees like those from the FBI and ICE express this point-of-view in
interviews, but I also observed the collaborative environment present at the ROIC when
employees seek out other employees for information. Instead of returning to their desk to
continue work after the morning huddle, time after the morning huddle was spent asking
each other questions, as well as gathering or requesting additional information.
For information-sharing to become institutionalized, it must become “a social
order or pattern” that has become so ingrained in the minds of the employees that it
occurs without thinking (Jepperson, 1991, p.145). More time needs to be spent evaluating
the actions of the employees of the ROIC in order to conclusively say that informationsharing has become institutionalized. Yet, many of the employees’ actions showed
evidence of functioning in a workplace where information-sharing had been
institutionalized by speaking to each other about the information they had, both during
and outside of the mandated times. After the morning’s hushed concentration, the office
was rarely quiet because people were often working together. It was my experience at the
ROIC that the representatives of federal, state and local agencies communicated and
worked together, so much so that it took me some time to remember who represented
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which agency because hierarchies were not discernable at the ROIC and everyone
comingled.
This is not to say that the ROIC model is perfect. As mentioned earlier, politics is
still an undercurrent with which supervisors need to contend. Fortunately, the human
relationships built at the ROIC help diminish the negative effects of the politics between
NJSP and OHSP. Employees who do not believe information-sharing will ever work in
law enforcement also challenge supervisors. Three employees with whom I spoke
expressed negative opinions about how ROIC initiatives could work. One partner in
particular believed that secrecy was a part of law enforcement that could never be
overcome. That individual personifies the myths that Meyer and Rowan (1991) recognize
as a threat to institutional change. This culture of secrecy and self-protection that the
partner believes still exists pervaded law enforcement before 9/11 and cannot easily be
overcome. After all, organizations are made up of complex people. Some individuals will
continue to withhold information even if demands of the workplace call for sharing
because secrecy was institutionalized in law enforcement for so long.
As Fligstein (1991) points out, a transformation in the organization can occur
once individuals perceive the need for it. Individuals who are reluctant or unwilling to
change may perceive the need for the transformation, but they still have not recognized
their own or the ROIC’s role in this move forward. Even though the ROIC had provided
the environment which would increase opportunities, protection, and freedom for
individuals to change their thoughts and attitudes on information-sharing, the senior-level
officials at the ROIC continue to support, sponsor and model this so change can occur.
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Each individual must continue, on an on-going basis, to see how sharing supports
his/her net value, or claimed expertise, within the constructs of the organization in order
for the institutionalization of information-sharing to continue. Abbott (1988) points out
that in order to legitimize their claimed expertise, organizations, or in this case each law
enforcement agency, competes with one another for jurisdictional monopolies. Releasing
information to other organizations within the fusion center reduces power and renders the
organization that relinquished the information less significant. At the 10:00 meeting,
instead of giving a summary of the 9:30 meeting, the manager of each desk allows the
roll call to continue as it did in the 9:30 meeting despite knowing what is already going to
be said. Each agency is thus able to stake claim of their legitimacy by being the
gatekeepers of information where only they may be able to search particular crime
databases and only they may choose to share the information. Additionally, the inability
to give all of the information they have on a particular subject because of security
clearance issues further legitimizes their existence at the ROIC because they are now the
only ones with access to this information.
The

withholding

of

some

information

does

not

preclude

the

institutionalization of information-sharing. Protection of secret information is necessary
because of legal and ethical conflicts with obligations to protect privacy rights. In this
case, however, the myths of law enforcement help individuals at the ROIC understand at
least one of the major barriers that explain why all information cannot be shared. As
Meyer and Rowan (1991) point out, the formal structure, in this case the various security
clearances which hinder complete information-sharing, dramatically reflect the myths of
law enforcement instead of the demands of their work activities.
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Every law enforcement agency has its own set of rules and security clearances for
several reasons. One reason is that each agency has its own databases of information for
which it screens and then trains its agents to use. Once they are screened and trained in
the sensitive handling of information, the agents are given access to it. Furthermore,
individuals within an agency are trained to recognize what information is relevant to
others outside the agency; this is widely understood throughout law enforcement. By
giving what information they can give in morning huddles and smaller meetings with
those who have the security clearance, individuals are perpetuating the culture of
information-sharing.
There is also an ethics component that affects the sharing of information
that must be noted. Though the current law enforcement environment calls for
information-sharing, there is also an obligation to maintain privacy. Occasions and
circumstances when these obligations conflict with one another may arise, but each
partner at the ROIC must weigh these obligations before discussing the information they
have. Protecting citizens’ right to privacy may be a justifiable reason to withhold
information because as Rosenzweig (2010) points out, a greater analytical capacity comes
at a steep price- “the peril of creating an ineradicable trove of information about innocent
individuals” (p. 626). It is the duty of the law enforcement officials who hold this
information to pass on only the information that is necessary.
Is emergence occurring despite the withholding of information from some
agencies? I argue, yes. The 9:30 meeting often sparks further conversation regarding a
particular event or situation. It is not uncommon for one employee to suggest looking at a
past crime or situation in order to shed more light on a current threat. In fact, the
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managers’ new role of actively engaging with the information and setting tasks for
analysts is more likely to lead to the discovery of emergent information. Once the
analysts return with information from their respective departments, the information can
be used to better understand a specific threat. The analysts in the room at the 9:30 and
10:00 meetings attempt to make connections between the information of which they are
aware and the information they hear from other partners. The ROIC utilizes these
connections to guide and provide direction for further analysis. Sensitive law
enforcement information that is being withheld is often too specific for it to be of greater
significance; instead the more general points of the information are shared among the
employees. Furthermore, the withholding of particular information does not seem to
prevent emergence because the goal of crime analysis is to find patterns which can
eventually lead to the capture of criminals. If all of the sensitive information were being
shared, the ROIC would no longer be engaging in crime analysis or their mission, but
data mining. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) worries that data mining could
lead to the targeting of innocent citizens where they may be harassed or suffer harm to
their reputation (German & Stanley, 2007). Data mining is a practice the ACLU and
others would like to prevent.
In short, the ROIC was created after a shock. 9/11 made the intelligence
community realize that collaboration and information-sharing were necessary in order to
recognize and therefore prevent more threats and attacks. The ROIC then developed an
environment conducive to information-sharing among the various partners. This process
is not linear; it is an iterative process. The ROIC can still improve its information-sharing
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environment and make the flow of information more seamless, and should continue in
these efforts.
Conclusion
It was imperative that New Jersey answer the call from the 9/11 Commission to
develop an umbrella agency which would house many different law enforcement
agencies so that they might collaborate for the common goal of preventing crime. This
structure, the New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center, is an innovative
interagency entity in the fight against terrorism and crime within New Jersey. The main
goal of the fusion center has been accomplished at the ROIC: information is being shared
across federal, state and local law enforcement agencies at the ROIC and significant
intelligence results from these efforts.
There are lessons to be learned from the case study of the New Jersey ROIC, all
of which can be summarized by Havelock’s (1971) astute observation that
“interorganizational processes can be reduced to interpersonal processes,” or the
processes that help expand one’s network of trusted individuals (p. 6-20). First,
collaboration occurs best in a comfortable, safe and positive environment. This can be
fostered by the sponsoring agency through physical spaces that contribute to an
environment of sharing. Large walls or individual offices do not promote sharing; low
walls or no walls at all and open meeting areas do. Second, daily meetings further
encourage the sharing of information by reminding the other employees where they can
go if they need information. It is not enough to work in the same office space; employees
must feel comfortable among each other and realize that they all ultimately have the same
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goal-to protect the public. Finally, for information-sharing to become institutionalized, it
must be reflected in the actions of its management and the organization.
Fusion centers were created after 9/11 so that when multiple threats are
recognized and the system once again “blink(s) red”, law enforcement can recognize and
respond to the threats by working together. Today, fusion centers do more than recognize
terrorist threats; they aid local police agencies with crime analysis and connect them to
resources that are unavailable at the local level. Is the ROIC doing this successfully? The
next two chapters seek to evaluate this component of the ROIC’s duty. The ROIC’s most
ubiquitous source of intelligence, the Common Operating Picture bulletin, is analyzed in
the next chapter to determine whether or not the COP is meeting the needs of its intended
audience.
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Chapter 2
Dissemination of Information to the New Jersey Police Community
The Regional Operations Intelligence Center’s (ROIC) mission, stated simply, is
crime analysis and the dissemination of information and intelligence. Crime analysis
provides context and gives meaning to information so it can be useful. The ROIC
executes the second part of its mission through the Common Operating Picture, or the
COP. 11 Dissemination of the COP must be two-fold: Information must reach both
decision-makers and patrol. Decision-makers include (1) those who decide how to deploy
patrol and (2) those who act as a filter between the large amounts of disseminated
information and patrol. As Mackay and Ratcliffe (2004) point out, the intelligence cycle
is “incomplete unless the intelligence product is used to influence the thinking of the
decision-maker” (p. 148).
Patrol officers are uniformed police officers assigned to monitor a specific
geographic area at a regular interval to look for signs of problems. They are better able to
recognize suspicious behavior in their daily contacts with people and the physical
environment if they are aware of pertinent information. It is critical that information and
intelligence be relayed to the people who can use it in order to identify suspicious
behavior, even if local law enforcement has what some may believe is a limited role in
combating terrorism because of a lack of analytic capabilities and a small jurisdiction.
Moreover, as evidenced by the fusion center’s move toward an all-crimes model,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
<<

!The NJSP analyst responsible for sending out the COP moved to another location after the system’s
observation and examination. Shortly thereafter, distribution of the bulletin was halted so the ROIC could
learn more about its value based on the findings of this study.
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terrorism is often funded by all types of crime. To make the connections between day-today crimes and terrorist funding, local law enforcement must know of current
developments in intelligence.
By asking several questions, this chapter will examine whether the COP is
meeting the ILP needs of local law enforcement and examine the use of the fusion center
in information-sharing in New Jersey. First, are the people who receive the COP those for
whom it is intended? Second, do the recipients read the COP on a daily basis? If not,
why not and what should be added or eliminated to make it more useful?
While e-mail limits the depth of intelligence that can be disseminated in the COP,
survey and interview data help inform the conclusion that the bulletin serves as an
important tool for municipal police agencies, even if it does not necessarily meet their
ILP needs. The COP needs to be distributed more systematically and targeted at more
senior law enforcement officials, who then are able to disseminate what they consider the
most relevant intelligence to patrol. I surmise that at least 25% of the current list of
recipients read the COP. To make the bulletin more useful, the analysts need to help
police officers understand the significance that national and international events hold for
themselves and their town.
Background Information
As a descriptive product, the ROIC disseminates intelligence and verified
information in the COP so that public-safety officials can understand the threat
environment in New Jersey at any given time. This is an important distinction because
open sources, such as CNN, may be able to report on information much more rapidly
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than the ROIC can and apologize later if the information is proven to be incorrect. The
ROIC does not have this luxury; it needs to be right all of the time. The customers—that
is, the public-safety agents of New Jersey—know they are receiving information or
intelligence in the COP that has already been verified through official sources.
The COP e-mail is sent daily between 11:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. Headlines in the
e-mail provide a brief summary of the information. Readers can open the included
attachment if any of the headlines are of interest to them. The information is divided into
categories that include officer safety, current threats, be on the look out (BOLOs),
emerging tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), and general knowledge. BOLOs
often contain pictures of wanted persons accompanied by written physical descriptions.
As patrol officers are the eyes and ears on the ground, they are the most likely lawenforcement personnel to see the wanted persons.
Matters of officer safety are also an important component of the COP. If, for
example, criminals are using a new method to commit a crime that could be hazardous to
the safety of people beyond those in the immediate vicinity, it would be important for the
officers to understand how far the hazards extend. The COP also contains information
regarding new tactics being used by terrorists against certain modes of transportation,
such as trains and airplanes. The officers on the ground need to know about this so they
will be more aware of suspicious behavior surrounding these targets. Appendix D is an
example of a COP bulletin.
Up to 2,500 individuals receive the COP e-mail each day. Because of its size and
the nature of the attachments, the ROIC’s current computer system cannot handle its
mass. Rather, the ROIC sends the bulletin to the Mid Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized
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Crime Law Enforcement Network (MAGLOCLEN), which then sends it to the ROIC’s
listserv. MAGLOCLEN is one of 6 regional centers in a larger network called the
Regional Information-sharing Systems (RISS). RISS is a federally funded program that
links criminal-justice agencies throughout the 50 states, the District of Columbia,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and England. It provides a secure website for law
enforcement to connect and share information. In addition, RISS centers also “provide
essential investigative services, including information-sharing, analytical support,
investigative support and research, equipment loans, confidential funds, training and
publications, field staff support, and technical assistance” (RISS, 2007). MAGLOCLEN
offered to send out the e-mails at no charge to the ROIC, and they accepted.
The COP listserv covers people from all branches of law enforcement. Initially, it
was set up to go out to NJSP and the New Jersey prosecutors’ offices. It has grown so
much that, at present, there is no discernible pattern to who is on the list—currently
representatives from the FBI, DHS, other fusion centers, the NJSP, and police
departments in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The COP is uploaded to the
RISSNET, RISS’ secure intranet which is accessible by thousands of law–enforcement
officials, so it is impossible to know how many more people (third parties) download.
MAGLOCLEN also lacks the capability to determine who or how many people read the
COP on a daily basis.
When the COP e-mail is “kicked back” 3 times from a particular e-mail address,
MAGLOCLEN automatically deletes that e-mail address from the list. Vacation notes are
excluded from this count. Replies to the COP are sent directly to the ROIC, where several
employees read through the e-mail. On average, 1-5 people per week ask to be added or
57

removed from the listserv. Requests to be added come from people who have either read
it on RISSNET or have heard about it from another subscriber. The ROIC representatives
also tell people about the COP and encourage them to ask to be put on the list.
No one at the ROIC knows how many people actually read the COP. Some
employees are of the opinion that very few read the bulletin on a daily basis. They base
this observation on an incident that occurred before I began my ROIC observation, when
the COP was not sent out for three days. During that time, only 3 of the 800 individuals
then on the list e-mailed to inform the ROIC that they had not received the COP, and
those 3 people worked in the ROIC office. While this could be attributed to poor
information-sharing, the employees felt it was indicative of the number of people who
actually read the bulletin.
There has also been dissatisfaction among some individuals who work on the
COP because they question the usefulness of their work. One employee casually
informed me that he did not think that the bulletin was worthwhile to law enforcement
and that the ROIC was not doing enough analysis. Instead, it was repeating open source
material.12 While there was some merit in his statement, as I came to know this person
better, I learned he was an individual who often voiced his dissatisfaction.
No systematic tracking had ever been undertaken to determine the number of
people who read the COP or to determine how it was disseminated to the local police.
The ROIC, therefore, was eager to understand more about its daily product and to receive
information that would help it decide how to make it more useful for the law-enforcement
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12

I found that many of the employees with whom I casually spoke inside the ROIC Analysis Element were
unaware of how much influence their daily product had among local police agencies. They knew only of
successes from other products and partnerships with municipal agencies.
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population. To contextualize the results, I will address an understanding of the theory of
dissemination.
Theoretical Review
The objective of dissemination is to transfer knowledge or information in order to
influence the thinking of the decision-maker (Knott & Wildavsky, 1980; Mackay &
Ratcliffe, 2004). In the case of a fusion center, the information and/or intelligence being
dispersed relates to criminal activity in the center’s state, as well as nationally and
internationally, and is meant to help decision-makers direct their resources.
The dissemination of intelligence is a critical function of the fusion center. As
pointed out by a recent Bureau of Justice Assistance report on ILP, “intelligence is
critical for decision-making, planning, strategic targeting, and crime prevention”
(Peterson, 2005, p. 3). Fusion centers disseminate intelligence to local police agencies,
universities, federal agents, the state police, county prosecutors’ offices, and many other
constituents because the mission of the ROIC is “to interface with the New Jersey law
enforcement community, and other law enforcement and homeland security agencies”
(NJ ROIC, n.d., p.1). In other words, fusion-center officials must determine who has a
“need to know” 13 or would benefit from the intelligence they have collected and
analyzed. The COP is meant to be a quick “one-stop shop” to give the law-enforcement

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13

Need to know is defined in the New Jersey ROIC privacy policy: “a result of jurisdictional,
organizational, or operational necessities, access to sensitive information or intelligence is necessary for the
conduct of an individual’s official duties as part of an organization that has a right to know the information
in the performance of a law enforcement, homeland security, or counter- terrorism activity, such as to
further an investigation or meet another law enforcement requirement” (NJ ROIC, n.d., p. 32).
!

59

community and other stakeholders a quick picture of the emerging threats for the state of
New Jersey.
The most important reason that fusion centers, such as the ROIC, must
disseminate information and intelligence is so the analysis performed at the center about
how to prevent terrorism and crime reaches the people who have the most contact with
citizens on a daily basis. As Henry (2002) points out, “[patrol] interact with the public,
casually or actively obtaining information about the community and the people who
inhabit it” (p. 324). Henry, a retired NYPD officer who holds a Ph.D., notes that “in some
instances, most notably when officers recognize the significance or importance of some
item of information, they take pains to ensure that other officers and, often, other
agencies are formally apprised of it” (p. 324). A man taking pictures outside a train
station may mean nothing to most; but if an officer is aware of intelligence that trains
may be targeted before the anniversary of September 11, he/she may make this known to
a supervisor or other agencies such as the ROIC.
Dissemination of information and intelligence can be problematic for a variety
reasons. Knott and Wildavsky (1980) believed that, while there is a universal acceptance
of it, disseminators are asked to be “the translators, interpreters, and gatekeepers for
government decision-makers” (p. 539). They equated this to command. Under the guise
of spreading knowledge, disseminators are likely to promote their own policy. This
suggests that the fusion center disseminators choose which intelligence to send to the
local agencies as a way of directing their law-enforcement efforts. If the center, in
response to real threats, wanted local agencies and their patrol to target terrorism more,
they might send more bulletins and information on the new tactics of terrorism and other
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reports of suspicious activity that might be related to terrorism than would an
organization with a different focus. Some might find this problematic, thinking fusion
centers may be promoting their own agenda of preventing terrorist activities, whereas
local police agencies may have other crime concerns for which they would like to have
more intelligence.
In addition, Knott and Wildavsky (1980) warned of information overload. By
disseminating too much information, disseminators may find themselves overburdened in
their efforts to maintain the constant flow of information, and the recipients may not be
able to keep up with reading the information. Law enforcement has many sources of
information, including county prosecutors’ offices, other state fusion centers, federal
databases, and bulletins disseminated by higher authorities within the department. Some
police officers receive hundreds of e-mails every week. Knott and Wildavsky’s article—
“If dissemination is the solution, what is the problem?”—was written in 1980, well
before the Internet was used to disseminate criminal-justice intelligence. The advent of
the Internet arguably makes it far easier for information to be disseminated, which makes
Knott and Wildavsky’s warnings that much more relevant and important.
Disseminators must also be sure they are sending information that has meaning.
As de Bruijn (2006) points out, “an actor who continuously shares meaningless
information runs the risk that others will, at some state, ignore it even when it is highly
relevant” (p. 7). Fusion centers need to share products that have meaning to the police
work that law enforcement is conducting, rather than information or knowledge that
could have been garnered from open sources such as news media. Mackay and Ratcliffe
(2004) believe that intelligence reporting should have three characteristics: It should not
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be common knowledge or open source material; it should have an angle that is relevant to
the client; and it should be intelligence that is both not obvious to the intended audience
and firmly judgmental (p. 151). While it might be ideal to adhere to these criteria, it is not
possible in this case due to the nature of the transmission. The ROIC is aware of
instances where criminals have been in possession of documents disseminated by the
center. For this reason, the COP cannot contain as many details as some may want.
It is not merely enough to choose how much and what to disseminate; the ROIC
must also share its intelligence output with the appropriate users (Carter & Carter,
2009a). In addition to decision-makers and patrol, city universities with public-safety
agencies could also find the information useful. Private companies that carry out
government contracts in weapons or aeronautics may also need the information so they
are aware of any growing threats to them. It is important for the fusion center to assess
and define every stakeholder and to disseminate the information to all who may have a
legitimate need for it.
Using experience and industry training, fusion-center analysts must carefully
balance the need for good, quality information with possibly negative results of overdissemination and avoid sending out unreliable information. In other words, the
information must be accurate, timely, and meaningful. English (2005) contends that
information quality is a priority in national security and defines information quality14 as
“consistently meeting knowledge worker and end-customer expectations” (p. 19). Police
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14

Information quality has also been defined in the ROIC’s privacy policy as “the various aspects of the
information; the accuracy and validity of the actual values of the data, data structure, and database/data
repository design. Traditionally, the basic elements of information quality have been identified as accuracy,
completeness, currency, reliability, and context/meaning. Today, information quality is being more fully
described in multidimensional models, expanding conventional views of the topic to include considerations
of accessibility, security, and privacy” (NJ ROIC, n.d., p. 30).
!
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officers have become knowledge workers who must share knowledge and work closely
with other knowledge workers in order to be proactive rather than reactive. Police need to
predict and attempt to prevent crime before it occurs, which is why police organizations
have transformed themselves from quasi-military organizations to knowledge
organizations (Gottschalk, Holgersson, & Karlsen, 2009, p. 88).
It is the police officer’s role as a knowledge worker that makes him/her and
information-sharing important to the ILP process. The officer needs the intelligence that
comes from the fusion-center analysis in order to first situate him/herself in a place where
he/she is most likely to do the most good and second to recognize suspicious behavior. In
addition, he/she policeman must understand what information he/she needs to send to the
ROIC so it may be analyzed and the ROIC can send a more accurate picture of trends in
crimes, the nature and extent of a particular problem, and where the greatest threat may
be.
Yet, the end-customer expectations of everyone on the COP listserv are not
necessarily known. Some may want the snapshot of international and national news as it
pertains to New Jersey. Some may want information about officer safety so their officers
are aware of the newest criminal techniques and tactics. Others may want information
that helps them prevent crime in their city, which would include information from
neighboring cities and counties about the most recent crime patterns.
Meeting the expectations of the customers on the listserv is not necessarily
synonymous with being effective. As Carter and Carter (2009a) point out, determining
“whether the information and intelligence disseminated by the fusion center have resulted
in the prevention, mitigation, and control of crime and terrorism” is an incredibly elusive
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measure of effectiveness (p. 1337). Few studies have been able to determine this.
However, Carter and Carter (2009a) state that there has been some anecdotal evidence on
the positive side, but it would be too early to conclude any empirical assessment of
success.
If effectiveness is elusive, the next best measure might be utility. For
dissemination to have utility, the information must be timely and accurate. Larry P.
English, president of the consulting company Information Impact International Inc.,
describes an incident in 2003 in which six flights between Paris and Los Angeles were
cancelled based on information indicating that al-Qaeda might be planning to hijack the
planes. The cancellations not only inconvenienced many passengers, but they also had a
significant economic impact on the airline. As English (2005) points out, if the
information had been accurate, a large-scale attack had been prevented. If not, the airline
and its passengers were inconvenienced by bad information that should have been
screened before it was disseminated. It may seem like a small price to pay to prevent
another 9/11-style terrorist attack, but screening the information and the dissemination of
quality information can reduce the errors of unnecessary over-reaction.
Errors in information fall into two types. Type I errors are false positives, which,
if inaccurate, are similar to the situation English described. Type II errors are false
negatives and are exemplified by the errors made during 9/11—that is, the inability to
recognize looming terrorist attacks. Information must be screened carefully to prevent
type I errors, but it must also be screened quickly and disseminated to those who need it
to prevent type II errors.
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In addition to maintaining accuracy, the ROIC must also abide by state and
federal regulations for collecting, storing, and disseminating criminal-intelligence data.
At the state and local levels, the authority that guides law enforcement in this domain is
28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)- (Judicial Administration), Chapter 1 (Department
of Justice), Part 23 (criminal intelligence systems operating policies). Its purpose is to
ensure that all criminal intelligence systems protect U.S. citizens’ constitutional rights.
The regulation recognizes that criminal activities that include drug trafficking, gambling,
bribery, and corruption of public officials “involve some degree of regular coordination
and permanent organization involving a large number of participants over a broad
geographical area”; but the collection of intelligence regarding such crimes potentially
threatens the privacy and rights of individuals. The regulation thus defines the operating
principles for gathering and storing criminal intelligence for all criminal-intelligence
systems operating with support from the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.
Given the many difficulties associated with disseminating information, it is
reasonable to question the utility of the daily informational bulletins, especially if the
ROIC does not know who or how many people are actually reading them.
Why not simply make the bulletins available to the law enforcement community
on RISSNET and allow people to upload them when they are able to do so? There are
several reasons to continue the current practice. First, the bulletins will garner a larger
pool of readers if the recipients receive the information in an e-mail rather than being
required to go to a password-protected website. Ease of access via e-mail allows readers
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to skim through the material and quickly decide whether or not to read it. If something
catches their attention, they can get to the information immediately.
Moreover, by sending the information to all the police departments in New Jersey,
the ROIC can increase its collaborative reach. Collaboration is the mission set by the
Information-sharing Environment, which was established in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Executive Order 13355, later amended by Executive
Order 13470, more broadly states that an important goal of the intelligence community,
of which the ROIC and all fusion centers are a part, is to provide information to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council so they
may make the most informed decisions regarding the protection of the United States’
national interests.
Fusion centers, therefore, must have the capability and structure to produce
intelligence that can be distributed to all the appropriate stakeholders. By designing a
structure that reflects the directions of myths and, in this case, executive order, Meyer
and Rowan (1991) believed that an organization “demonstrates that it is acting on
collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner” (p. 50). Fusion centers are
legitimizing their existence, strengthening support, and securing their survival by
demonstrating their adherence to collective values. Meyer and Rowan hypothesized that
organizations that omit environmentally legitimated elements will lack acceptable
legitimate accounts of their activities. These types of organizations “are more vulnerable
to claims that they are negligent, irrational or unnecessary” (Meyer and Rowan, p.50). If
the ROIC intends to survive, it cannot be perceived as being negligent or unnecessary in
the publicly funded world of law enforcement.
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In summary, while dissemination is challenging, it is important for a fusion center
to inform public-safety agencies and officials of their threat environment. In theory,
awareness of the significance of objects in their environment would increase the amount
and quality of information that the public-safety officials send back to the fusion centers.
The results will help us determine whether the ROIC is reaching the decision-makers and,
thus, patrol and whether they find the COP information to be useful.
Results
Before sending out a survey to the ROIC listserv, we wanted to try to determine
how many people were reading the COP bulletin. The first step was to request an e-mail
receipt. As stated earlier, the ROIC sends out an e-mail with headline topics and an
attachment with more detailed information. The following message was included at the
top of the attachment portion of the e-mail to find out how many people were opening the
attachment:
The N.J. ROIC Analysis Element is conducting an internal audit of outgoing intelligence products.
This is part of an ongoing project to better understand the needs of the customers. Please send a
blank e-mail to njroicanalysis@gw.njsp.org to confirm that you have received and read this
bulletin.

This would yield a very conservative estimate of the COP readership as it was asking
people to cut and paste the address into a new e-mail, rather than simply pressing the
reply key. In this case, 75 responses were received from the 806 people on the listserv at
the time.
The next step was to determine whether the COP e-mail was opened or instantly
deleted, a measure related to delivery status notification. This is a request to the e-mail
recipient’s server to return a notification of the delivery—i.e., whether it has been read,
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has been deleted without being read, or has been delivered but not read.15 The COP
bulletin was sent on Thursday, January 13, 2011, to all listed first-order recipients: 806
people. The result showed that 157 people opened the e-mail the first day, 23 more
people opened the e-mail over the next 8 days, 56 people deleted the e-mail without
reading it. Another 16 instances noted that the recipients were either retired, no longer in
the position, or unknown. In addition, 5 people were “out of the office” for a period of
time. In total, about 32% (257/806) of the listserv was “tracked,” with a read rate of about
22% (180/806). The NJSP did not have any read receipts. We surmised that this agency
and the remaining 549 recipients who were not tracked had firewalls that disallowed
delivery status notifications when sent from outside the network.
The COP was tracked for the NJSP on January 31, 2011.16 The results indicated
that of the 74 NJSP and partners with NJSP addresses, 17 people (about 20%) read it, 37
people deleted it without opening it, and 20 people had not responded as of February 8,
2011.17
In total, the COP was tracked for 41% (331) of the people on the listserv. If we
assume that the rest of the listserv who could not be tracked read the bulletin at the same
rate, , we could estimate that 60% (197/331) of the listserv opened the COP bulletin e!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
<"

!The initial delivery-status notification did not work. Nothing came back even after several people in the
office open the e-mail to check the system. Working with the technical support at MAGLOCLEN, it
became apparent that the tracking service on the mail server was treating the list as one person. By creating
a group, each person would be counted as an individual and the e-mails would be tracked for every person.
For security reasons, this could be done only once.!
<#
!In order to measure how many of the NJSP read the e-mail, all NJSP e-mail addresses received the COP
directly from the ROIC. This allowed us to see who read the it because we were sending it from inside the
e-mail network. This did not capture those outside the NJSP, so the results will need to be combined to see
how many people are reading the COP in total. Unfortunately, we do not know how many other agencies
utilize firewalls, so we are unable to get the results of the e-mail test for the entire list. This gives us a
rough estimate for just under half the list. Although the e-mail was sent two weeks after the first tracking, I
believe the results can still be combined because the list adds or deletes only a few people each week.
17
Many of the people within the office do not read the COP, because it contains information they had
already discussed in the morning huddle.!
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mail sent from the ROIC. For a more conservative estimate, we can assume that only the
197 recipients read the bulletin, which is a read rate of 24% (197/806).
Survey of COP Readers
Before I sent the COP readership survey, I learned that the number of people on
the COP listserv had increased to more than 2,500 people after the Law Enforcement
Outreach Officer had added his list of contacts to the listserv, without the knowledge of
two of the other list managers. The new contacts included many local and state police.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to replicate the COP tracking with this larger list, as
many of the additional recipients were out of the network and e-mails sent from the
ROIC could not be traced. If the additional 1,700 contacts would have responded at the
same rate as the initial 800 contacts, a return rate of about 10% would have been
expected.
However, this is only an assumption because there are differences between the
two recipient sets with respect to the amount of time they had been exposed to the e-mail
listserv. Nevertheless, I have assumed that these new additions can increase the number
of respondents to the survey because more of the recently added recipients might be
interested in the material that is disseminated and enthusiastic about receiving it.
If recipients do not read the ROIC e-mails because they receive too many overall,
ignoring these e-mails might occur only after recipients have been on the list for an
extended period. Newer recipients may still read them regularly rather than delete them
and will thus be more likely to respond to the request to respond to a five-minute survey.
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To assess perceptions by COP readership about the daily bulletin, a survey was
created and a link to take the survey e-mailed to the listserv on March 7, 2011 (see
Appendix B). The e-mail read as follows:
Dear NJ COP bulletin readership,
In an effort to improve our operations and enhance the quality of the NJ Common Operating
Picture (COP) report, we are sending a survey to you regarding various aspects of the report we
would like your opinion on. As a valued member of the law enforcement community, your
feedback is critical to this initiative and the overall viability of the NJ ROIC and the successful
execution of its mission.
The survey can be found at https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/NJROICCOP and should take only
a few minutes to complete. Any information you include will be managed confidentially. We are
committed to continuous improvement in all areas and your participation in this survey is very
much appreciated.
Thank you for your support. If you would like to provide your comments to us directly, please feel
free to contact researcher Carla Cue18 directly at (210) 836-6640 or at njroicanalysis@gw.njsp.org
Thank you in advance for your involvement,
Analysis Element
NJ Regional Operations Intelligence Center
2 Schwarzkopf Drive
West Trenton, NJ 08628
(609) 963-6901
(609) 671-0923 fax!

In addition a link to the survey was also included in the COP e-mail, asking people to
participate. The results show 138 responses on the first day and a declining number
thereafter. A second reminder e-mail, March 15, 2011, generated 38 responses that day
and, again, a decline thereafter. Hypothesizing that the response rate might increase if the
e-mail were personalized, a final e-mail was sent on April 6, 2011, from the personal
work account of the privacy officer rather than the generic ROIC account. The survey
garnered a response rate of about 12.6% (315/2500).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18

Cue is the author’s maiden name and was used for all contact during the survey and initial set of
interviews.
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To keep the response time to less than five minutes, there were only three
mandatory questions. The required information included the agency name, the type of
organization for which the respondent worked (federal, state, local, tribal, private sector),
and the respondent’s position within the organization (upper-level management, middlelevel management, patrol). All the other questions were optional. The results indicated
that 250 of 315 people (79.4%) completed the survey. Some respondents chose not to
answer some of the questions.
An important caveat must be noted. Given the approximate percentage of
individuals on the COP listserv who completed the survey (12.6%), the survey’s results
should be understood as the opinions of those who are most invested in the COP.
Therefore, the results may be skewed toward more positive responses about the COP
rather than what might have been elicited if all the recipients had responded. This could
mean that those who did not respond to the survey might have wanted even more
information than the survey respondents requested.
If those with less interest in the product want more private information, the ROIC
is unable to address this problem because of 28 CFR Part 23. Other non-respondents may
be representative of law enforcement officers who never read any intelligence or
information and prefer to be more reactive than proactive. There is no way to know how
this affects the survey results. If, however, the ROIC considers the suggestions of the
survey recipients, perhaps more people will read the COP.
In addition, the results of the survey represent the entire COP listserv, which
includes people from federal, state, local, and private entities. To better understand the
interaction of public-safety personnel with the COP, results of interviews conducted with
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the recipients are included to provide more depth to the survey results. While this cannot
completely address the problem of obtaining the opinions of those with the most vested
interest, an attempt to conduct in-depth interviews with those who did not answer the
survey will help us understand how most police officers use the COP.19 In order to be
thorough, interviews had to be limited to a particular group. Therefore, only local police
were interviewed because they represent the largest percentage of the COP listserv and
have the most contact with the public.
Response rates to the survey questions varied. The final two questions, which
asked for additional comments and what type of information should be included in the
COP bulletin, received the lowest response rates—only 25% and 15%, respectively.
Table 2.1 shows the response rates for all of the questions. All other questions had a
mean response rate of 83% and a median of 81%.
Table 2.1: Response rate for survey questions
# of
responses

Percentage

Name, E-mail, Contact
number

160

51%

Agency Name*

315

100%

Question

Type of organization at which
you work*

Position within organization*

315

315

Details

Optional

100%

Federal, state,
local, tribal,
private sector

100%

Upper, middle
level
management,
frontline

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19

Not every person who answered the survey provided an e-mail address. If provided, e-mail addresses
were deleted from the master list of people who were considered for interviews. Only one person who was
interviewed stated that he had completed the survey.
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Would you characterize your
department as urban, rural or
neither?

What type of crimes are a
priority in your department?
How are ROIC products
received in your respective
department?
How is the information made
available to frontline
personnel or those with
everyday contact with the
public?

On average, how often do you
read the COP attachment

315

246

270

268

272

100%

Urban, rural,
state-level,
federal-level

78%

Violent, property,
public nuisance,
terrorism, white
collar

86%

Dispatch, chief,
bureau head, email, other

85%

E-mail, posting,
meeting, not
made available

86%

Every day, every
other day, 12/week, 1/month,
never

When was the last time you
read the COP attachment
closely?

272

86%

Yesterday, few
days ago, last
week, last month,
cannot remember

What was it about?

159

51%

Open-ended

Why did you read it closely?

160

51%

Open-ended

Do you regularly forward the
e-mail to anyone?

269

85%

93

30%

258

82%

To how many people do you
forward it?
On a scale of 1-10, 1 being
not valuable at all and 10
being extremely valuable,
how valuable is the
information in the COP?
How is the information in the
COP used?

258
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82%

0, 1-5, 5-10, 1050, 50+

Senior officials,
midmanagement, all

people, no use,
other

What type of bulletin would
be most useful?

259

82%

Daily, weekly,
biweekly,
monthly, when
sig. event occurs

Are you and/or your
department units familiar with
all of the
resources/capabilities
available to assist public
safety efforts at the N.J.
ROIC?

246

78%

Yes/No

Have you found any of the
other intelligence products
distributed by the ROIC
useful? i.e. POP reports,
incident assessments, etc.

246

78%

Yes/No

Does your department know
"where to go" with a request
for N.J. ROIC assistance
(contact information, ROIC
internal structure)?

246

78%

Yes/No

What type of information
should be included in the COP
in order to make it more
useful?

80

25%

Open-ended

Additional comments

38

12%

Open-ended

250

79%

Completed the survey

*= Mandatory questions

The majority (63%) of the survey respondents classified their organization as
local. These included local New Jersey city police departments, Pennsylvania and
Connecticut police departments, and county prosecutors’ offices. The majority of the
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25% of respondents who classified their agency as state-level represented the NJSP and
the New Jersey OHSP. A quarter of the respondents (25%) were from a state organization
and 7.9% worked for a federal entity. Most of the federal representation came from the
FBI. Only one respondent worked for a tribal organization, and 4% of respondents
worked in the private sector. The ROIC personnel assumed there are not many tribal
agencies represented on the listserv. There was an almost equal distribution of
representation from upper-level management (33.7%), middle-level management
(30.2%), and patrol (36.2%). Most of the respondents (41.9%) work in an urban setting.
Respondents from rural and state-level departments each had 76 respondents—or 24.12%
of the total number of respondents. Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the
survey respondents.
Table 2.2
Descriptive statistics for survey respondents (315)
Type of Organization
Federal
7.90%
State
25%
Local
63%
Tribal
1%
Private
4%
Level within Organization
Upper-level
33.70%
Mid-level
30.20%
Frontline
36.20%
Setting of department
Federal
9.86%
State
24.12%
Urban
41.90%
Rural
24.12%
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COP: Who Gets It? How Do They Get It?
!

Survey questions asked how the COP bulletin is received,20 how it is made

available to patrol, and, if e-mailed, to how many people it is forwarded. The results
revealed that of the 270 people who responded to the question, 84% receive the COP email by personal/work e-mail. This large percentage is to be expected as this is the main
method of distribution for the COP. Fifteen percent of respondents receive the COP from
the chief, the bureau or unit head, or through dispatch. One person responded that he/she
manually looks for it online.
Table 2.3
How Do You Receive the ROIC Products?

Personal/Work E-mail

From the Chief/the Bureau
or Unit Head

Look up Manually

228 (84%)

41 (15%)

1 (.37%)
Total Responses:270

The principal audience for whom the ROIC writes the COP bulletin is the law
enforcement community, including patrol as they have the most day-to-day contact with
the public. When asked in the survey how the information in the COP bulletin is made
available to those who have daily contact with the public, 63% of respondents (169/268)
said it was made available by e-mail; 19% make the information available in a meeting of
officers such as briefings or roll calls; and an additional 4% post the COP in a public
area. Four percent of the respondents said it was not made available to any other people.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
>D

While the ROIC sends out an e-mail, we surmised that people could also receive the product as a forward
from someone else. The COP is also posted to RISSNET and could be downloaded. !!
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Of those who responded “other” (8%) and chose to fill in a response, the majority said
the information was made available to specific departments or squads. A minority said
the information was made available in all the previously mentioned formats, and the
deciding factor was the nature of the information itself. For example, a wanted picture
may be posted in the break room for all of the officers to view. One respondent said the
information is put in the officers’ mailboxes.

Table 2.4
How Is the Information Made Available to Frontline Personnel or Those
with Everyday Contact with the Public?
E-mail

Meeting

Posting

Other

Not Available

169 (63%)

53 (20%)

13 (5%)

12 (4%)

21 (8%)
Total Responses: 268

In some departments, the supervisor is the only one who receives the COP. He or
she will then forward it to an intelligence officer or the entire patrol. It is important to
note that the people on the listserv are not the only ones who receive this bulletin. Emails can be forwarded easily, which is the main reason why top-secret information is
omitted from this document. To find out how many people forward the COP e-mail,
survey respondents were asked, “Do you regularly forward the COP bulletin e-mail to
anyone?” Among those who responded to this question, 271 (34%) answered. Those
respondents were then directed to the question, “To how many people do you forward
it?” The largest group, 42 (15%) indicated that they forward the e-mail to 1-5 people; 20
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(7%) indicated that they forward it to 5-10 people; 23 (8%) responded that they forward it
to 10-50 people; and 7 respondents (3%) said they forward it to more than 50 people.
Table 2.5
Do You Regularly Forward the COP Bulletin E-mail to Anyone? If Yes, to
How Many People?
0

1-5 People

5-10 People

10-50 People

50+people

179 (66%)

42 (15%)

20 (7%)

23 (8%)

7 (3%)
Total Responses: 271

The next question sought to find out how and who is using the information—for
example, if it used by upper-level management to direct patrol, by middle management
for investigative purposes, or for general awareness that is made accessible to the entire
department. The responses of the 258 people who answered this question were not
mutually exclusive: 36%, the greatest number of responses, indicated that investigative
personnel were made aware of the information; 29% noted that all people in the
department were made aware of the information; 24% said that only patrol personnel
were apprised of the information; 24% indicated that middle management decides how to
use the information; and 20% said that senior officials use the information to direct those
under their command. A small number of respondents, 2%, said that the information was
of no use. The majority of the respondents who provided an open-ended response (5%)
indicated that they selectively forward the information to others to whom they feel it is
relevant.
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Table 2.6
How is the Information in the COP Used?
Investigative
Personnel

All
People

Patrol
Personnel

Middle
Management

Senior
Officials

No Use

Other

93 (36%)

74
(29%)

63 (24%)

61 (24%)

51
(20%)

6 (2%)

13
(5%)

Total Responses: 258

In-depth interviews were conducted to shed more light on how patrol received the
information. In some departments, the chief had decided that all police should regularly
receive the daily COP bulletin, either by e-mail or during the roll-call meeting at the
beginning of the shift. Police could choose whether or not to read it if sent by e-mail, but
at least the information was made available to them. In other departments, only detectives
received the bulletin. Many police-agency detectives did not know if patrol received it.
Some agencies printed the bulletin and left it in the break room or in a book with other
notices for the patrol. This book or binder contained BOLOs and other officer-safety
notices.
One surprising and very significant finding that emerged from the interviews was
that many of the officers interviewed did not know how they initially started receiving the
e-mails. Many of the officers in middle-management positions or in patrol said they
started receiving the COP one day and surmised that their chief had included their names
on the list. They actually did not know whether others within the department were on the
distribution list but thought that their colleagues also received it. One of the detectives
said he always believed everyone received it until—after I approached him for an
interview—he asked others and was surprised to discover that was not the case.
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One of the most interesting findings from the in-depth interviews was how
frequently one person within a department would take it upon himself or herself to make
patrol aware of the COP bulletin. Many police departments did not have enough staff to
cull through intelligence and send out only what was relevant to patrol. Thus, many of
officers interviewed printed out the bulletin or specific parts of it to distribute to patrol or
display on a board where it would be noticed by patrol. These officers valued ILP and
believed it not only could help direct the focus of patrol but could also provide good
information for the safety of their fellow officers.
Figure 2.1 shows the COP dissemination process for the police agencies that were
interviewed. The ROIC sends the COP (by way of MAGLOCLEN) to the chief, select
officers, or to dispatch. An e-mail address for a dispatch unit is included in the
distribution list only if the chief or someone within the department has given this e-mail
address to the ROIC. The chief will then forward the bulletin to an intelligence analyst
who reads through it to determine whether there is any pertinent information. If so, the
analyst will forward the e-mail to the officers in the department or post it in the break
room. One chief with whom I spoke e-mailed it to dispatch only if he wanted it to be read
by other officers. Many of the select officers indicated they did nothing with the COP
after they received it. As mentioned earlier, however, a few proactive officers did print
out the sections of the COP they thought were most important and distributed them to
patrol via e-mail or a flyer in the break room.

80

Figure 2.1
COP Dissemination Process
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In addition, communication failures occur if some of the New Jersey police
departments are absent from the COP distribution list. Given that the list was not set up
systematically, this is a very real possibility. If no one in a given department is receiving
the COP by e-mail, it can be assumed that patrol would receive it only if the county
prosecutor’s office has forwarded it to that patrol’s department.
I interviewed police officers from 13 different counties across New Jersey and
found that some counties were more proactive than others about sending information.
Some police officers did not know if their county sent out a regular crime bulletin, while
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many other officers noted that they received criminal information bulletins not only from
their own county, but from other counties as well.
Select officers may not pass the COP on if they believe everyone is receiving it
already. Regardless of department size, dissemination of the COP varies and is
fragmented for some agencies. In one city, an officer said the department had its own
intelligence unit and, therefore, distributed the COP information in its own bulletin.
Another officer, from a large city, said there was no information-sharing or COP
distribution in his department. In fact, even within the department, the shifts did not
communicate important local intelligence gathered from the night before. Still, other
officers interviewed said they often saw information from the COP in intelligence
bulletins put out by other agencies.
Another important concern uncovered during the interviews was that not all
police had access to work e-mail; and those who did were not required to check regularly.
Thus, the only way for them to receive the information consistently is if someone within
the department is assigned or takes the initiative to disseminate it in another manner.
How Often Is the COP Read?
!

For relevant information to be used by patrol, the ROIC must first ensure that the
e-mail recipients are receiving and then reading it. Tracking the e-mail indicated only
about 10% of the recipients sent back a read receipt. Therefore, the survey respondents
were asked, “On average, how often do you open the COP bulletin attachment to read
more about a topic in the COP bulletin?” This would indicate whether the information
contained in the daily COP bulletin appeals to the e-mail recipients. Of the 272
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respondents, 161 (59%) responded that they opened the attachment daily, 80 (29%)
indicated that they read it every other day or once or twice a week, and 14 (5%) said they
read it once a month or never. The “other” option was chosen 17 (6%) whose most
frequent response was that they read it upon receiving it. This most likely means that they
read it when it has been forwarded to them from another source.
Table 2.7
On Average, How Often Do You Open the COP Bulletin Attachment to Read
More About a Topic?

Daily

1-2 Times a
Week

Once a Month

Never

Other

161 (59%)

80 (29%)

8(3%)

6(2%)

17 (6%)

Total Responses: 272

Despite assurances that the survey was anonymous, survey respondents may have
answered in what they perceived to be a socially desirable way and thus may have felt the
need to overestimate how often they read the COP bulletin. However, there is some
evidence that people will answer in a less socially desirable way when using an electronic
survey (Kiesler, Siegel, & McGuire, 1984; Kiesler & Sproull, 1986). I, therefore, asked
respondents, “When was the last time you read the COP attachment closely?” followed
by “What was it about?” and “Why did you read it closely?” Among the respondents, 136
(50%) said they had read it yesterday, 102 (38%) indicated they had read it in the last few
days or last week, and 34 (13%) said they had read it in the last month or could not
remember the last time they had read it closely. The two subsequent open-ended
questions generated far less feedback. Of the 272 respondents, 159 (58%) and 160 (59%)
respondents respectively, skipped the questions entirely. Several possibilities may explain
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this lack of response. Respondents simply may not have wanted to write the real
response, they honestly could not remember, they could have overestimated how often or
how recently they read the COP and might not have remembered its specific contents.
Table 2.8
When Was the Last Time You Read the COP Attachment Closely?

Yesterday

A Few Days
Ago

Last Week

Last Month

Cannot
Remember

136 (50%)

68 (25%)

34 (13%)

5 (2%)

29 (11%)
Total Responses: 272

When asked about the last COP attachment they read, many survey respondents
remembered they had read about terrorism and some mentioned reading international
bulletins. By dividing the responses according to local/statewide bulletins, national
bulletins, and international/terrorism bulletins, I found that 64 responses included a
terrorism or international component. One of the most widely read and, therefore, most
popular items was a bulletin about water-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Water-borne IEDs were a recent topic and, while the large number of responses could be
attributed to the recent bulletin on the subject, recall may also be ascribed to the topic’s
distinctiveness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). While local and statewide responses were
also popular, very few respondents remembered national bulletins. The rest of the
responses were varied and included answers that mentioned human-trafficking, drugs,
and gangs.
Respondents reported a variety of motives that prompted them to read the
bulletin. One of the most frequent was that it was normal procedure or part of their jobs.
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These respondents said it was their due diligence to keep up with threats in order to piece
together information. Another group of respondents stated that they read the bulletin
because it pertained to their area of patrol or an area very close to them. A smaller group
of respondents said they read the bulletin because it sounded interesting or because they
saw something in it that they might see often in their own communities. For example, one
respondent noted that a bulletin on fraudulent student visas piqued his interest because
his department sees many student visas.
In-depth interviews helped reveal how frequently police officers read the COP
bulletin. Upper-level management—including chiefs, captains, and lieutenants—
skimmed through the COP every day. They seemed to know immediately whether the
information was germane to their needs and concerns. When asked how they knew what
to look for, many replied that experience had given them the knowledge to understand
what was most pertinent to them and their departments. On the other hand, middle-level
management—including detectives and sergeants—were less likely to read through the
bulletin. Many, with the exception of the officers who had taken it upon themselves to
disseminate intelligence, said they would skim through it when they had time.
When asked what types of headlines made them read further, all the interviewees
mentioned items about officer safety or cities or counties in their immediate vicinity.
Many of the officers skipped information if was not about something in their area. For
example, officers in cities in southern New Jersey scrolled down to the southern New
Jersey section of the COP bulletin to see if there were any crime patterns emerging in that
area. One officer, however, did say he read about what was occurring in northern New
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Jersey because he believed that crime patterns and trends that first occurred in that area
would eventually be replicated in the southern part of the state.
The interviewees also read the information in the bulletin if the headlines
corresponded to intelligence regarding soft targets in their own communities. For
example, one police officer explained that, because his town has many highways and
hotels, he looked for headlines that may offer intelligence about highways as targets or
new tactics or techniques criminals are using involving transportation. More recently,
intelligence has been received that train stations may be the next targets of terrorist
attacks, and many New Jersey cities have passenger train lines that run through them. The
interviewees mentioned they consistently read the in-depth passages that mention train
stations. Other officers read the intelligence only when it pertained to their area of
investigation such as gangs or narcotics.
What Do Recipients Want in a Daily Bulletin?
!

!

I asked survey respondents to name the focus of their unit or department in order
to determine what type of information is most useful. This was not a mutually exclusive
question, so respondents were able to select more than one option. There were 246
responses. Property crimes had the greatest number, with 155 (63%) of respondents,
while violent crimes and public nuisance crimes had 141 (57%) and 104 (42%) responses,
respectively. Terrorism and white-collar crimes had the least number of responses with
89 (36%) and 66 (27%) responses, respectively. Of the 41% of respondents who chose to
add a response for “other,” many said the focus of their department was all of the crimes.
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Intelligence, training, narcotics, and traffic were also recorded as responses for other foci
of the department.
Table 2.9
What Types of Crimes are a Priority in Your Department?
Property

155 (63%)

Violent

141 (57%)

Public Nuisance

Terrorism

White Collar

Other

104 (42%)

89
(36%)

66 (27%)

102 (41%)

Total Responses: 246

The final portion of the survey sought to determine the importance respondents
ascribed to the COP bulletin, how it could be improved, and if they knew about the other
resources the ROIC offers. First, the survey asked the respondents to rate the information
in the COP bulletin on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being not valuable at all and 10 being
extremely valuable. The majority of the 260 respondents (80%) rated the COP bulletin at
5 or higher. The mode was 8, with nearly a quarter of the responses. Only 6% of the
respondents rated the information at a 2 or 3; no one rated the information at a 1.
One concern expressed by some of the ROIC analysts was about information
overload—whether the center is sending out too much information too frequently. I,
therefore, asked the respondents what type of dissemination schedule would be most
useful. Of the 259 respondents, 200 (78%) indicated that a daily (39%) or weekly (39%)
bulletin would be most useful, only 16 (6%) felt the schedule should be reduced to
biweekly or monthly e-mails, and 24 (9%) felt that the bulletin should be disseminated
only when a significant event occurred. Many of those who responded “other” (19 or 7%)
indicated they would like to see it on a daily basis and also when significant events occur.
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Table 2.10
What Type of Bulletin Would Be Most Useful?
Daily

Weekly

Bi-weekly

Monthly

Sig. Event

Other

100 (39%)

100 (39%)

9 (3%)

7 (3%)

24 (9%)

19 (7%)

Total Responses: 259

The final two open-ended questions were presented to further determine what
recipients would like to see in the daily bulletin. The first question—“What type of
information should be included in the COP bulletin in order to make it more useful?”—
elicited 80 responses. Many of the respondents praised the current configuration of the
bulletin and said it should remain the same. However, a majority of wanted more local or
New Jersey-centric information. Respondents said they could find the information about
international crises in the news but wanted to know how these related to them or to a
patrol in New Jersey. Many added that the information needed to be timelier and that
emergency notifications should be sent out as needed.
The second question asked for any additional comments. Once again, many were
very complimentary and praised the efforts of the ROIC to report intelligence to the New
Jersey law-enforcement community. There were some negative comments, including
“Too much of the information contained in the COP is a repeat of common open source
news.” Another respondent said, “The COP bulletin is far inferior to other fusion center
products I receive,” but did not elaborate. Other than these two comments, however, the
rest were positive or offered minor suggestions for improvement.
In-depth interviews reiterated what survey respondents said about the COP
bulletin. Many appreciated the information, even if it was available on open-source
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websites such as CNN. Interviewees said they did not always have time to read
newspapers and could, therefore, go to the COP to get the most accurate account of what
had occurred nationally or internationally. Osama bin Laden’s death had occurred prior to
the interviews, and some respondents said they did read through the COP intelligence on
bin Laden because they believed the ROIC was able to give an unbiased opinion, as
opposed to what was offered by other omnipresent news sources. While open-source
material was being read by survey respondents, this was rarely the type of information
that was forwarded to patrol.
Not every officer interviewed agreed that all of the information in the COP
warranted inclusion. One analyst, in charge of collecting bulletins and then disseminating
pertinent information to his department every 2 weeks, stated that he thought patrol
would see open-source material in the news; therefore, he believed there was no reason
for the ROIC to put it in its intelligence reports. Another officer, who sent out his own
daily bulletin to his department and nearby agencies, also complained that inclusion of
the open-source material was unnecessary.
Officer safety tips were one of the most important aspects that many police
officers read and passed on to others. The officers said that, while they sometimes saw
the information in other places, safety was such a big concern that there was no harm in
reinforcing the message. One police officer recounted how he had passed along
information that proved to be useful regarding a new suicide technique involving a
poisonous gas made from a detergent:
They make a poisonous gas out of detergents, over the counter stuff. [The ROIC] put a product
about that. Coincidentally two weeks later we were one of five incidents where someone tried to
kill themselves that way. I had two officers go to the hospital but they were aware enough about it
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to get away from it a lot quicker so their exposure was a lot less. Things like that make it a lot
more valuable to us. That wound up preventing a lot more injuries.

One of the most common complaints of police officers in the southern New Jersey
region was that the COP seemed to place too much focus on crimes occurring in northern
New Jersey. One interviewee surmised that this could be because there are more urban
cities in the northern part of the state and, thus, that region was experiencing more crime.
Officers said they would like more detail about some of the intelligence or
suspicious activities reported in the COP. One officer explained that he wanted to know
more about the aftermath of some of the incidents. For example, he elaborated, if a
preliminary report stated that someone was caught shining a laser into an airplane, he
wanted to know why it occurred. Was the perpetrator a teenager who considered the
action a prank or did the act have a terrorism nexus? More information would help him
understand how it might affect him in his patrol area.
Another officer offered a more calculated reason for wanting more information in
the COP:
For me, the county breakdown—if there was more detail in there … it helps us, we’re always
looking at that for patterns. It helps us to identify things so that we can form links. Even though
scientifically, I can’t boil that down, I can say [to the ROIC] we have noticed that in this track
flyer, you may not have reviewed yet or didn’t get because [police departments] only broadcast it
to certain areas. We want to bring this to your attention. If we can get more detail in the top part of
that report in the county, that would be very beneficial because there’s [some] things that are listed
in there that we definitely take notice of because of the dynamics of our township and the
geography of what we have going on here and if we had more detail, it’s just going to make us
more aware. Since I know that we try to be very proactive in the intel front, collecting information,
disseminating information, that would be very beneficial to us to have that detail.

This police officer, like many others I interviewed, sees the COP as a method of
informing their own intelligence. As one police officer, who reads the bulletin regularly,
pointed out, “Many police officers understand that it’s generic and informational but at
least you can basically get a snapshot of what’s going on in the state.”
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Discussion
If information dissemination is taken for granted or undertaken indiscriminately,
intelligence organizations such as the ROIC may lose customers. As a public entity
formed to respond to the law-enforcement community, the center must adhere to the
requests of the agencies it serves in order to contribute to the public welfare. By
demonstrating it is acting on the collective values of the public and informing the lawenforcement community of terrorism issues internationally and nationally in the COP
bulletin, the ROIC is able to demonstrate its legitimacy and, therefore, its existence,
which strengthens public support and secures its survival. It is not enough to bring the
different agencies together and provide evidence that they are collaborating. The ROIC
must have something tangible to show for these efforts.
In the community of information-sharing, the myth pervades that an increasing
amount of information shared with others in the larger community is a sign of
productivity and utility. One of the ways the ROIC shows its utility to DHS and its many
partners is to disseminate a large quantity of information to a large distribution list. If the
ROIC does not provide the information to those who have the most contact with the
public, who would? If this were the case with regard to utility, the center would definitely
prevail over other agencies. The ROIC disseminates a daily bulletin and weekly,
monthly, and yearly reports on the crime in northern and southern New Jersey to over
2,500 people. However, it is important to find out if the people who receive the
information are the appropriate recipients and how they were chosen.
First, who are the “appropriate” recipients? They are the decision-makers within
each department who are able to filter important information to patrol. For the COP to
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reach these people, the ROIC must focus its efforts on the bulletin’s listserv. As the list
grew, its organization was lost because no information was collected about the additional
recipients. In addition, there seems to have been little rhyme or reason, outside of
convenience and networks, to explain who was actually added to the list. Some of the
COP recipients did not forward the information to others in their department because they
assumed the others already received it. Other recipients did not read the COP at all
because they did not find enough pertinent information to make it worth their time.
It is not feasible for the ROIC to track and send a daily bulletin to every police
officer in the New Jersey more than 500 police departments. It is also unlikely that each
department would want the COP sent to every patrol officer. Rather, the bulletin should
be disseminated to those in charge of decision-making (Mackay & Ratcliffe, 2004, p.
155). By allowing decision-makers to filter the COP information, patrol is not
overburdened with too much material.
In addition, recipients expect and use different types of information. Many police
officers read only the information that pertains to their area of patrol and officer safety
tips. Chiefs and upper-management officials are more likely to scan through the entire
bulletin because they feel they need to understand the crime environment in order to
direct their patrol units. Inundating patrol with unnecessary information may cause them
to ignore the entire document. The ROIC needs to disseminate the information to the
customers who have a need for the daily bulletin, those who need the greater environment
snapshot, i.e., the chiefs of police or the intelligence analysts for the local lawenforcement agencies. Those customers can then choose to forward certain reports to
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their patrol. The ROIC is thus meeting the expectations of all of its customers and
avoiding information overload.
The information the ROIC disseminates is as important as finding the appropriate
audience. Once this audience has been identified, the center needs to ensure that its daily
bulletin contains information that can be described as high-quality, accurate, timely, and
meaningful because open-source material may be part of identifying the threat
environment in New Jersey. The COP does include crime information from open-news
sources such as CNN. The argument against including this information is that if a lawenforcement agent wants information on recent national or international events, he/she
would have most likely already known about it from the news or from his own agency.
However, the pieces of information missing from the COP are the answers to the
questions of “‘So what?’ and ‘What does this report mean to the client that they didn’t
already know?’ as well as the question ‘Does this add to the client’s presumed
knowledge?’” (Mackay & Radcliffe, 2004, pp. 150-151). Customers want to know more
than what they can garner from open-news sources; they want to know why they should
care about it. Is there a tie to New Jersey? If trouble is stirring in Egypt and there are
Coptic Christians known to live in New Jersey, what should law-enforcement officers
expect?
The ROIC needs to provide a framework of understanding for police officers,
who want information they can apply when they need it. Applied information allows
them to make the connections more easily between what they have read or heard about in
the COP and what they see on the streets. The ROIC analysts must impose structure to
the information they disseminate to produce meaning for the police officers.
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If the information is not placed in a context to which the recipients can relate, they
may feel overwhelmed with information they feel is unnecessary. As noted by many of
the people interviewed, police officers are bombarded with dozens of e-mails a day.
Sifting through irrelevant e-mails takes them away from work they could be doing on the
streets to protect citizens. On the other hand, reading relevant e-mails helps them to do
their jobs better.
The ROIC cannot include more classified information for several reasons. First,
this information can be shared only with other agents who have the same security
clearance. The FBI, DHS, and NJSP all have their own security clearances. While some
are shared, many are specific to a particular agency; and with a distribution list over
2,500 people, there is no way to know who or how many of those people have a
particular security clearance. To get on the list, recipients do have to show they are
affiliated with a law-enforcement organization or a private company that may have a
need to know, but that does not guarantee the information will not go beyond them and
does not directly address the security-clearance concern.
The ROIC will most likely garner the largest readership through e-mail.
Readership would shrink if users were asked to sign onto a secure server to obtain the
information—even if the information were more informative—especially if there is no
buy-in from the customers. As pointed out by several of the interviewees, signing onto a
server requires usernames and passwords that are very often forgotten. As a method of
keeping sensitive information secure, e-mail distribution is very unreliable and
vulnerable. Since e-mails can be forwarded to those who do not have the proper
clearance, the information can be printed out and distributed to literally anyone. Another
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challenge to e-mail security is that an individual’s e-mail account can be hacked. As an
official at the ROIC noted, the COP is written in a way such that it could be put on the
front page of The New York Times. The ROIC has chosen to deem greater dissemination
more important than a product with more depth and exclusivity.
The only way to ensure security is by hosting the information on a secure
platform where those who log in have been given access after a thorough background
check. The ROIC presently does not have these capabilities but does believe this may be
the only way to transmit intelligence securely to the law-enforcement community. On the
other hand, the major advantages of e-mail is that it is incredibly fast. Sending the COP
straight to the customers’ inbox makes it more accessible than hosting the information on
a secure platform.
One of the most important questions not yet addressed is whether the ROIC sends
out quality information in the COP. The information disseminated in the COP has
reached the level of information quality if we use English’s (2005) definition of
information quality as “consistently meeting knowledge worker and end-customer
expectations” (p. 19). According to the interviews and the survey responses of the most
invested people, many of the police officers peruse the daily e-mail exactly as the ROIC
had intended: Most police officers read the pertinent information in their area in order to
remain aware and vigilant of the threats in their patrol area and many read through the
bullet-point list at the top of the e-mail to find out if there are any headlines of interest.
While many of the officers interviewed stated they could not recall a specific instance of
using the information within the COP, all affirmed that the bulletin serves a valuable
purpose in informing the law-enforcement community of threats. In fact, most of the
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officers who receive the daily bulletin expect only a quick snapshot that they can scan
through quickly. However, in order to garner more than 24%-60% readership rate, the
ROIC still has work to do.
Conclusion and Recommendations
After 9/11, the law-enforcement community realized the importance of
information-sharing, especially with patrol. Anecdotally, many people have heard of
instances where a tip from a vigilant citizen or patrol officer has led to a big break in a
case. As noted by Henry (2002), a patrol officer is more likely to give information if he
thinks it might be significant. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the intelligence community
to give patrol the information they need to recognize significant items.
Given the constraints of the law, what more could the ROIC add to the COP to
make it more useful? As evidenced by the survey and interviews with police officers,
open-source material is read by some of the COP recipients. It is easy for recipients to
choose to ignore the material if they feel it is superfluous. One officer did say that
perhaps open-source material should be placed at the end of the COP, so the most
compelling information was at the top of the e-mail.
To make open-source material more useful, the ROIC analysts need to help police
officers understand how international and national news may affect the police and the
citizens of New Jersey. Many officers also wanted to know more about the suspiciousactivity reporting. Rather than just reporting that a man was seen photographing a critical
infrastructure, for example, the officers want more helpful or distinguishing details about
this man and his activities. Was this just a tourist, a professional photographer, or an
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amateur shutterbug, or was there anything that indicated that he might be obtaining
information from the photographs or his proximity to the bridge to plan an attack? Should
the rest of New Jersey be aware of these activities? Finally, many police officers in
southern New Jersey felt that much of the COP focused on northern New Jersey topics.
Many began to ignore the bulletin because they did not think the information pertained to
southern New Jersey.
The most important lesson to be learned from the collected opinions of the COP
readership was that the dissemination list needed to be more systematic. To reach the
greatest number of people and ensure that patrol are receiving the most relevant and upto-date information possible, the ROIC needs to send the bulletin to a more targeted list
of stakeholders. The ROIC can then suggest to the police departments a possible
distribution stream. Moreover, evidence from the interviews reveals that not all county
prosecutors’ offices send out information to the police departments in their respective
counties. The ROIC may correct this communication gap by asking that all
communications from the prosecutors’ offices be sent to them as well. They can then
ascertain which prosecutors’ offices are not sending out information. If, however, the
break is at the top level of the local police departments and the chiefs of police do not
forward the communications, then it is then incumbent upon the ROIC to educate the
police about the center’s mission or appoint a police officer to be the intermediary
between the ROIC and/or the respective prosecutors’ offices and patrol.
It is clear that not all of the local departments are currently represented. I
recommend that the ROIC send an e-mail to everyone on the current list inform him or
her that the center is initiating a new COP distribution list. The current list members
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should be asked to e-mail their contact and institution information if they want to
continue to receive the bulletin. The names should then be categorized systematically to
ensure that at least one key person from every police agency in New Jersey is represented
on the list. This will assure the ROIC has daily contact with every police department in
the state.
While dissemination represents a large part of what the ROIC does in order to
improve the information-sharing environment in New Jersey, the center also serves as the
macro-level intermediary for the 21 counties. Equipped with knowledge of statewide
threats, the ROIC is able to analyze crimes that cross county borders and share this
information with local police agencies. To understand how the ROIC can function in this
role for the local police agencies, the final chapter will test the hypothesis stated earlier in
the introduction, with an examination of the level of information-sharing occurring
between the police and the ROIC and the characteristics of the departments and the
people who share the most information with the center.!
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Chapter 3
Information-sharing Among Municipal Police Agencies in New Jersey
Researchers and practitioners agree that channels between and among publicsafety agencies not only need to be clear but also need to be of adequate capacity so that
information may be passed easily. In addition, the information should enhance the
opportunity to assess risk effectively. At present, few empirical studies touch on the way
local police agencies use intelligence from fusion centers. As Ratcliffe and Walden (2010)
point out, past research has focused on police-community relations rather than on noncoercive police behavior, such as reading intelligence bulletins.
Before research can adequately address how a fusion center can improve
information-sharing, we must first understand the utility of the fusion center as perceived
by local law-enforcement agencies. This chapter informs the policing literature first by
exploring the communication structures and processes among New Jersey municipal
police officers and then by examining the relationship between local police agencies and
the state fusion center, the ROIC. I test the hypothesis that police from agencies that are
aware of the capabilities of or find the intelligence from the ROIC useful will be more
likely to share information with the center. I believe that the police from agencies that
have used the ROIC’s intelligence will understand the importance of information-sharing
and, therefore, will be more likely to reciprocate.
In addition, the results of this work, in the form of its data and method, will also
help future researchers begin to understand how to measure information-sharing. Without
a concrete form of measurement, I have chosen to measure information-sharing between
the ROIC and police agencies as either phone or e-mail contact on a day-to-day basis.
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Information-sharing among police agencies is measured differently because contact on a
day-to-day basis is not always necessary between these agencies. Instead, I have chosen
to evaluate information-sharing among police agencies as the officers’ willingness to
contact other departments for information or expressions of connection to these other
departments.
After interviewing 21 law enforcement officials, I verify my hypothesis and
further conclude that communication needs to improve among police agencies and with
the ROIC in New Jersey. Currently, communication breaks down at the county level
among police agencies. As hypothesized, agencies that utilize the center’s analysis
capabilities have the closest working relationships with it and do share information more
frequently than those with no formal or informal relationship. Furthermore, the degree of
interaction between New Jersey police officers and the ROIC varies based on the police
officer’s rank, the police department’s setting, the personal connection to the ROIC, and
the department’s ongoing relationship with the center. I recommend that the New Jersey
ROIC help facilitate additional and more effective communication with the center and
among municipal police departments in the state by means of a more powerful publicoutreach program.
I will first offer a review of the few empirical studies that have been completed on
fusion centers in order to understand the value added from this present study. Next, I will
provide the results of the examination of the state of information-sharing within law
enforcement agencies, among them, and finally between them and federal lawenforcement agencies. The results of the interviews will then provide insight into how
police officers use the ROIC and share information with it. Finally, I will share the police
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officers’ many valuable suggestions on ways to improve information-sharing between
local law-enforcement agencies and the ROIC.
Previous Research
The need for an integrated law-enforcement community cannot be overstated. As
pointed out by McGarrell, Freilich, and Chermak (2007), a multiunit, multiagency
structure is essential in the United States because of the country’s decentralized,
fragmented law-enforcement structure. This also applies to the local police agencies that
need to recognize patterns of crime that cross jurisdictional lines, in the same way that
fusion centers have brought together different levels of public-safety governmental
agencies.
As fusion centers are still relatively new, few empirical studies have examined the
flow of information to the centers, among those agencies, those who work in them, and
the relationship the centers have with their external stakeholders. The most recent study
examined assessments of the utility of a state fusion center by law enforcement
executives and personnel. Cooney, Rojek, and Kaminski (2011) administered two
surveys, one to all police executives in South Carolina and the second to a sample of
personnel employed by law enforcement agencies in that state. They found that 43% of
executives and 60% of personnel reported the South Carolina fusion center to be very
useful. Moreover, personnel who had used the center’s services or had attended a training
session there were more likely to rate the center as useful, compared to those who had no
experience with it. Finally, they found that only 57% of personnel had used analysis
services in the past year; and, during the same time period, a smaller percentage had
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submitted any suspicious activity reports. The authors suggest that fusion centers should
implement strategies to encourage the adoption of ILP in local law-enforcement agencies.
Moreover, they conclude that the centers should educate law-enforcement personnel
about their services.
As noted in Chapter 2, patrol form the basis for much intelligence-gathering and
are also the consumers of the intelligence products. Therefore, it is important that
agencies—such as the New Jersey ROIC—not only disseminate timely and accurate
information, but also that they receive information from street-level police officers. In
line with Cooney et al.’s (2011) study that “leaders who placed a high priority on ILP
were more likely to provide a very useful rating of the [fusion] center” (p. 13), I suggest
that police officers will be more likely to report or share information with the fusion
center if they see value in the products that are disseminated by the ROIC.
Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) conducted a study that explored the relationship
between a state-intelligence center and that state’s troopers “with a focus on perceptions
of the intelligence center, the quantity of communication in both directions, and an
interpretation of the intelligence center’s main product” (p. 6). Utilizing semi-structured
interviews with 52 state troopers at 2 state-police locations, they found that half the
troopers had not communicated with the fusion center at all, and only 9.6% had
communicated with the center at least once a month. They also found that more than half
the troopers interviewed were unaware of the center’s capabilities. Interestingly, 49% of
the state troopers found other state troopers and police officers to be the most reliable
sources of intelligence.
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Joyal (2010) also recently concluded a qualitative study on the efficacy of state
fusion centers, using site visits to 4 centers and 49 open-ended, semi-structured
interviews with participants working at the centers and others affiliated with the sampled
fusion centers or the national fusion center initiatives. She found that, while fusion
centers are “improving law enforcement’s ability to collect and share information,” they
have “yet to develop reliable and robust predictive or estimative capabilities” (Joyal,
p.73). She explains that analysts are still providing more investigative case support rather
than predicting or preventing future crimes through analytical work. Furthermore, despite
successful buy-in from law enforcement agencies, she concludes that fusion centers must
continue to market themselves to other likely partners because their potential value is not
known to all.
Without knowing the capabilities of the state fusion center, police turn instead to
other police for information. This use of personal relationships as sources will also be
examined in this chapter. Perhaps not surprisingly, studies on informal communication
among police officers are scarce. A dozen years ago, Weiss (1998) conducted a study for
the National Institute of Justice to determine how that police agencies communicate about
innovations in the field of policing. He administered a survey to police planners in 360
local organizations and found that police used both a formal and an informal system to
contact police agencies about innovation within the field. The formal network centered
on professional organizations, whereas the informal network was formed by contacting
“other law enforcement agencies directly to gather information needed to manage their
departments” (Weiss, p. 1). Weiss found that about 40% of the police planners contacted
another agency at least once a month, primarily by telephone. His study concluded that
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newer technologies, including the Web and electronic bulletin boards, showed significant
potential.
Other studies conducted on information-sharing among police agencies have
focused more on the technology used for collaboration. For example, Coplink, a project
funded by the National Institute of Justice and the National Science Foundation, has been
widely studied. Coplink is a digital initiative used to link police agencies together to
share law-enforcement-related information. Police officers are able to search several
databases simultaneously for a person, a vehicle, an incident, and a location. Although
different from the COP and other ROIC initiatives, Coplink is an example of other
information-sharing initiatives. Overall, it has shown promise as an effective tool to help
combat crime (Hauck et al., 2002; Zeng et al., 2003).
Results
What is the Current State of Information-sharing in New Jersey?
The 9/11 Report highlighted a serious problem in the law enforcement community.
To find out whether this situation has changed, I asked interviewees a series of questions
about information-sharing. It quickly became evident that communication broke down at
the county level. Communication was most often excellent within the department,
satisfactory among departments within the county, and needed improvement when police
in departments of one county needed to speak with police in departments of another
county.
Every police officer noted that information-sharing had “improved since 9/11.”
As one officer explained,
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I think the landscape has changed as far as information-sharing and things like that post 9/11
because that changed the landscape of the world. I think we needed to share information more. I
think it’s gotten better but I think it could get better. We’re progressing; it’s just a slow progress.
People get so caught up in worrying about what’s in it for them and they need to focus on the
overall goals, enforce the laws, apprehend these people and not care who gets the credit for the
apprehension, just make sure it gets done.

Similarly, other interviewees noted that they “were on the same team” and that
they want to see the bad people off the street. While all the police officers stated that they
did share information, they also noted that they had seen instances where sharing did not
occur at various levels, including police officers within the department, outside the
department, and when the sharing should have taken place from the federal to the local
levels.
While nearly every police officer I interviewed agreed that 9/11 brought about a
much-needed change, I did speak with one person who did not believe this was the case.
A partner at the ROIC, who had nothing negative to say about the center itself, instead
told me he did not believe that anyone at the local level was sharing information. He was
extremely adamant that police agencies have not changed in his 20-plus years of
criminal-justice experience, and nothing could be done to encourage information-sharing.
While interview data showed that many police officers believe this to be untrue, this
mode of thinking may never change completely for some individuals.
Information-sharing Within Each Police Department
!

Communication within each department generally seemed very good, as many
police officers noted that communication was consistent and occurred frequently. A
majority of the police in the departments where the officers were interviewed had an email account they were mandated to check each day. In addition, many departments have
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a roll call, or “muster,” where important information is passed on to the officers on duty.
Generally, one person within the department reviews the occurrences from the day/night
before to brief the patrol or the chief on significant occurrences. The following officer’s
account is typical of most departments:
Every morning we start out here at 7:00. We have a muster morning briefing. The midnight shift
supervisor tells us what happened on the midnight shift and the evening shift before to give us a
basic idea of what happened. If they had any calls that were serious that we might need to know
about, we need to go back out to later or if there is any intelligence we need to know about, a
stolen vehicle, if they are looking for certain people for robbery. Sometimes they’ll give us all the
information or the flyers to be on the lookout for certain people.

This is also where police officers are briefed about officer safety or BOLOs that were
released in the ROIC’s daily COP bulletin.
Only two police officers stated that information-sharing within their own
department is poor. One detective explained that communication within his unit is good,
but communication is difficult across the different units. Pointing across the hall, he said,
“You would think that there’s a huge wall between us, and not just between our divisions,
but between the patrol and the detectives; that’s been there for 30 years.” He explained
that he would sometimes tell the other units about a possible lead on a case given to him
by a source.
We have come to them and said “hey one of our snitches said x, y, z and it might help your case”
but then they tell us that we are holding onto information. What information am I holding onto? If
I know something that’s going to help you, I will tell you. I am not going to say everyone [should]
have an open investigation because once it starts getting around, people talk.

He went on to explain that he is currently trying to take the mystery out of his own police
work among patrol and others by inviting them to his department on a rotating basis. This
helps others understand his own police work and his philosophy about sharing
information.

106

Another officer voiced a more serious concern regarding communication within
his department. He said that police officers do not communicate from one shift to the next.
If there’s a shooting at night and they get the shooter, [police officers think] ”ok we got him, we’re
done.” They won’t tell anyone. It could be a gang thing. The shooting could be retaliation or
something, so even though you got the shooter, the victim’s guys are going to say, “screw that,
we’re going to come back.” That’s information you should put out there. But they don’t. They got
the shooter … move on.

!

While many of the police officers interviewed stated that communication was generally
consistent among the officers in their own department and across shifts, this department
seemed to be an outlier.
Information-sharing Within the County
!

According to the interviewees, information-sharing within the county was also
generally good because they felt comfortable calling other departments in their county for
information. The quality of information-sharing ranged from excellent to “could be
better” depending on which of New Jersey’s 21 counties the department was based in.
Police in larger counties said that communication was good among the departments
closest to them within the county, but was more strained the further away one travelled.
The best way for the officers to receive information from police departments
within their county was through a known acquaintance in that department. One detective
noted that communication within the county was:
pretty good because you are constantly working with the same people. You have a tendency to
work with the prosecutor’s office a lot [and] other agencies on these multi-jurisdictional cases,
whether it be burglary or bank robberies or whatever…you get to know people. They are there for
a while. It’s easy to pick up your cell phone and call them locally, county-wide.

Police chiefs have the advantage of knowing the other chiefs in the county personally,
even if they have not worked with each other. When asked about communication in his
county, one police chief said that it was very good. He explained how he shares
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information by saying, “I pick up the phone and go right to the chief because I know
them all. I think that’s the same with a lieutenant or someone. They probably have a
name. I think that is a lot of how that information gets shared.” Almost all the officers
interviewed, regardless of rank, noted that building personal connections with police
officers in other departments is the best way to communicate within the county.
Five of the police officers noted that they communicated consistently with
departments within the county through detectives’ meetings. Some police departments
took it upon themselves to initiate a meeting of the different stakeholders in the area who
would benefit from the information-sharing. For example, one officer stated that he began
a county detectives’ meeting that has since expanded to other departments just outside the
county. Initially, it was difficult to establish the meetings as regular events in the routine.
To entice people to come, the officer personally catered the meetings. For the first few
meetings, he sent an e-mail with the menu. The officer noted that the detectives’ meeting
is still very successful because, he believes, he holds it on the same day of every month
for exactly one hour. He realizes that people are busy and says that the most important
way to keep everyone coming back is by making sure that the meeting is no longer than it
needs to be, and the only agenda item is that of sharing intelligence. Federal, state, and
local police agencies are all involved in this particular meeting, and they “bring what
[they] have.” The stakeholder may bring an informational sheet or a wanted picture and
put the pile on the table. Everybody takes a piece of paper and when it’s your turn, you can
explain what you gave out and then people will shoot up hands. “I know that guy” or “he’s
involved with this girl,” or “the girl you’re looking for is his ex-girlfriend.”

The officer noted that information-sharing in these meetings is extremely helpful in
closing cases for some area police officers.
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Efforts to establish on-going detectives’ meetings have not been met with equal
success. While other police officers mentioned detectives’ meetings, at least 4
interviewees stated that the meetings had become less useful because of poor attendance.
Officers noted that they simply did not have the time or the resources to send someone to
a monthly meeting that was sometimes an hour away. As one officer stated, “we always
try to send a rep, doesn’t always happen, but [we] try.” Three of the interviewees
surmised that once police gained personal contacts from the meetings, then the meetings
themselves were no longer a necessity. Yet another officer said that it was costly to host
the meetings, because of the refreshments, and it was difficult to find a central meeting
spot.
Not all the police officers agreed that communication among departments within
the county was satisfactory. Of the two interviewees with the minority opinion, one, a
police officer in a suburban town in southern New Jersey, said that communication was
not great. We don’t network as much as we should. On the operational level, I think the guys—the
patrolmen—might speak with the other patrolmen but as far as admin and supervisors, I don’t
know that it happens as frequently as it should.

!

On the other hand, a police detective thought that the detectives were good about sharing
information with one another but that patrol did not have the same mentality. He felt they
had an ownership attitude about a particular crime, that it was theirs and they did not
want to tell anyone. The detective went on to say that communication was “a little bit
better but nowhere near as good as it could be.”
Information-sharing Outside the County
!

109

In a state as small as New Jersey, with 21 counties, many police departments are
relatively close to departments in other counties. Despite this proximity and the
knowledge that criminals travel, information-sharing seems to break down at the county
level. A large majority of those interviewed (16/21) stated that information-sharing with
departments outside the county was not good. In other words, many of the police officers
did not feel comfortable reaching out to other departments outside their county for
information.
A very small minority, 3 police officers, however, thought that communication
among departments across counties was good. They remarked that the county detectives’
meetings, which include the police departments of nearby counties, is the most important
way to share information. For instance, two counties in particular have a very good
working relationship because of their proximity to one another and their large shared
boundary. All the police officers who were interviewed in these two counties mentioned
this meeting and its utility. In fact, the connection was even noted by some officers from
other counties. This relationship seemed to be an anomaly, however. Another police
officer said that communication has improved over the last few years. He believed this
was because police agencies have become “so reliant on one another because you don’t
have this huge pool of personnel to keep drawing from. A lot of times you have to form
these partnerships to solve these crimes.”
If a county detectives’ meeting is not part of the protocol, police officers said that
their preferred method for disseminating information is through the Technology to
Recover Abducted Kids (TRAK) message. These messages are critical alerts sent via e-
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mail and/or fax to police departments throughout New Jersey. As explained on the
Lyndhurst Police website (2005),
TRAK, Technology to Recover Abducted Kids, is a computer software system that was originally
designed to help law enforcement agencies locate and recover abducted children. It has since been
used in countless types of cases, assisting law enforcement in the process of communicating
important visual information. This system allows any police officer to quickly and efficiently
create high-resolution photo bulletins and share them electronically with other law enforcement
jurisdictions, the media, and the community, when they deem it appropriate.

!

A TRAK message differs from other communication because police officers can specify
which departments receive it. If a police officer seeks general information regarding a
particular crime, he can send a message to all nearby departments within and outside the
county. The officer can seek information from all of New Jersey. For example, one
officer explained that, “if [they] start experiencing a string of burglaries, [he] will put out
a TRAK message, just indicating [they] are experiencing a lot of daytime burglaries,
[saying] ‘this is the method burglars are using. Is anyone experiencing similar incidents?
Contact us.’” When the burglaries become a serious or widespread issue, the interviewee
said a task force would be created, including people from other jurisdictions with the
same problem.
Others interviewees noted that TRAK messages can be easily forgotten or ignored.
When asked about information-sharing with departments outside his county, one
detective voiced his objection to TRAK messages by recounting a story:
[On] one occasion, an off-line search for a particular vehicle involved in a bunch of fraud cases
[turned up a] list of a dozen or so agencies that this car was ran in. So it was a matter of physically
calling each one of them because you know if you send the TRAK, are you going to get a response
from all of them? Probably not. So it’s like let’s just get on the phone and ask. That was the best
means of doing that to reach outside the county.

!

Later, however, the same detective surmised that the lack of communication between
departments in different counties was “natural. On a local level,” he said, “what do I need
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to get in touch with other counties for?” This police officer was only one of two
interviewed who did not see communication with departments in other counties as
necessary.
A majority of the police officers interviewed (16/21) recognized the value of
communication among police departments across counties but often added that
communication was minimal. Despite attempts at multi-county detectives’ meetings, a
lack of resources once again became a hindrance to communication. One detective noted
that communication with departments in other counties was “very difficult with time
constraints.” He explained further:
We’re short one detective and with the economy, it’s gotten worse. It’s very difficult to find time
to sit for an hour and have lunch and talk about things when you can do the TRAK flyer. It was
nice because it was good networking; [you can] meet the guys from other agencies, exchange
cards, [and] numbers, but it’s very time consuming travel-wise. To travel from here to [a
neighboring county] for lunch at 12, you are talking 2-3 hours out of your day just for that when
you can get the info from a TRAK flyer. In a way, it’s effective but you don’t have the manpower
right now to do it. We used to do it once a month.

!

Another officer in a small town agreed that they did not “have the people to lose for a
couple of hours” and warned that the situation would only get worse with more budget
cuts.
Sharing information becomes especially important when towns border each other
and a serious crime occurs in one of them. One patrol officer acknowledged this and
stated that he only heard about some crimes in the next town because a police officer in
the department lived there:
Sometimes I don’t think [information] gets passed on as efficiently as it should and that’s even
with simple stuff. We have an officer who lives in [a neighboring county]. He’ll come in and tell
us, “Hey, did you hear about the shooting in [nearby town]?” [Nearby town] is the next town over
from us but because it’s [neighboring county] we just don’t hear about it which can be dangerous
for us. That person can be coming into our town and we don’t even know it. Same thing with
[another neighboring county]. Two towns away. It seems like if it’s not within the county, it takes
a bit more. Unless it goes out on a state-wide level, it’s a little bit harder to get information or it’s
not passed along as freely as it seems.
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Aside from personal contacts, TRAK messages and phone calls were the only means by
which some of the police officers could reach departments in other counties. This has led
to a poor communication system among counties. However, one detective pointed out
that “counties are typically horrendous in communicating with one another which is why
the ROIC is at least trying to pull it together.”
Information-sharing with the Federal Public-Safety Agencies
In the course of interviews and conversations about information-sharing, the one
area in which many police officers felt little had changed was between federal law
enforcement agencies and local agencies. Eight police officers commented on how little
was being shared that came from the federal agencies to local agencies. Unfortunately,
this, in turn, sometimes leads local police officers to refuse to share their own information.
One police officer noted that the FBI refuses to share information and has used different
“tricks” to gather information. For example, within policing, deconfliction is a process
that police officers must go through to ensure that other agencies are not investigating the
same person. During deconfliction, a police officer types the name of the person he is
investigating into a system that cross-references the name in other investigative databases
to indicate whether another public-safety agency is investigating the same person. As one
detective explained, “The biggest reason for that is so that you don’t have the cops and
the FBI show up at the same time or an undercover officer working it.” Theoretically,
deconfliction should occur in every case and can often be useful because one can pull
together more information if someone else has already been working the case for some
time. However, one police officer stated his problem with the procedure and the FBI:
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The problem with the deconfliction is that when you put a name in the system, they contact you
for information. What the FBI used to do, they would put everybody’s name in the system so if I
spent a month coming up with info and I put the name in there, they come to me, like “what do
you got? I have been working on that.” Well no, you’re not but now you are that I am handing
everything over. That’s the problem.

!

Mistrust between federal agencies and local agencies is extremely dangerous for
public-safety agents. If deconfliction is not occurring and agents from more than one
entity are not aware that they are both investigating the same person, agents from one
department may unintentionally harm those from another department. In addition,
investigations may become compromised. The police officer went on to recount an
occasion when deconfliction either did not occur or did not work, and the police and the
DEA both showed up for a drug delivery:
We were working on a wire. There was a big package coming in from NY. We grabbed the guys
going to pick it up as the DEA grabbed the guy that was delivering it. It wound up, we jumped out,
DEA jumped out. We almost had a Mexican stand-off in the street. There are ways to get around
that with deconfliction but nobody does that.

!

If local police think that they are receiving less information than they should, it is
possible that everyone will refuse to participate in sharing. “When you hit that federal
level, there is still that stigma that ‘Do I really want to give them all this because I don’t
know if I am going to get that back in return?’” While the problems with deconfliction
may stem from the fact that the design for the process was inadequate, the statements of
these two officers point, instead, to a problem with information-sharing and receiving
credit for solving crimes.
While information-sharing occurs at least at a minimal level among local police
departments, it is rarer among different levels of law-enforcement agencies because
certain information can be given only to others who have the same security clearance.
Some recognized this, as noted here by one police officer:
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We still struggle with our federal partners. They are happy to take information in, but you won’t
get follow up. If our patrolman develops info that leads to something, we walk that up the chain.
When we take that job down, we try to bring that patrolman in to take the lead to let them see the
end result of what it is they did. Often, when you deal with feds, you may not be included. It
depends on what’s going on but the culture with the feds, it’s still a little bit of a struggle. I would
hope to see that improve a little bit more. But again, I don’t know all their mandates, what they’re
allowed to do that may preempt them from giving us information.

!

Some police officers, however, decide to share information with federal agencies,
even though they know that the federal agencies will not reciprocate. Four of the police
officers said they decide to share information with federal partners because they feel they
are all on the same “team,” and they want to see the perpetrator off the street.
A lot of guys just want to get things closed. I don’t care if you get the arrest, I just don’t want to
see this guy’s name across my desk anymore. Just go. Take care of it. That’s how I am. You can
take all the credit in the paper, just take the guy off the street.

!

A small majority of the police officers (11/21) who were interviewed voiced the
sentiment about “being on the same team” but knew it was not the consensus among all
police officers.
Sharing Between Northern New Jersey and Southern New Jersey
!

A smaller, though still significant, result that emerged from the interviews was the
division between northern New Jersey and southern New Jersey. Adding to the lack of
communication among police departments across counties were the differences that
police officers saw between themselves and the officers in the other half of the state.
When asked if he saw a difference in police and policing in northern and southern New
Jersey, one officer from an urban northern New Jersey city joked that northern New
Jersey had electricity. Despite the intentionally jovial nature of his comment, there is
something to learn from his joke. Eight police officers stated that they feel as though the
other half of the state is completely different. One police chief in a suburban central New
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Jersey city noted that it was “like two different states” or “two different planets.” He went
on to say that he could not describe it in words, but he felt the personalities of the police
officers were different. When asked if he thought the differences could be attributed to
the number of large cities in the north, he said that even the smaller towns in northern
New Jersey were different from southern New Jersey because of the types of crimes that
they see. As an example, he explained that a small town like Hoboken in northern New
Jersey, with a population of 38, 577, would most likely see far more serious crimes than
any other town in southern New Jersey, with the exception of Camden. Another police
officer explained that northern New Jersey is more urban, whereas southern New Jersey
is more suburban.
At least three police officers said they most definitely saw a difference, not only
in personality, but also in the method of policing. Many of the officers in southern New
Jersey recognized that cities in northern New Jersey may be more heavily influenced by
what goes on in New York City because of their proximity to the large metropolis. As
one captain in a small southern New Jersey town noted, “down in south Jersey, it’s a
mentality thing that that is New York in New Jersey.”
These perceived differences in policing could lead to hesitancy to contact police
in another city, thus hindering communication. A detective in a small rural town in
southern New Jersey said he would not call the Newark Police Department for a stolen
vehicle because he knew they did not have the time to deal with such crimes; he knew the
level of crimes there were far different from those that he would see.
Even when police officers are brought together for conferences or meetings, the
differences seen by some police officers may continue to obstruct communication. For
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example, one police officer from a suburban southern New Jersey city stated that, when
he went to a conference held in northern New Jersey, he felt out of place because it
seemed to him that all the police officers in northern New Jersey knew one another.
While a minority of the police officers (3/21) believed there was no difference in people
or policing across the two halves of the state, these results point to a more fractured
communication system than just crossing county borders.
Reporting Crimes Through the TRAK System
A fractured informal communication system necessitates greater reliability on the
formal communication system in place. Given the difference in the volume and types of
crimes that occur in cities across New Jersey, it is important to understand how police
officers formally share information about the crimes in their jurisdictions with other
departments. One of the most common methods for reporting crime to other police
departments is through the New Jersey TRAK system. As previously mentioned, police
agencies can send out a TRAK message about a pattern of crime they are witnessing in
their city or a picture of a wanted suspect. Police officers have the option of sending these
critical alerts to the entire state or to only particular counties or departments; they are
then delivered to the agency’s fax machine or e-mail address and sometimes to the emails of the supervisors. If deemed important by the supervisors, these messages are
given to patrol.
TRAK messages were the one method of communication that seemed to be
universal among the various police agencies with whom I spoke. Fifteen officers noted
that it was a very important way for them to inform other police departments in the
surrounding area of criminals who inevitably travel outside the city boundaries. All the
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interviewees said their departments—whether large or small, in the north or the south—
used TRAK messages.
The policy regarding when TRAK messages were to be used varied widely from
department to department. For example, several interviewees in suburban and rural police
departments stated that they used the TRAK system for “everything.” Those in larger or
more urban police departments stated that they used the TRAK messages for BOLOs and
other important crimes that occurred throughout the city. One police officer remarked
that, “when we were at the height of our carjacking problem, we used to send out every
morning the daily list of vehicles that had not been recovered so that other agencies could
look at the car hot sheet.” Another police officer said he uses the TRAK message to
remind people of the monthly county-wide detectives’ meeting.
The variation in the degree to which police departments use the TRAK system
seems to correlate with the size of the department. Larger departments use the TRAK
system less frequently than smaller ones. A police officer from a high-crime, urban city
stated that, “some of us use it a little bit. Most of them don’t.” Only one officer in one of
the larger urban areas stated that he used TRAK messages “a whole lot.” He went on to
say that he “use[s] it for missing persons … [and when we] are seeking specific
information on a certain MO [modus operandi].” However, the lack of TRAK messages
has not gone unnoticed by the smaller cities. One officer in a small city in southern New
Jersey noted that he never saw any TRAK messages out of one particular large city. The
interviewed police officer from that city stated that they “used it to some extent” but
generally used their own internal system.
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Smaller departments, on the other hand, seemed to use TRAK messages more
often, much to the chagrin of some of the police officers in larger departments. These
larger departments claimed that smaller departments used it too often for too many
crimes. Their opinion was that smaller misdemeanor crimes did not belong in the TRAK
system. For example, one police officer stated, “a lot of the larger departments will use it
for major crimes. The direct opposite is that some of the smaller agencies will use it for
everything, right down to a shoplifting event.” Many of the police officers in the large
urban areas were critical of the small police departments that used the TRAK system for
the smaller crimes and said that this “is where it gets wasted.” Large cities were not the
only critics of the police departments that used the system in what they considered an
excessive way. An officer in a suburban area said he did not like getting TRAK messages
from police departments about retirement parties and fundraisers. This particular officer
said he received all of the TRAK messages via e-mail and sometimes received a thousand
messages a week. He did not think that being informed of a retirement party for a police
officer he did not even know was a good use of the system.
Even though it is in use across New Jersey, the TRAK system has also been called
“too time-consuming.” One detective noted that “the fax machine sits on a desk and not
everyone gets the faxes that are printed out. They slide off onto the floor and not
everyone sees them.” In an increasingly bureaucratic organization that requires attention
to an ever-increasing amount of paperwork to fill out and review, many police officers
are foregoing the distribution of a TRAK message because they have too many more
pressing responsibilities. In addition, budget cuts across New Jersey have led to an
increased workload for many of the officers. Many TRAK messages are sent to police
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officers who may receive hundreds of e-mails every day. Only some of the TRAK
messages will thus be given the attention their senders intended.
How Do the Police Use the ROIC?
!

The second half of this chapter examines the role of the ROIC, not only in
facilitating information exchanges among police departments, but also in its other roles in
gathering information from police and sometimes helping them analyze data that will
result in criminal apprehensions. In my interviews of New Jersey police officers on the
COP listserv, I sought to ascertain how many of the departments I contacted used or were
aware of all the many resources at the ROIC. The center’s capabilities include the ability
to analyze crimes to identify and anticipate hot spots so that the police can redirect their
resources to a problem area, time, or day. The ROIC can forward BOLOs from police
departments to the listserv of 2,500 police officers, ensuring that those on the list are
receiving the picture of a wanted person, which can then be disseminated to their
patrolmen. In addition, the analysts at the ROIC can conduct network analyses of crime.
How Much Do Police Officers Know About and Use the ROIC and Its Capabilities?
!

Before asking how police officers used the ROIC, I wanted to find out how they
had initially learned about it. I surmised that this information would help me understand
how the center can become more accessible to those who do not know about it. Nine of
the 21 interviewees responded that they could not remember how they came to know
about the ROIC. Police chiefs stated that they knew about the ROIC through regular
informational meetings of the local police chiefs. In later interviews, conducted with
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people who were ROIC contacts, interviewees responded that they knew about the center
through a personal contact. Two police officers said that a former New Jersey state
policeman came to work for the department after retirement and informed them of the
ROIC. One police said he heard about the center from his brother, who was a trooper.
Among the interviewees, word-of-mouth was the most popular method.
In addition, some police officers initially learned about the ROIC when they had
actually worked with the center on initiatives such as Violent Enterprise Source Targeting
(VEST), which had been established in several cities, including Patterson, Newark,
Camden, Jersey City, Trenton, and Perth Amboy. These six large cities have a long and
extensive history of violent crimes, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
saw the need for collaboration among the many different public-safety departments
present in each city. The ROIC provides intelligence support and sends an employee to
the VEST meetings in each city once a month, when all the stakeholders gather to share
information. The police in these cities see this as a beneficial relationship, as VEST
meetings seem to result in reductions in the level of violent crime according to a ROIC
supervisor during a huddle.
In addition to reducing crimes, VEST meetings and other ROIC initiatives, such
as Operation Ceasefire,21 have helped inform police officers of the center’s various
capabilities. Many of the officers who used the ROIC more frequently identified such
initiatives as the source of their awareness of the center’s utility of the ROIC and thus
made use of its resources. For example, one interviewee, who had previously worked
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Operation Ceasefire was a monthly meeting of representatives from larger New Jersey cities that had a
ceasefire unit, that is, a shooting-investigation unit that handles all non-fatal shootings within the city. The
meetings took place at the ROIC, where participants shared information and reported on recent incidents in
their towns. There are no longer meetings at the ROIC, but some cities continue to have a ceasefire unit.
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with the ROIC when Operation Ceasefire was still operational, said that he talks to the
ROIC almost daily. He noted that,
in the past, before the ROIC, one of our major obstacles for getting information regarding
immigration [was] ICE and agencies like that [and it] was damn near impossible to get some
answers.... That just doesn’t happen for us anymore. We pick up the phone if we have to, shoot an
email to the ROIC, and with the ICE representative that sits down there, that’s just not an obstacle
for us anymore.

!

This particular officer has such a good relationship with the ROIC that he also
uses the fusion center for investigative purposes. He has found that the ROIC can help his
officers gather intelligence more efficiently so they can be on the street rather than at
their desks:
With any specific shooting investigation: we [used to] respond to the incident, we gathered what
information we needed and then, before the ROIC was established, your next step was detectives
would come in off the road, after doing an initial investigation in the field at the scene and then
they would have to come in and gather a whole lot of information themselves. Information on the
victim, information on possible suspects, possible witnesses, vehicles, plate numbers, things like
that. Since the establishment of the ROIC and our close relationship with the ROIC, we now are
able to, with a simple email, forward that information to the ROIC and they, within hours, compile
all that information for us, send it back in an email form or phone call and that has been a big plus
to us because it allows my detectives to be out on the street doing an actual physical investigation
rather than wasting three or four hours in here trying to compile the information that the ROIC
now feeds to us. It’s been a major plus for us and we’ve had a great relationship with them.

!

Even if police officers did not previously work with the ROIC, some had personal
contacts there that they felt they could call, if needed. For example, one officer said that
he uses the ROIC to contact other cities. He noted that criminals tend to travel across
jurisdictions, and it is important to talk to the police in other cities. To accomplish this, he
is “networking … because of the ROIC. If I can’t hook up with [town in southern New
Jersey], maybe through [name of ROIC employee], we can.” Another police officer, who
worked in a relatively small department, stated that he used his personal contact at the
ROIC to obtain information from larger departments that, he said, were not as willing to
share information:
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[When getting information from a large police department], it’s very very hard to pry it out. By
having them working with the ROIC, we go through [name]. We call the ROIC and the ROIC can
get the information for us … nothing beats personal contact.

!

He went on to explain that the ROIC exhibited consistent expertise in knowing what
information could be shared with other agencies. Those with personal connections felt
more comfortable about seeking help or information from the fusion center. In fact, many
of the police officers felt lucky to have the personal connection with the ROIC:
We are fortunate because there is a guy at the prosecutor’s office who ran the ROIC.

!
We had some incident at the school which put us at the forefront in Burlington County because we
were having a lot of threats against a school. We were regularly dealing with them for a while.
Once the relationship’s established, we had a reserve officer that also works at the ROIC. He
would bring back information and share with us and would broaden our horizon by asking if we
knew about certain services. Now he has a good relationship with the investigative lieutenant so if
there is something happening, he’ll make them aware of it.

!

In comparison, police officers from small departments, many of whom had not
worked closely with the ROIC on any of its initiatives, seemed to know only about some
of the center’s capabilities. For example, one officer indicated that his agency uses the
ROIC to report missing persons. Another officer from a small, suburban police
department in southern New Jersey elaborated on this use of the ROIC and said, “I know
that when I need something I call them, whether it’s pinging22 a phone or trying to figure
out something about a suspect I can’t get information on. I’ve used them before
specifically for missing persons. They are good for that stuff.” One other officer indicated
that he used the ROIC for gun traces, but that was his only contact.
In contrast, one police officer from a small southern New Jersey town said he had
used the ROIC on three separate occasions. Three different burglars were believed to
have committed over 200 burglaries in his township and surrounding counties. He
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Pinging a phone means to locate the tower origin of the last signal the phone received.
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explained that in this situation, “the ROIC was intimately involved. The New Jersey State
Police were involved with surveillance,” and 20-30 of the state troopers were involved.
He later stated, “A couple of guys here know a couple of guys that work there. This is
what we got, how do you help us? They usually do. They are pretty accommodating.”
This officer is knowledgeable of the resources, not only because of previous experiences
with the ROIC, but, once again, because of close, personal contacts.
Of those who said that their police department used the ROIC only infrequently,
the common sentiment was that the department was self-sufficient and had the necessary
resources to target crime on its own. For example, when asked how he contacted federal
agents about an ongoing case, one sergeant explained that he has a friend who works for
the FBI who would direct him to the right person. He was surprised to learn that both ICE
and the FBI had representatives at the ROIC.
Overall, every interviewee knew that the ROIC existed and that it had numerous
capabilities and resources, but about half of those interviewed were unsure of how to use
those resources. Three police officers said they had never personally used the ROIC or its
resources but knew that their department had at one time or another. Those officers knew
that the ROIC had an analysis unit and, as one police officer noted, thought the fusion
center had the capability to do almost anything: “It’s almost like the sky’s the limit. I am
pretty sure that if someone can do it, the ROIC can do it—‘The big hype about the
ROIC.’ Specifically, if I ever needed something, I would call the ROIC.” Unfamiliarity
with the ROIC’s resources seemed to be more prevalent among the detectives and patrol I
interviewed than among more senior police officers. One detective said that he “[knows]
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it’s an intelligence center. As far as beyond that, I don’t know too much about it to be
honest with you.”
Even some of the more senior police officers may not be using the ROIC as much
as they possibly could. For example, one police chief was asked if his department would
ever consider informing the ROIC if there were a string of burglaries that he thought
went outside his city and county limits. He responded he had never done so, but his city
“sits on the hub of 3 counties [and is a short driving distance to a 4th county] … so [the
ROIC] would be a clearing house for the 21 counties.” He recognized that the ROIC
“would be able to geographically pass information quickly to 4 of the counties.” He
stated that he would begin to consider using the ROIC for this type of information
dissemination. Another police chief, from a small central New Jersey town, said he knew
his department did not use the ROIC “anywhere to what they could be used.” He felt that
part of the blame resided in his lack of knowledge about the ROIC.
How Do Police Officers Communicate Information to the ROIC?
!

Even if police officers are not using the ROIC’s resources, it is important that
they feed information back to the fusion center. Without sources of information, analysis
and targeted dissemination cannot occur. To improve this feedback loop, some of the
larger police departments in New Jersey have a ROIC liaison who is mandated to notify
the center about significant events in their cities or “shooting hits.”23 I interviewed a
police officer who identified himself as the police department’s ROIC liaison and who
said, “every day I am dealing with them, either e-mail [or] text. There is material being
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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A shooting hit is the reporting of any gunshot wound.
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passed back and forth. I pass along shooting hits to the ROIC.” Shooting hits are recorded
by the ROIC for the entire state of New Jersey and are evaluated each month by an
analyst.
Although I was unable to interview police officers from all the cities that have a
partnership with the ROIC through programs such as VEST, I was able to see from my
participant observation at the center that many of those cities were at least regularly
passing information to the ROIC about shooting hits. One police officer, who had worked
with the center through the VEST initiative, said he regularly worked with the ROIC:
We have a good working relationship with them. They do the predictive analysis which is
software we don’t have access to so they are usually on top of things. When they feel there’s a
need for it, they’ll send it out. When we feel, we will also reach out for them. “Can you guys do
this predictive analysis for us?” Everything we ask them, they do for us but like I said, if they
know there’s a trend, they also pick it up. All my emails I send out goes to the ROIC also. So they
have everything that we do also. There again, the daily crime report everyday, they get all that
information. If we need something from them, I’ll call them, usually [name of person at the
ROIC]. When we get a big project here, it’s a hot job, I’ll work with him…. It’s more of a
collective. It’s all separate units but we try, because of the relationship we have, we try to make it
a collective unit. We work it out. I think that’s the best way.

For counterterrorism alerts, the feedback loop to the ROIC is mandated to include
the County Counterterrorism Coordinator (CTC). Every county in New Jersey has a CTC
who, ideally—even though the interviewees noted this is not always the case—passes
counterterrorism information on from the ROIC to the police and also feeds information
from the local police back to the center. During interviews, some police knew exactly
who their CTCs were because they received regular feedback from them. Other officers
were either unaware of what a CTC was or said they did not have regular communication
with their CTCs. This seemed to be highly dependent on the quality of the CTC and the
success of his/her outreach in each county. For example, I interviewed several officers in
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one county, and each of them knew the CTC by name and explained that they frequently
received bulletins from her.
Sometimes, however, the path of the feedback loop was a little unclear. I
interviewed one officer from a small southern New Jersey city who stated that his
department was initially confused about how to filter information to the ROIC. The
department initially sent information to both the ROIC and its local CTC but has
discontinued this practice and now has
one person calling the county who filters the information up, usually via phone call because you
are on location with a rapidly developing situation and you are giving firsthand information up the
line and it would get up to the ROIC within ten minutes.

!

Other departments were confused about how to handle notifications. Some police
officers seemed to think that notifying everyone was the best way to handle the
information:
We just had an incident at one of the hotels. Three Middle Eastern men were reported to be talking
about Al Qaeda. [The] patrol supervisor in charge of shift that day notified the ROIC, the FBI
representative on the Joint Terrorism Task Force and our local contact is [name] in the
prosecutor’s office (CTC). They were all notified of that incident….

!

More non-terrorism-related crimes were handled at the local or county level rather
than at the federal level. Many of the officers felt that the county prosecutor’s office was
the first point of contact in the process to report potential crimes they felt could be linked
to others outside their jurisdiction:
What I’ll do sometimes … my first trip is out to the county. Has anybody contacted you from
within the county? Do they have trends going on? They might say no but I talked to somebody
down in Camden and they are seeing it down there so he’ll either call for me or I’ll call up to the
ROIC, are you aware of anything that is going on? I haven’t see anything in the COP but is
something going on? Generally they’ll say, “Send me what you got or what you think we should
look at it,” and I’ll send it up to the unit up there to look at it. I’ve done it a couple of times.
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Filtering information to the ROIC may also include following a chain of
command. This pattern was acknowledged by half the police officers, whether they went
through the county or a supervisor. As one patrol officer explained,
We have a chain of command, like I would take it to my sergeant and he would take it up to the
lieutenant, up to the captain and to the chief and it would be disseminated that way. So we
wouldn’t specifically, on a patrol or sergeant level, do it. It would go from the bottom to the top
before it gets somewhere unless it was an emergency.

In fact, when asked about patrol’s knowledge of the ROIC, many of those interviewed
indicated that patrol knew the least about the fusion center. One sergeant noted that he
felt it was his duty, not that of patrol, to filter information to the ROIC. He believed his
patrol did not need to have any additional knowledge of the ROIC because, as the
sergeant, he serves as the filter with the ROIC. When asked how much his patrol used the
ROIC, another sergeant stated,
I think it’s very limited what the ROIC is used for. I am sure they have all heard of it and know
it’s a one-stop shop for all different agencies. I don’t know if they know everything that is
available there. I don’t know if I do. I have been there for training classes, computers, the lab but I
don’t know what’s all up there.

Police officers who stated that they did not share information with the ROIC cited
two reasons. One officer said he did not call the ROIC because he did not think his
community’s local crimes were important enough to warrant the communication. Another
officer, in central New Jersey, echoed this sentiment, saying that he knew the ROIC had
bigger worries than any of his small-town crimes.
Still other police officers said t they simply did not know what to send to the
ROIC. As one police chief made clear, even though he was aware of some of the center’s
capabilities, he did not know what information needed to be communicated. He believed
this was a procedural issue:
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I’ll have 10 different officers and they’ll say 10 different things on how you get information to the
ROIC. And vice versa. I bet some officers don’t even know what it is. Is that partly my fault? Yes
it is. I should probably be able to utilize it more for our things. But I don’t know that there is good
returning that information, what information they want, [or] what their analysts are doing. I know
they have several analysts there....

What Do Police Officers Suggest as Remedies for the Break in the ROIC Feedback Loop?
!

One of the most important ways of feeding information back to the ROIC is
through its connections across the state, particularly because of the targeted intelligence
that comes from these connections. Therefore, I asked the interviewees to suggest how to
make other officers more aware of the ROIC’s resources and how to improve the
feedback loop. Three senior police officers, of varying ranks, believed the feedback loop
needed to be repaired at the local level. They knew that the idea for information-sharing
had to begin at a more senior level for patrol and more junior police officers to become
an active part of this process.
I guess one of the easier ways of doing it is you gotta have a commitment, department-wide
commitment. I think you would have to have an intelligence officer to coordinate all the
information to offer some of this stuff. You’re going to miss things but I think that coordinator can
see about the information and follow it up.

Other police officers also recognized leadership’s impact in making patrol officers
more aware of their environment. As one sergeant noted, “It’s on us to make our guys
more vigilant.” Another sergeant, in a large city, knew he faced an uphill battle in his
efforts to convince patrol to bring suspicious activities to his attention. He said, however,
that he had seen some success as he continued to build personal relationships:
For example, the [officer] in the street crimes unit under me, we have a very good relationship.
One of my detectives is very close with him. So the information is getting passed back and forth.
The [officer] is communicating with people in his unit the same way. I send my people over there
and they see roll call, they go talk to the guys. We started small and like I said, success breeds
upon success. You get those guys to buy in, all of a sudden, they are looked up to by the patrol
guys. It’s got to start with all personal relationships. Start it small and get it to mushroom out. If it
does catch on fire, it would be such an intelligence windfall that we would be able to tap into.
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Some police officers suggested more training by the ROIC. Two officers, who
were familiar with the center’s many capabilities, said they knew of the ROIC not only
because they had been on a tour there, but also because ROIC representatives had come
to their department to provide collaborative training:
I think we are pretty well informed…. We use their crimetrack and mapping, say we are going to
do a search warrant. We’ll pull the address up and with that capability through the ROIC and the
computer we can map out the safest way for the officers to go in through what they have to give us.
We are pretty familiar with it. When we first got started, we made a trip down there and they went
over everything with us and there were also a couple of occasions, whenever they brought in a
new system or a new opportunity online, they have always been good about sending people up
here for a day of hands on training or whatever to get used to the system. That has been a big help.
Because they do that, there is no reason not to use it because they have always been willing to
come up and make us familiar with it.
Any outside agency that can offer [help], if it’s free, I don’t see a reason for any department not to
jump on something like that. So I think the more training and the more outreach and the more
examples they can present to these agencies that aren’t using them to show them how quick and
how efficient information can fly back and forth. Specific examples like that if you can throw that
out to an agency that is having a problem like that, show them how that problem doesn’t exist
anymore because you have somebody at the ROIC, I think examples like that would certainly
bring those departments that are a little hesitant bring them on board a little quicker.

As the sergeant mentioned, budget cuts have burdened and limited many police
departments. Demonstrating how collaboration with the ROIC can lead to a successful
relationship might result in mutual benefits for these departments. A very progressive
detective in one department, who had used some of the ROIC’s capabilities to apprehend
a burglar, used a ROIC analysis to convince his department to become an ILP agency:
Six months ago I said, well let’s send all this intel to the ROIC to develop a geospatial map of
where the burglaries are occurring and maybe they can give us an idea of where the next one
occurs. They did it, we acted on it and we had the guy in 5 days. I said look what they did, look
what they are capable of. It’s amazing. I don’t understand how it all works. They are all very smart
people that sit in a room with a lot of MAs and PhDs. They were very impressed by that so we are
taking baby steps.

A sergeant who filtered information from the ROIC to his patrol offered an
additional suggestion. He said he often used many of the officer-safety portions in the
COP to inform police officers of possible dangers. Two of his police officers had been
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hurt while responding to a call involving an attempted suicide, who had used a solution
made from a household detergent. The story was published in the local newspaper. The
sergeant realized, in retrospect, that this information would be good for other police
officers to know, but he did not think to tell the ROIC about this when it happened.
Shortly after, he received a phone call from the ROIC, which he perceived as a good way
to increase communication between his department and the fusion center. He suggested
that the ROIC make these calls more often in regard to other incidents across New Jersey:
I don’t know if the ROIC has someone that looks through newspapers but if they see something
they might be interested in, it would be good for them to call. That’s what happened…. I don’t
think about what I can do for the ROIC. If they had somebody like an outreach officer making the
phone calls that would be pretty easy.

Discussion
After conducting an ethnographic study at the ROIC over the course of a year and
a half, I became very familiar with its mission of providing information and services to
local police agencies to help them incorporate ILP and thus better anticipate and target
crime. I also observed that concrete evidence of the utility of such information may be
difficult to see while at the ROIC. The research objective of my speaking with police
officers was to find out how and when they used the fusion center’s analytical capabilities.
The results of the interviews led to interesting suggestions that need to be addressed.
First, while communication is better among law enforcement agencies in general,
there are still breaks in information-sharing that detrimental to the process and its
effectiveness. As resources dwindle, it becomes more important to pool the remaining
resources and work together. The interviews pointed out a barrier between police
departments within and outside counties. As many of the officers noted, criminals do
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travel. Therefore, communication is extremely important so that departments can share
information and apprehend criminals.
Police officers in one region of New Jersey also see a barrier between themselves
and the other “half” of New Jersey. This perception, strongly held by the police officers I
interviewed, is extremely detrimental to the working relationships among the different
police agencies in New Jersey. It could result in a hesitation, or even reluctance, to work
with officers, not only in the other half of the state, but just 20 minutes away in another
county. In a state as small as New Jersey, with its small landmass of 8,700 square miles,
these sentiments do not facilitate information-sharing.
The ROIC can play a far more important role in remedying this situation by
becoming an agency that connects law-enforcement agents across county borders. If
executed appropriately,24 detectives’ meetings that extend past county borders can link
police officers to one another. The officers I interviewed who still attended these
meetings felt that communication was good with other departments because they felt
comfortable reaching out to their contacts. In addition, as many of the officers noted, a
personal contact is one of the best ways to gather information:
Also, being here so many years, one of the most important tools you have is a name. If you call a
department asking for information you might end up getting a civilian operator answering the
phone, you might get some almost retired guy who doesn’t care or you get a desk officer who is
too busy to help you at all and what you want is a name and a person that you can call directly on
the cell phone and have them actually point you in the right direction so that you have the info.
Personal contact is the best.

In fact, the ROIC has already recognized this need and has started an initiative
called the New Jersey Southern Intelligence Exchange, which often goes by its acronym,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
>@

!How to appropriately execute detectives’ meetings is beyond the scope of this study. However, as
pointed out by one police officer during his interview, these meetings should be brief and occur regularly at
the same time each month.!!
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NJSIX. NJSIX is a meeting of representatives from six different counties in the southern
half of the state. While still new, this initiative looks very promising and could become
the model for other such meetings.
Furthermore, if police officers do not know the name of a person at a particular
municipal, state, or federal department, they need to know that they can call the ROIC.
The ROIC analysts assigned to each of the regions of New Jersey have contacts in many
of the departments across the state. It is highly unlikely that officers now learn about the
center through word-of-mouth. Smaller and more rural police departments will likely
benefit the most.
The ROIC is not the only organization that needs to make more contact with
police departments. While I discovered no documented evidence, I suggest that
communication may disintegrate at the county level because of the lack of initiative by
county prosecutors’ offices or their failure to recognize their role in connecting law
enforcement agencies. According to New Jersey law, the county prosecutor is the chief
law-enforcement officer for the county. “As such, the Prosecutor has wide-ranging
authority over the law enforcement community in the county” (Bergen County
Prosecutor’s Office, n.d.). Thus, police departments work under the mandate of their
respective county prosecutor’s office and may not feel the need to work with other
departments outside their county. Some officers understand this and call the county
prosecutor’s office that oversees the department from which they may need information
rather than the department itself.
While this may save time for police officers, by limiting the number of phone
calls an officer needs to make, the system needs to be more robust. First, the 21 CTCs are
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not all fulfilling their collective role as the filter for counterterrorism information between
the police departments and the ROIC. Each CTC should be the most informed person in
the county, as he/she is able to gather information from both police departments and the
ROIC. If, however, police officers are not aware of their CTC, as evidenced by the
interviews, the CTCs are unable to gather information from the police officers, nor will
the officers know to send information to them.
Secondly, the CTCs are the gatherers and disseminators of counterterrorism
information. As pointed out by one of the managers at the ROIC, there is no filter for
other information or suspicious activity that is not overtly counterterrorism information.
The public outreach officer at the ROIC, who is heavily invested in understanding
and preventing gang crimes, told me during participant observation that he would like to
see the equivalent of a CTC for violent crimes—or a Violent Crimes Coordinator (VCC).
If a VCC can act as the liaison between the county police departments and the ROIC for
violent crimes, as the CTC is already mandated to do, police officers can make the VCC
their first point of contact for filtering this type of information to the ROIC. The officers
can also contact their local VCC to get in touch with other county VCCs and, thus, other
police departments.
The efficacy and ease in contacting the VCC about crimes that may extend to
other counties is contingent upon the communication among the 21 VCCs. This served as
the impetus for setting up monthly videoconference meeting among the CTCs. As found
with the detectives’ meetings, however, these meetings are not well-attended. When I
first began my observation at the ROIC, the average number of attendees was six. As a
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result, these meetings no longer take place. If the ROIC intends to institute a VCC, it first
needs to ensure better participation each month.
In addition to a more structured chain of communication, universal mandates need
to be used by all police departments regarding TRAK messages. These messages have
been identified as the one form of communication that many officers use to send a
message to many different police departments simultaneously. It is an invaluable
information-sharing tool that is not used to its full potential because its practice is
inconsistent from department to department. Larger police departments may not use it at
all, whereas smaller departments send out TRAKs for everything. Firm, universal
instructions on when to use these messages should be mandated for all departments so
that the communication will be more effective. The ROIC does not have the power to do
this. However, it may be able to mitigate this restriction by training municipal police
departments so police would understand the importance of sharing only information that
others might find useful.
Small departments in southern New Jersey need to be more familiar with ROIC’s
capabilities and how using the fusion center can benefit them, regardless of the type of
crime they experience. As evidenced by the interviews, police from smaller departments
do not use the ROIC, even though many have seen serious budget cuts. Police officers
were either unaware of the resources available or they did not feel their problems were of
sufficient magnitude to be handled by the ROIC. Officers from larger departments,
particularly those who have had a working relationship with the ROIC in one of its
initiatives, utilize the center’s resources and have attributed decreases in shooting hits to
their collaborative partnership. Small towns in southern New Jersey may not experience
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the amount of crime that those in the northern part of the state have, but their quality of
life is also negatively affected.25 The officers in southern New Jersey should also be
made aware of the resources available to them.
In addition to smaller departments, lower-ranking police officers should be
encouraged to use the ROIC’s resources or at least be made aware of the importance of
reporting suspicious activity to the fusion center. A lack of knowledge or a disinclination
to use the ROIC’s capabilities could have been due to the type of information that certain
ranks think is useful in their investigative roles. For instance, patrol officers respond to
911 calls and take accident reports. Detectives investigate crimes and carry out follow-up
on investigations. Both of these ranks seemingly have a limited need for many of the
ROIC’s capabilities, such as geo-spatial mapping or contacts with federal agencies.
Instead, it is often believed in policing that those in the higher ranks, including sergeants
and captains, might find a greater need for these tools in order to deploy patrol.
Despite this continuing mindset among many police officers, not all practitioners
agree with this assumption. Tom Nestel, a progressive Pennsylvania municipal police
chief who has worked for the Philadelphia Police Department for more than 20 years,
stated that “geo spatial mapping can be used to help forecast the location of crime and
thus assist patrol supervisors in making deployment decisions.” It can also help detectives
in identifying patterns and formulating suspects. He went on to explain:
the root of this kind of thinking is that management is responsible for deployment and long range
thinking but I would argue that the front line personnel should be taking that way instead of being

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25

I specify small towns in southern New Jersey because the evidence suggests that police departments,
regardless of size, are more prepared if they are proximal to a large city (Schafer, Buruss, & Giblin, 2009).
Many of the ROIC’s initiatives are partnerships with cities in the north. Therefore, many of the small cities
in the north may be more aware of resources available to them simply due to their proximity to the large
citiesT!!
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just 911 responders. Using tools to forecast and analyze data could potentially change the mindset
of responder minded personnel and help them become more strategic in their patrol plan.

It is crucial to make all levels of police enforcement aware of the tools available
at the ROIC to help target crime in New Jersey, particularly now when budget cuts are
forcing police departments to be more strategic with their resources.
Finally, I must discuss the results with reference to the hypothesis that only those
police from law-enforcement agencies that had found utility from the relationships with
the ROIC continued to share information with the ROIC. This supports Cooney et al.’s
(2011) finding that those who placed a high value on ILP were more likely to place a
high value on the fusion center. But I would add a condition. Police officials who have
benefited from the fusion center’s capabilities through past relationships, through either
personal or formal associations, will understand the value of ILP and thus rate the utility
of the fusion center higher than those who have not had these experiences.
Once law-enforcement personnel begin to understand the value of ILP and the
utility of the fusion center, they will be more likely to comprehend its significance and
realize the great extent to which information-sharing is an integral part of ILP. If the
center were to gather more targeted information from local police agencies, it could
synthesize and analyze the information and disseminate more targeted and accurate
products. Even though information-sharing is a part of ILP, it seems that local lawenforcement agencies must first understand the value of ILP before we begin to see real
strides.
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Conclusion
New Jersey’s ROIC has been recognized for its excellence at the National Fusion
Center Conference because it has been so innovative and has brought together so many
resources. However, law-enforcement agencies across the state need to know about these
resources so they can be utilized by more than just those who have personal contacts at
the center.
The ROIC’s initiatives have helped bring more publicity to the role of the fusion
center. It is now time to expand the reach to more than just urban-crime areas. The ROIC
needs to take on a greater role as the nexus of communication in New Jersey, ensuring
that all communication among the different counties will be more efficient. Even though
many police officers know that crimes often cross county boundaries, they do not
communicate effectively to pass on or request information from other police departments.
The ROIC needs to apply the lessons it is has learned from promoting informationsharing among different law enforcement agencies in its own physical space to promote
information-sharing among the police departments of New Jersey.
!
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Conclusion
Fusion centers no longer focus solely on terrorism-related crimes. In response to
the need for more coordination among all public safety agencies, they have become allcrimes or all-hazards centers. In other words, they have expanded their focus in order to
address the varied needs of local police departments. Although the need for ILP and
collaboration was evident long before 9/11, the events of that date forced everyone to
rethink how they conducted police investigations. As one astute police officer noted,
information needs to be shared, but this may take some time:
Gone are the days where we’re huddling around saying you can’t have it. Bad guys talk to each
other. Criminals share everything and why are we not sharing? That’s the way law enforcement
used to be. “‘This is mine. Stay away. Don’t come into my town. I am not going to tell you what’s
going on. I got the big case. I don’t want you making the arrest.’” That’s still a prevalent attitude.
Good luck breaking it. I think it’s going to take another generation to get through. Anyone who
has 30+ years generally is not going to be on board with this.

Even though all the attitudes about information-sharing cannot be changed
instantly, valuable lessons can be learned from the results of the case study of New Jersey
and the Regional Operations Intelligence Center that may help increase communication
across the United States regarding the use of fusion centers in both theoretical and
practical terms. How representative is the ROIC of other fusion centers? Many of them
were established before central planning for all the centers was completed. Thus, each
center was planned independently, and each continues to operate differently, as described
by the 2008 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress on fusion centers
(Rollins, 2008). Recent efforts, such as the Baseline Capabilities Assessment, have
attempted to streamline the efforts of the fusion centers to identify gaps in individual
centers. While each fusion center’s daily operation schedule may differ slightly from the
ROIC, this center can still be seen as representative of other centers because many of
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these recommendations focus on how to improve information-sharing—an issue that all
law enforcement faces today. Therefore, the implications and recommendations from this
case study can be made for all, or at least most, of the fusion centers presently in
operation.
First, the fusion center must create an open environment for information to flow
more freely among partners. If the center is unable to create this environment and employ
partners and managers who not only believe in the mission, but also are willing to work
with other agencies, the analysts cannot synthesize and analyze new information. The
environment should be a model for how the entire state collaborates. People should come
together in timely and well-planned meetings, instructional seminars, and other events
and feel comfortable enough to volunteer and share information they think can advance
the mission of public safety.
In fulfillment of their mission, fusion centers must talk to and be informed by the
decision-makers to whom the intelligence is targeted in order to learn what they want
from an intelligence product. From the case study, we know that police want to know
more about how international and national events and suspicious activities in their area
will affect how they police their cities. The intelligence products must also be targeted to
those who have the experience and knowledge to understand what information needs to
be filtered to patrol so the latter can recognize significant suspicious activity. Fusion
centers should implement a services-evaluation policy so they always receive feedback
on their products and learn more about what their customers want.
Finally, fusion centers need to take a greater lead in building communication
channels and informing police officers of the resources that can help them apprehend
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criminals faster. To keep pace with younger and more modern criminals who use social
media and technology to communicate, officers must also be familiar with all the
resources at their disposal to communicate with one another. While crime can never be
eradicated completely, it is up to the many public-safety agents to help decrease it as
much as possible. Because criminals know no boundaries, and it is essential for all the
enforcement agencies to share information. This is especially true when crime spills over
state lines. As one police officer noted,
It’s also getting worse out on the streets. Another thing we found is that we have a pipeline to
Pennsylvania. It has lots to do with the section 8 housing. They are taking the projects down in
[city]. Real Estate is a bust in places like Allentown so these people need money. The federal
government gives them a check every month so they bring their families down there and bring
their problems with them. I have a friend who is a cop in [city] with big money. Route 78 runs out
there; it’s a pipeline out to PA. He calls me one day. [It was] one of the guys on the hit list with
VEST. Our problems are spread out all over the place, out in Pennsylvania.

Despite this police officer’s warning of crime in New Jersey being connected to
crime in Pennsylvania, police agencies do not speak to other agencies across county lines,
much less outside their state. A police officer, whose jurisdiction sits on the New
Jersey/Pennsylvania state line, commented on how often police agencies across state
borders speak to one another: “Zero, zero. Absolutely zero … unless somebody is wanted,
that’s the only time we talk.”
My research on the information-sharing environment in New Jersey suggests that
information flows more freely among the informal community of trusted acquaintances
or colleagues. This community can be nurtured so that it is maintained, but among a
broader community of “safe” people. The definition of “others” with whom information
cannot be shared or trusted is thus reduced because the community has increased.
Just as the ROIC has increased communication among different agencies by
expanding the agency partners’ social networks with other agency partners at the center,
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local police officers must also increase their networks through increased interaction. This
interaction is critical because this is where information-sharing and, thus, meaning occur.
With more targeted information from their networks, officers can understand more about
their environment and recognize threats more easily.
Finally, and most importantly, information-sharing is not only a part of ILP. ILP
analysis helps to encourage information-sharing. Results from my study substantiate
Cooney, Rojek, and Kaminski’s (2011) suggestion for fusion centers to implement
strategies that encourage ILP in local law-enforcement agencies. This can be
accomplished by working with local law enforcement to demonstrate the value of the
center’s analysis work and by building relationships with local police so they are not only
knowledgeable of the center’s capabilities, but also feel comfortable calling the center for
help with a case.
This study is not without its limitations. Given unlimited resources, a study of
fusion centers could have taken a different approach. For example, a quantitative study
may be able to assess the quality of information-sharing in the 72 fusion centers and thus
assess each fusion center. I am grateful for the access I was granted to the New Jersey
ROIC. One limitation I could not address adequately concerns the use of information
from abroad. Neither the CIA nor the NSA are involved in any of the fusion-center work,
despite being two of the agencies shown to have held information that could have helped
piece together the threat facing the U.S. before 9/11. While fusion centers can gather
information from domestic agencies—including DHS and the FBI —about foreign threats,
some may argue that participation needs to involve all possible agencies. My lack of
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clearance to see classified information limited my ability to understand how fusion
centers have worked around this weakness.
Looking forward, future studies need to assess and suggest a solution for the
breaks in communication among police departments in different states, as well as those in
an individual state. Fusion centers have fulfilled the need for communication among
federal, state, and local agencies, as mandated by the 9/11 Commission. However, there
are still obstacles to an open exchange of information among all law-enforcement
agencies; and it seems that personal contacts have become the most effective method for
and the best promoter of information-sharing. Future studies should examine how best to
foster these personal relationships in the same way that fusion centers have built personal
relationships among federal, state, and local agencies. For now, it seems as though
making law-enforcement personnel knowledgeable about the analytical capabilities of the
fusion centers may be the best way to proceed. A study should thus see how training law
enforcement might affect their contact with their respective local centers.
While the rules that govern and restrict the roles of academia and law
enforcement are not always the same, this study has demonstrated that the common
ground that does exists can be beneficial to both institutions. A recent lecture based on
this study was presented at the ROIC. Not only was it well-received, but the decisionmakers confirmed the value of this ethnography to the ROIC itself.

It was even

suggested that perhaps some form of this information would benefit those who work at a
national level—e.g., DHS. This response also reinforces the value of and need for other
ethnographic research that could focus on anything from the smallest local police
departments to larger national agencies.
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The entrenched reluctance of some in the communication loop to share
information, a divisive sense of territorialism, and uncertainty about what is, in fact,
“‘useful’” information would provide fertile ground for interdisciplinary studies that
include criminology and, perhaps, psychology and theories of communication.

The

constant tug of civil liberties against the need for certain options and strategies to help
law enforcement in the United States also lends itself to further study.
In addition, future studies need to look at how crimes are thwarted and work
backwards to understand the role shared information played in apprehensions and how
that information was shared. Did it begin with a very aware police officer or citizen?
Alternatively, as in the case of 9/11, plots that are not uncovered also provide an
opportunity to learn. While it is hoped these cases are few and far between, cases such as
the underwear bomber should be examined to identify and understand the breaks in
communication. This type of study may require the skills of a fusion-center analyst, who
has the necessary clearance level to be privy to the classified information necessary for a
thorough understanding of the incident.
Results from this dissertation should also be used to understand the information
flow between local agencies and larger agencies. Knowing that the use of fusion centers
varies across police agencies based on knowledge of their capabilities and a personal
contact there, future studies could examine these characteristics on a larger scale to see
how contact compares across fusion centers using these characteristics as focal points. If
so, the method by which the more connected fusion centers develop contacts should be
examined so that best practices can be shared with other centers.
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Finally, this study and the few other empirical studies completed on fusion centers
(Joyal, 2010; Ratcliffe & Walden, 2010; Cooney et al., 2011) have worked from contact
lists given to them by the centers. This may have skewed many of the results regarding
the utility of the centers for each of the police officers or fusion center personnel
surveyed or interviewed. A more complete assessment of the utility of the centers would
begin, instead, with a list of all the police departments in the state for which the fusion
center could possibly assist, followed by an survey or interview of law enforcement
representatives who may or may not be on any of the fusion center distribution lists. The
interviews could disclose why some agencies or personnel have not been as eager to ask
for assistance from or share information with the fusion centers.
The importance of information-sharing and ILP cannot be overstated when one
realizes that the advent of the Internet has changed the landscape of criminal activity such
that even hardened criminals are scared of the new breed of criminals:
I interviewed a guy a couple weeks ago, big gang guy in the Bloods. He got arrested and I went
and interviewed him. 23 years old, street tough, no doubt about it. You could look at him and say
that he had no problem handling himself on the street. At the end of interview I asked him, “why
are you telling me this? What’s your motivation?” He told me, “I am afraid out there,” which kind
of took me back. Here’s this street thug. He’ll fight with anybody; if he has to shoot someone, he
will. He said he’s afraid. His fear is the 14-15-16-17 year old kids who just like pulling the trigger.
There’s no fear to them. It’s almost like they are playing a video game and they think there is
some kind of reset button.

!

There is no question that access to information, lawful and otherwise, becomes more
complex and critical on a daily basis. It is hoped that the fusion centers, enriched by ongoing academic research and internal evaluation and adjustments, will continue to play an
important role in protecting the United States in these astounding and harrowing times.
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Appendix A
New Jersey Municipalities by Population
Bigger Cities (6,000+ Residents)

Source: City-Data.com, can be found at http://www.city-data.com/city/New-Jersey3.html
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!

Smaller Cities, Towns and Villages (1,000-6,000 Residents)

!
!
!

Source: City-Data.com, can be found at http://www.city-data.com/city/New-Jersey3.html
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Very Small Towns and Villages (<1,000 Residents)

!

!
!
!
!
!
!

Source: City-Data.com, can be found at http://www.city-data.com/city/New-Jersey3.html!
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Appendix B
Survey of COP Recipients
(Page 1)
The following survey is a research study conducted with the agreement of the N.J.
ROIC. Participating is completely voluntary and surveys will be made anonymous. The
information gathered will be used to better understand what information is relevant to the
recipients of the COP sent by the N.J. ROIC Analysis Element.
1. Name (Optional)
2. E-mail (Optional)
3. Contact Phone Number (Optional)
4. Agency Name
5. Type of organization at which you work
•
•
•
•
•

Federal
State
Local
Tribal
Private Sector

6. Position within organization
•
•
•

Upper level management
Middle level management
Patrol

7. Would you characterize your department as urban, rural or neither?
•
•
•
•

Urban
Rural
State-level
Federal-level

8. What type of crimes is a priority in your department?
•
•
•
•
•
•

Violent crimes
Property crimes
Public nuisance crimes
Terrorism
White collar crimes
Other (please specify)
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(Page 2)
1. How are ROIC products received in your respective department?
•
•
•
•
•

By dispatch
By chief
Each bureau head
By personal/work e-mail
Other (please specify)

2. How is the information made available to frontline personnel or those with
everyday contact with the public?
•
•
•
•
•

By e-mail
Posting the COP in a public area
In a meeting of officers
It is not made available
Other (please specify)

3. On average, how often do you read the COP attachment?
•
•
•
•
•
•

Every day
Every other day
1-2/week
1/month
Never
Other (please specify)

4. When was the last time you read the COP attachment closely?
•
•
•
•
•

Yesterday
A few days ago
Last week
Last month
Cannot remember

5. What was it about?
6. Why did you read it closely?
7. Do you regularly forward the COP e-mail to anyone?
•
•

Yes
No
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(Page 3)
1. To how many people do you forward it?
•
•
•
•
•

0
1-5
5-10
10-50
50+

2. On a scale of 1-10, 1 being not valuable at all and 10 being extremely valuable,
how valuable is the information in the COP?
3. How is the information in the COP used?
!

•
•
•
•
•

Senior officials use the COP to direct those on the ground.
Middle management decides how to use the information.
All people on the ground are made aware of information in the COP.
The information in the COP is of no use.
Other (please specify)

4. What type of bulletin would be most useful?
•
•
•
•
•
•

Daily
Weekly
Biweekly (Every two weeks)
Monthly
When a significant event occurs
Other (please specify)
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(Page 4)
1.

Are you and/or your department units familiar with all the
resources/capabilities available to assist public safety efforts at the NJ ROIC?
•
•

Yes
No

2. Have you found any of the other intelligence products distributed by the ROIC
useful? i.e. POP reports, incident assessments, etc.
•
•

Yes
No

3. Does your department know "where to go" with a request for NJ ROIC
assistance (contact information, ROIC internal structure)?
•
•

Yes
No

4. What type of information should be included in the COP in order to make it
more useful?
5. Additional comments
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Appendix C
Interview Questions
1. Tell me about your job and your department/agency.
• For what agency do you work? What position do you hold?
• How long have you held this position?
• What training/schooling did you have? What intelligence gathering training have
you had?
• What other positions in this department/agency have you held?
• Other positions elsewhere within law enforcement?
• Outside of law enforcement?
2. How would you describe the area of your patrol?
•
•
•
•

Urban, suburban, rural? Influx of people?
Violent/property crimes?
Crimes the department is most concerned with?
Possible targets of terrorism? Train stations, airports, military bases, etc.

3. Tell me about a typical day.
• Where would intelligence fit into this day?
• Do you do this at the beginning?
4. Tell me about your intelligence sources, i.e. closed networks like LEO or open
sources like CNN.
• Do you receive information from the COP that you otherwise would not have
received?
• Do you receive any other regular e-mails telling you about the latest intelligence?
5. How did you come to hear about the ROIC?
• The COP bulletin?
• Do you know of any of the ROIC capabilities or have you ever used them? Geospatial mapping, gun trace, etc.
• Have you ever communicated with the ROIC or reported anything to them?
6. Tell me about the types of headlines in the COP that might catch your attention.
• Why do they catch your attention?
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• Tell me how you determine if information is important enough to read and pass
along.
• Have you ever actively used information in the COP in an investigation?
7.

Tell me what you would do if a pattern of crime emerged in your area of patrol and
you suspected it might be happening in other areas outside of your patrol.
• Would you ever pass this information to the ROIC?

8. How is communication generally among police agencies?
•
•
•
•
•

Communication with agencies inside the county?
Communication with agencies outside of county?
How would you contact another agency?
Have you ever used the CTC for information or to give information?
What kinds of information or intelligence would be important enough to share
with another department inside the county? Outside the county?
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Appendix D
Abbreviated Example of a COP Bulletin
Significant Activity (24 hours)
New Jersey
(U//LES) NJ ROIC Counterterrorism Watch recently received reports of
suspicious activity (For more information, please contact the NJ ROIC Analysis
Element.)
! Date, County: Identified subject reportedly storing large amounts of fertilizer,
shooting powerful homemade fireworks
! Date, County: Unidentified male photographing military contractorʼs facility
National Activity
! Two New Jersey men, accused of conspiring to kill, maim, and kidnap people
outside the U.S. by joining a Somali terrorist group, are negotiating guilty pleas
that would avert a trial, court records show.26
International Activity
! The Taliban have warned of a possible terrorist attack against the Netherlands
in the wake of the governmentʼs decision to form a minority government backed
by anti-Islam politician Geert Wilders.…27
Current Threat
“White Powder” Threat Letters at Schools in Houston, Texas, and Washington
D.C.
(U//LES) Since date, unknown suspect(s) have mailed 18 threatening letters that
include a powdery substance to schools in Houston, Texas, and Washington,
D.C.
Tactics Techniques, & Procedures
Rail Line Attacks Worldwide
(U//FOUO) The U.S. Transportation Security Administration has no specific
intelligence suggesting that violent transnational or domestic groups are planning
to conduct attacks along passenger and mass transit rail lines in the United
States, but the tactics, techniques, and procedures used overseas are easily
transferable here.28
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26

DHS Open Source Enterprise Daily Digest
Sify news, URL
28
U.S. Transportation Security Administration, “Rail Line Attacks: Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures
Assessment,” !
27
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Appendix E
Glossary
ACLU
AE
ATF
BOLO
CJIS
CTC
DHS
DOH
DOJ
EOC
FAMS
FEMA
FBI
HIDTA
IACP
ICE/HIS
IED
ILP
MAGLOCLEN
MOU
NCIC
NOC
NJ OHSP/OHSP
NJSIX
PSI
RISS
NJ ROIC
SAR
SCI
SCIF
TRAK
TTP
VCC
VEST

American Civil Liberties Union
Analysis Element
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
Be on the look out-wanted pictures of people
Criminal Justice Information System
County Terrorism Coordinator
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Health
Department of Justice
Emergency Operations Center
Federal Air Marshall Service
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Bureau of Intelligence
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
International Association of the Chiefs of Police
Immigration and Customs Enforcement/Homeland Security
Investigations
Improvised Explosive Device
Intelligence-led Policing
Mid Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement
Network
Memorandum of Understanding
National Crime Information Center
National Operations Center
New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Protection
New Jersey Southern Intelligence Exchange
Person of Strategic Interest Package
Regional Information Sharing Systems
New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center
Suspicious Activity Report
Sensitive Compartmentalized Information
Sensitive Compartmentalized Information Facility
Technology to Recover Abducted Kids
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
Violent Crimes Coordinator
Violent Enterprise Source Targeting
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